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Abstract
Evans' (e.g., 2006) heuristic-analytic theory of the selection task proposes that card
selections are triggered by relevance-determining heuristics, with analytic processing
serving merely to rationalise heuristically-cued decisions. Evans (1996) provided
evidence for the theory by setting up an inspection-time paradigm. He used computer-
presented selection tasks and instructions for participants to indicate (with a mouse-
pointer) cards under consideration. The theory predicts that longer inspection times
should be associated with selected cards (which are subjected to rationalisation) than
with rejected cards. Evans found support for this idea. Roberts (1998b) however,
argued that mouse-pointing gives rise to artefactual support for Evans' predictions
because of biases associated with the task format and the use of mouse pointing. In
the present thesis all sources of artefact were eradicated by combining careful task
constructions with eye-movement tracking to measure directly on-line attentional
processing. Across a series of experiments good evidence was produced for the
robustness of the inspection-time effect, supporting the predictions of the heuristic-
analytic account. It was notable, however, that the magnitude of the inspection-time
effect was always small. A further experiment separated the presentation of rules from
associated cards to avoid possible dilution of the inspection-time effect arising from
parallel rule and card presentation. However, the observed inspection time effect
remained small. A series of experiments utilising think-aloud methods were then
employed to test further the predictions concerning relevance effects and
rationalisation processes in the selection task. Predictions in relation to these
experiments were that selected cards should be associated with more references to
both their facing and their hidden sides than rejected cards, which are not subjected to
analytic rationalisation. Support was found for all heuristic-analytic predictions, even
.,' .
where 'select/don't select' decisions were enforced for all cards. These experiments
also clarify the role played by secondary heuristics in cueing the consideration of
hidden card values during rationalisation. It is suggested that whilst Oaksford and
Chater's (e.g., 2003) information gain theory can provide a compelling account of our
protocol findings, Evans' heuristic-analytic theory provides the best account of the
full findings of the thesis. The mental models theory (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne,
2002) fares less well as an explanation of the full dataset.
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Chapter 1
The Psychology of Conditional Reasoning
1.1 Chapter Outline
This chapter provides an introduction to the psychological study of human reasoning,
with a particular emphasis on issues relating to people's cognitive processes when
reasoning about conditional statements of the form 'if ... then'. Indeed, this thesis is
primarily concerned with people's reasoning performance in relation to one specific
conditional reasoning paradigm: the abstract version the famous four card selection
task introduced by Peter Wason (1966). This task is described in detail below, but
suffice it to say for now that it is based around an abstract indicative conditional rule
and aims to assess people's hypothesis testing behaviour in relation to this rule. The
task remains intriguing for two main reasons: first, most people get the problem
wrong according to the logical standards of conditional inference; second, it has been
devilishly hard to figure out why the logically incorrect responses that are made tend
to be highly systematic. The present thesis will, therefore, continue a long line of
important research in its attempt to further an understanding of these issues. Indeed,
the whole thesis is predicated on the belief that we need to progress our theoretical
accounts of the selection task before we can then determine what the selection task
may be able to tell us about how people interpret and think about condition~l rule-
forms. Because the present thesis focuses on the selection task the present chapter will
provide some particularly in-depth coverage of empirical findings and theoretical
perspectives that surround the task.
This introductory chapter will be structured around the following key themes: (1) the
importance of reasoning in everyday life; (2) the nature of deductive reasoning,
conditional reasoning and propositional logic; (3) basic issues in the study of
conditional reasoning, including the link between conditional reasoning and the
rationality debate; and (4) the Wason selection task, its associated phenomena, and
theories that have been proposed to explain these phenomena.
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1.2 The Importance of Reasoning in Everyday Cognition
The ability to make inferences that go beyond given information is commonly viewed
as being fundamental to human intelligence (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991;
Oakhill & Garnham, 1994; Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993). Deriving inferences is,
itself, a core element of the reasoning and decision-making that makes humans so
different to other animals (cf. Stanovich, 1999; 2004). We use reasoning to learn
concepts and principles and to generalise what we have learnt from one situation to
another (e.g., Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett & Thagard, 1986). Without reasoning we
would not be able to understand utterances in language (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1995)
or engage in everyday problem solving (e.g., Holyoak & Thagrad, 1995). Intriguingly,
much reasoning seems to take place automatically and without conscious awareness.
For example, without realising the complex processing that is taking place, we are
able to talk to people and understand what they are saying, we are able to attend to
problems and draw on relevant information from our memory to try to solve them,
and we can engage in sophisticated planning so as to imagine the shape and i~~gr
future events - both in the short-term and the long-term.
However, our reasoning abilities, whilst often effective in many practical contexts, are
not infallible, and we do make mistakes. We might solve a problem, generate a
forecast of the future and plan a course of action all based on a faulty judgement in the
first place, and mistakes like this can be costly and may be also be dangerous. Some
examples of this in recent history include: (1) the case of the scientists who judged
that the Chernobyl nuclear reactor was safe during a routine test, when, in fact, a
danger state was imminent (26th April 1986, Medvedev, 1991) and (2) the pilot who
turned off the wrong engine to isolate an engine fire that led to a passenger aircraft
crashing near the village of Kegworth in Derbyshire (8th January 1989; Trimble,
1990). In business situations, too, a wrong decision may mean putting a company out
of business, whilst in medical research it might mean inaccurate claims about a drug.
It is important to note, though, that a bad outcome does not necessarily mean poor
thinking, as there may be a lack of information available to the reasoner at the time. In
the same way, a good outcome may not necessarily reflect sound reasoning (as we
12
will see later, it might be that a decision produces a response that coincides with the
logically correct choice). The significance of all these points, then, is that they
demonstrate how vitally important it is to study human reasoning in order to
understand the nature of systematic errors (or biases) that influence the inferences that
people draw. It is only by deriving a clear understanding of the nature and causes of
such biases that an attempt can be made to reduce their impact through education,
training or other remedial approaches (cf. Baron, 2000; Evans, 1989; Stanovich,
2004).
1.3 Deductive Inference, Conditional Reasoning and Propositional Logic
There are a number of different types of inference that are commonly discussed in the
reasoning literature, and a particularly common distinction is between an inductive
inference and a deductive inference (though see C.S. Pierce [Weiner, 1958] for an
intriguing discussion of so-called abductive inference, which is aimed at finding the
best explanation for surprising or anomalous observations). An inductive inference is
one that generalises from specific everyday experiences toward encompassing rules or
laws that capture observed regularities (e.g., that all metals expand when they are
heated). An inductive inference adds information and involves reasoning that
progresses from the specific to the general. An inductive inference, therefore is not
necessarily true and may well be falsified by a future observation (e.g., the
identification of a metal that fails to expand when it is heated).
A deductive inference, on the other hand, is one where the conclusion that is drawn
necessarily follows from the information given (i.e., it is not possible for the given
information to be represented in a way that would render the conclusion false). No
new information is added in a deductive inference, that is, reasoning occurs from the
general to the specific. Although an inductive inference is not logically sound, both
types of inference are important in our everyday thinking about the world. However, it
-, : ,. .~..: '_'. \
is deductive inference that is the focus of interest in the present thesis. In the past,
research into deductive reasoning has been dominated by so-called normative theories
that determine whether inferences are correct or incorrect according to formal
standards of effective thinking. In the case of deductive reasoning, the normative
13
theory that embodies a priori criteria for determining the validity of inferences is that
of logic. Most of the work on deductive reasoning involves the normative framework
afforded by propositional logic - especially in the case of conditional reasoning,
which forms the focus of this thesis.
When conditional reasoning tasks are used in experiments, correct or incorrect
answers are categorised by the logical axioms of the propositional calculus (e.g., see
Hodges, 1993). Propositional calculus uses the terms p and q to express the atomic
propositions that make up a statement, and the logical operator' if. ....then' to relate
the atomic propositions together (see Evans, 1982). As such, statements taking the
basic form 'if p then q' are traditionally how conditionals have been studied inthe
psychological laboratory. Propositional calculus also involves a number of operators
in addition to if....then, such as not, and, or and, less commonly, if and only if.
According to propositional calculus, a proposition can only be assigned one of two
logical values: 'true' or 'false'. There can be no in-between values - and therefore no
uncertainty about the truth status of a propositional term.
In order to work out the relation between a logical operator and associated
propositions a syntactic formalism referred to as 'truth table analysis' can be used (see
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). Truth table analysis enables a decision to be made as
to whether a statement involving propositional terms and one or more logical
. 't"
operators is valid or invalid. When we have two propositions, p and q, these can each
be either true or false, and when combined together there are four possible states of
affairs, as depicted in the following truth table:
p q
T T
T F
F T
F F
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From this truth table it can be seen that both p and q can be true, p can be true when q
is false, p can be false when q is true, and, finally, both p and q can be false. If we
now consider a real-world conditional of the form ifp then q, such as 'if the switch is
pressed the kettle boils' (where p = the switch is pressed and q = the kettle boils) we
can establish the following truth table for the conditional:
conditional
p q ifp then q
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
,
First, if both p and q are true then if p then q is true. If we know that the switch is
pressed and that the kettle boils, then we can be sure that 'If the switch is pressed then
the kettle boils'. However, if p is true and q is false (the switch is pressed and the
kettle does not boil) then the assertion if p then q, 'If the switch is pressed then the
kettle boils', is false. Moving on to the next two instances, if p is false and q is true
(although the switch is not pressed the kettle still boils) then the statement 'If the
switch is pressed then the kettle boils' is true. In this case we do not actually know
whether the statement is true or not, or we are not happy saying so, but according to
logic it has to be either true or false. The assertion has to remain true because there are
no grounds for it to be false - something else could have caused the kettle to boil such
as putting it on the hob. Therefore the assertion has to be true. Also, when both p and
. " '. L'
q are false (the switch is not pressed and the kettle does not boil) the assertion is also
true according to propositional logic.
There are four inferences associated with conditionals: Modus Ponens (MP), Modus
Tollens (MT), Denial of the Antecedent (DA) and Affirmation of the Consequent
(AC). When we consider these inferences in terms of a truth table for a conditional
inference we can see that only MT and MP are valid inferences, whereas DA and AC
are invalid inferences, otherwise known asfallacious inferences. For example with the
15
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conditional 'if the switch is pressed then the kettle boils' (ifp then q) and we are told
that the switch is pressed (p is true), then the correct conclusion is 'the kettle boils' as
there is only one line in the table wherep is true and where ifp then q is true (q is also
true). The inference is therefore valid. The same can be said for the MT inference. If
we are given the conditional 'if the switch is pressed then the kettle boils' and then
told that 'the kettle does not boil' then we can only infer from the truth table thatp is
also false, Le. 'the switch is not pressed'. Therefore the inference is also valid.
The other two inferences are more difficult. In terms of the AC inference if we are
given the statement 'if the switch is pressed then the kettle boils' (ifp then q) and are
told that 'the kettle boils' (q is true), then when we consider this in terms of the truth
table we notice that there are two lines that fit this situation and in one case p is true
and in the other p is false. Because we have no clear answer in terms of logic itmeans
that we cannot conclude anything from this statement, therefore the inference is
invalid. The same can be said for the fourth inference, DA. Given the statement 'if the
switch is pressed then the kettle boils' (ifp then q) and 'the switch is not pressed' (p is
false), we note again that there aretwo lines in the truth table where ifp then q is true
and p is false. We now have the same situation as we had with q in the AC inference
where in one line q is false and one line q is true. No conclusion can be drawn and so
the DA inference is invalid.
Experiments on conditional reasoning may involve the presentation of truth table
cases and the requirement for participants to judge whether the presented case
corroborates the given rule or contradicts it (in some experiments an 'irrelevant'
response is also permitted so that people can register their belief that the case has no
bearing on the given conditional). An alternative to this 'truth-table evaluation task' is
the 'truth-table construction task', where participants are requested to generate
confirming or falsifying instances for the given conditional (see Evans, 1998b, for';~
review of key phenomena associated with truth-table construction and evaluation
tasks). An alternative approach to examining conditional reasoning is for the MP, MT,
AC and DA arguments outlined above to be presented to participants with a
requirement for them to make a validity judgement (see Evans et aI., 1993, and Evans,
16
1998b, for reviews). This 'conditional-inference paradigm' may either involve
presenting the participant with a choice of conclusion and asking them to choose the
valid statement from the list of possible conclusions (an evaluation task), or it may be
done by asking them to produce their own conclusion (a generation task).
Yet another approach to exammmg conditional reasonmg involves presenting
participants with a reasoning task that requires them to understand logical
relationships by asking them to consider and evaluate alternative hypotheses. One
famous example of this is the four-card selection task of Peter Wason (1966), which is
,
the task that is the focus of the research presented in this thesis. We tum to a detailed
overview of the selection task and its many variants in Section 1.5 below, after first
considering some of the basic issues to have emerged in the study of conditional
reasomng.
1.4 Key Issues in the Study of Conditional Reasoning
Traditionally, reasoning researchers have often been preoccupied with how accurate
participants' inferences are according to the normative standard of formal logic.
Studies that have examined this issue have tried to determine when errors are made,
and whether errors are random or systematically biased by features of the task. Errors
have been interesting to researchers because it is thought that if we can discover,~~
conditions under which errors are produced then we can learn something about
underlying cognitive processes. Debate in the reasoning literature has tended to focus
on how biases come about, and whether they derive from a rational attempt to reason
or from some other source. These alternative views of biased reasoning can be
illustrated if we look at the case of Modus Tollens conditional inference introduced
earlier. Ifwe consider the statements:
If it is a square then it is orange
It is green
It logically follows that it is not a square. If it were a square then it would ha~e to b~'
orange. Although a majority of people appear to make this valid Modus Tollens
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inference it is often reported that a substantial minority of participants say that no
conclusion can be drawn (see for example Evans, 1977, where 75% of participants
drew the inference). The interest then is why some people readily draw this valid
inference whilst others do not. The situation can be complicated further by adding a
negative in the first (major) premise, for example if we say:
If it is not a square then it is orange
It is green
In this case we can still make the Modus Tollens inference but it leads to a different
conclusion, that it is a square because if it were not it would have to be orange. Evans
(1977) showed, however, that this change in the major premise leads to a huge change
in participants' responding so that now only 12% of participants draw the Modus
Tollens inference. The presence of the negative can be described as a biasingf~~t~~,'
and it is therefore clear that to understand inferences in reasoning it is not just a case
of understanding whether people can draw an inference, it is also critical to determine
when they fail to do so and under what circumstances.
The above statements are examples of an abstract reasoning problem, that do not have
any connection with prior knowledge. If we start to add real world content (or
'thematic' content) to a reasoning task then things start to get even more complicated.
Although many experiments have asked participants to ignore their prior knowledge
or beliefs in reasoning, these experiments have shown that people find this incredibly
hard to do (Evans et aI., 1993). Ifwe look at the statement: .,.:,
If it is a square then it is orange
It is a triangle
according to logic we can not infer anything about the colour of this shape. Drawing
the conclusion that it is not orange is committing the denial of the antecedent fallacy.
As Evans (1977) has shown, with the basic kind of conditional statement depicted
above (i.e., affirmative and abstract), simply adding a negation to a term can strongly
18
affect people's responding. Interestingly, however, when we add thematic content to a
statement like this, the effect of the negative disappears. It is now context that plays a
critical role. Ellis (1991, Experiment 5) for example, embedded problems in short
scenarios such as:
If the truck is heavier than the legal limit, then the alarm bell will ring.
The truck is under the legal limit
and found that most of the participants drew the denial of the antecedent fallacy by
inferring that the alarm bell would not ring. When the materials used arbitrary
universal claims however, such as:
If the student is doing Economics, then he is a socialist
they only drew the inference around 50% of the time. So it seems that pragmatic
factors that involve prior knowledge have a big effect on the way we reason.
Evans (1991) proposes that research into reasoning has been motivated by three
separate but interconnected issues. He calls these the competence question (by what
mechanism can participants reason out the solution to logical problems?), the bias
question (what factors cause systematic errors and biases in reasoning and what do
such biases tell us about the nature of reasoning processes?), and the content question
(what features of the task content and context affect the ability of participants to
reason the solution to logical problems and what does this tell us about the nature of
the reasoning process?). We will come back to these issues later when we discuss
phenomena that occur on the selection task, but we pick up on how these issues play
out in relation to the so-called 'rationality debate'.
Experiments reported in the literature on human deductive reasoning with statements
such as conditionals have led to two main conclusions: (1) that observed competence
on reasoning tasks is often low as measured according to the 'gold standard' of
normative logic; and (2) that performance is often inconsistent across different
19
reasoning tasks and is susceptible to a range of experimental variables, such as those
associated with manipulations of problem content or associated context (Evans,
1989). These conclusions have been fundamental to the emergence of the 'rationality
debate', in that performance, according to logicality, has often been seen as an
indicator of rationality in reasoning. This inconsistent pattern of performance on
reasoning tasks contradicts what we know about human intelligence, that is, that
humans are generally seen to be rational and intelligent entities (e.g., Cohen, 1981).
Cohen (1981) in fact claims that experiments on deductive reasoning will never be
able to demonstrate human irrationality. He argues that how people perform on
laboratory-based reasoning tasks should not be confused with underlying competence
because these tasks are, by necessity, artificial and unrepresentative of real-world
problems. Indeed, it might even be the case that participants are reasoning according
to logics other than the propositional calculus. Since Cohen's (1981) influential paper
there have been a variety of criticisms directed at the reasoning and decision-making
literature about the external validity of the reported research. It has been suggested
that researchers have been too quick to generalise from laboratory studies to the real-
world. However, Evans and Over (1996) suggest a different way of conceptualising
rationality. They distinguish between rationalityI.where people act in a reliable way in
order to achieve their real-world goals, and rationality-, where people act for reasons
sanctionedby a normative theory. Within the reasoning literature, then, performance on
reasoning tasks can be seen to be irrational according to normative theory (failure to be
rationals),but still be rationalwith regards to achievingreal-world goals (rationali),
The distinction between rationalityI and rationality, is not just a way of defining and
thinking about rationality. Evans and Over (1996) go further and make an actual
psychological distinction between implicit and explicit systems of cognition that they
argue map onto these two types of rationality (for related dual-system views of
cognition see Reber, 1993; Stanovich, 1999, 2004; Sloman, 1996). For Evans and
Over (1996), the 'implicit' system involves the application of tacit knowledge and
. : . :', . , . >:"~'; l .'
procedures obtained through prior learning and experience. The 'explicit' system, in
contrast, is characterised as involving conscious thinking and embodies mechanisms
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whereby we model hypothetical states and consequences. Both the implicit and the
explicit system are constrained: the implicit system because of its reliance on learning
from past experiences; the explicit system because of its limited capacity that Is
bounded by working memory constraints. Rationality, then, is restricted generally -
and rationality- more so than rationalityj, because the explicit system relies on the
implicit system to pass relevant information on to it. Evans and Over (1996) therefore
propose that we do have the ability to be both rational! and rationalr Although we
sometimes use rationality- in everyday life, most of our routine decisions involve the
application of rationality..
The rationality, versus rationality- distinction affords a neat resolution to the
rationality debate, although it is not without its critics (see the accompanying replies
to Evans & Over's, 1996, proposals in the special issue of the journal. 'Current. "
Psychology of Cognition' in 1997). Indeed, in his more recent discussions of
reasoning processes, Evans (e.g., 2006) has essentially dropped any mention of the
rationality./rationality, distinction, instead simply invoking a 'dual processing' view
of cognition, which sits at a lower level of theoretical abstraction than an all-
encompassing dual-system framework. This affords the advantage of reducing the
amount of 'theoretical baggage' that comes along with the dual-system perspective,
thereby avoiding many of the challenges that can be lodged against the broader
scheme (see Evans, 2006). Evans' dual-process views of reasoning will be discussed
in more detail below in the context of his current heuristic-analytic dual-process
theory of reasoning (Evans, 2006) that incorporates 'three principles of hypothetical
thinking'.
Unlike Evans' (2006) move to a lower-level dual-process characterisation of
reasoning and issues relating to rationality, however, we note that other authors, most
notably Stanovich (2004), remain deeply wedded to a generalised dual-system
perspective as a way to account for conflicts between our evolutionary-older reptilian
minds whose primary goal is that of the replication of the species (cf. Dawkins, 1976;
1996) and our more modern capacities for self-reflective thought and autonomous
control over our biological programming (i.e., analytic rationality). According to
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Stanovich (1999, 2004), System 1 developed early in evolutionary prehistory and
forms the universal basis for all animal cognition. In this system, knowledge is
retrieved and applied rapidly and automatically and it is therefore described as
implicit and unconscious. It does not correlate with individual differences in working
memory capabilities or measured general intelligence (see also Stanovich & West,
2000) and appears to operate through associative neural networks. The processes
carried out in System 1 reflect high-level functioning of universal abilities such as
language comprehension. In contrast, System 2 is said to have evolved late and is
unique to human beings. Knowledge is retrieved much slower and sequentially and so
is described as explicit, conscious and analytic. It operates through working memory
and does correlate in its efficiency with measured general intelligence (Stanovich &
West, 2000). Processes carried out in this system reflect heritability of cognitive
capacity measured by IQ, which vary according to inherited genes.
1.5 The Wason Selection Task Phenomena
Having outlined some of the fundamental issues surrounding the study of conditional
reasoning-including those of deductive competence, bias and rationality-we now
turn our attention to the conditional reasoning paradigm, the Wason selection task,
that formed the focus of the empirical research that will be presented in this thesis.
We start off by overviewing the nature of the task and the way that it links with
concerns about people's understanding of conditional statements. We next examine
key phenomena that have been uncovered over the past 40 years of research that has
made use of the basic selection task as well as variants of it. Finally this section will
provide an in-depth critical discussion of the main theories that have been proposed to
account for people's performance on the task.
The selection task that was originally developed by Wason (1966) involved pres~nting
participants with four cards, derived from a larger pack of similar cards that each have
a letter on one side and a single-digit number on the other side. The four cards that are
presented onlyshow their facing value (see Figure 1), which in the present case are
'A', 'D', '3' and '7'. These values are often referred to as the p, not-p, q and not-q
cases for a rule of the form 'ifp then q '. Participants are then given a rule that they are
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told applies to the four cards, and their task is to decide which card(s) need to be
turned over to determine whether the rule is true or false. The rule is as follows: 'If
there is an A on one side of the card then there is a 3 on the other side of the card'.
p not-p q not-q
Rule: If there is an A on one side of the card, then there is a 3 on the other side of the card.
FIGURE 1.1
The standard abstract version of the Wason selection task
The logically correct response to this problem is to turn the A (P) and the 7 (not-q)
cards as these are the two cards that could potentially provide a letter-number
combination that could show the rule to be false. This can be seen more clearly if we
project the logical consequences of turning each card. The A card may have either a 3
on the back, which conforms to the rule, or another number which contradicts the rule,
therefore it has to be turned over. The D card does not have to be turned over as the
rule has no implication for a card with a D on it. The 3 card may have an A on the
back but if it does not the rule is not contradicted as there is no claim that there is an
A on the back of a 3. There is then, no need to turn this card. Lastly, the 7 card might
have an A on the back, and this would then be a case of an A with a number that is not
a 3. As this clearly contradicts the rule, the 7 card needs to be turned over.
Despite its apparent simplicity, studies have shown that fewer than 10% of people
make the logically correct choices A (P) and 7 (not-q), with the majority of people i
choosing either the A (P) and the 3 (q), or just the A card (see for example Wason,
23
1968, 1969; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1970). Indeed, two logical errors that persist on
the task are: (1) the selection of the q card; and (2) the failure to select the not-q card;
The wealth of literature on the selection task over the last four decades has, in the main,
come from researchers' attempts to explain these logical mistakes. This effort has, in
fact, led researchers in two quite different directions. One direction has involved
attempts to defme what features of the task make it so hard, and, leading on from that,
what task manipulations will make it easier. As a result, there is a body of empirical
research on a number of different task phenomena. These phenomena arise from: (1)
changing the form of the rule; (2) changing the content of the task; (3) changing the
context of the task, and (4) changing the task so that participants can envisage
alternatives explicitly. Key aspects of the empirical research addressing these
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phenomena will be considered next. The other direction that researchers have taken has
been to prioritise the formulation of theoretical explanations of the behaviour observed
on the task. This theoretical body of research will be dealt with later on in this section
after reviewing empirical findings concerning key selection-task phenomena. It is of
course, important to note here that the empirical phenomena have informed theory
development, and theories, likewise, have informed the range of empirical phenomena
that have been examined. This separation of empirical fmdings from the theoretical
issues is, therefore, at least in part aimed at managing the complexity of the vast
literature surrounding the selection task, though it remains that some researchers have
taken a more empirical stance on the task whilst others have been more concerned with
theory development. " r •
1.5.1 Changing the form of the rule
Wason (1966) originally suggested that people were showing some sort of confirmation
or verification bias on the abstract selection task, that is, they were trying to prove the
conditional rule true by choosing the p and q cards instead of trying to demonstrate the
potential falsity of the rule according to normative logic. However, subsequent research
by Evans and Lynch (1973), which introduced negations into the conditional rule,
showed that participants exhibit a systematic error known as matching bias whereby they
simply choose the cards that are named in the given rule. In order to understand
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matching bias, it is necessary to define the logical status of each of the four cards
because reference to card choices as p, not-p, q and not-q becomes ambiguous once
negations are introduced. The cards are therefore usually referred to as True Antecedent
(TA), False Antecedent (FA), True Consequent (TC) and the False Consequent (FC). On
the affirmative rule 'If p then s'. these defmitions relate to the p, not-p, q and not-q card
respectively. When using a negated conditional such as, 'Ifp then not q', however, the
negative consequent reverses the correspondence between the negation in the instance
and its logical status so that TC is now represented by not-q and FC by q (refer to Table
1.1 below to see this more clearly for the logical cases across all rules in the negations
paradigm).
Permuting negatives through the conditional rule allows the separation of confirmation
bias and matching bias. If confirmation bias was being exhibited then participants should
choose the TA card and the TC card every time regardless of the presence of negatives in
the rule. However, if they are matching they should make the p and q choices over the
not-p and not-q choices on each logical case, i.e. the cards mentioned in the ruie'. 'E~~
and Lynch indeed found that people matched consistently those cards that were
mentioned in the rule, despite the existence of negatives.
TABLE 1.1
Negations paradigm applied to the selection task showing matching antecedent cases (P)
and matching consequent cases (q) across all four rules
TA FA TC FC
/fp then q
If there is an A, then there is a 3 A(P) D (not-p) 3 (q) 7 (not-q)
/fp then not q --
If there is an A, then there is not a 3 A(P) D (not-p) 7 (not-q) 3 (q)
If not p then q
If there is not an A, then there is a 3 D (not-p) A(P) 3 (q) 7 (not-q)
If not p then not q
If there is not an A, then there is not a 3 D (not-p) A(P) 7 (not-q) 3 (q)
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Matching bias appears to be a robust phenomenon that arises across a variety of different
tasks. It has been demonstrated in selection tasks that use abstract rules with various
connectives, including: ifp then q, q ifp, p only if q and there is not both p and q (e.g.,
Evans, Clibbens, & Rood, 1996; Evans, Legrenzi, & Girotto, 1999). Furthermore,
Roberts (2002) has shown that matching occurs in conditional selection tasks using
categorical rules of the form all p have q. In addition to this, matching bias has been
observed on other types of task such as the truth table construction task, where people
are asked to construct instances that verify, falsify or are irrelevant to a given conditional
or categorical rule, and on the truth table evaluation task where they are asked to identify
instances that verify, falsify or are irrelevant to a given conditional or categorical rule
(e.g. Evans, 1998b; Evans et al., 1999).
However, it seems somewhat unclear as to whether matching bias can be extended to
rules such as disjunctions. Whilst some evidence from truth table tasks suggests such
generality (Evans et al., 1999; Evans & Newstead, 1980), evidence from disjunctive
selection tasks is extremely inconsistent. Van Duyne (1973, 1974) observed no effect of
matching bias on disjunctive rules. Evans et al., (1999) observed a weaker matching bias
effect compared with other connectives and Krauth and Berchtold-Neumann (1988)
found no matching bias effect with inclusive disjunctives but an effect with exclusive
disjunctives. A more recent study by Roberts (2002) that set out to investigate this
disparity revealed an inverted effect, so that there were fewer matching than
mismatching selections. The concept of matching bias and its underlying determinants
will be a constant theme within this chapter.
1.5.2 Changing the content of the task
Many reasoning tasks have been presented with abstract content with the idea that
reasoning with abstract content allows us to tap into some kind of 'pure' reasoning
ability. However, as Manktelow (1999) suggests, this assumption is problematic for
two reasons. First, reasoning with abstract materials has been shown to be subject to a
• .' " I, ~. ',,'
number of biases, for example, the matching bias that is observed on the selection task
as described above. Second, it may be that the form and content of the task cannot be
separated, so that how you think cannot be separated from what you think. This
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second point contributed to the shift in perspective to using the task content to explain
the task more fully. Indeed, research with the Wason selection task accounts for the
majority of empirical research that has examined content effects in reasoning tasks,
outside of the 'belief bias' effect with categorical syllogisms (e.g., Ball, Phillips, Wade,
& Quayle, 2006; Evans,Handley,& Harper, 2001;Morley,Evans,&Handley, 2004).
Within early selection-task research it seemed that altering the content of the task by
using realistic or thematic materials significantly improved people's performance.
Wason and Shapiro (1971) reported an early study exploring this 'thematic facilitation
effect'. The materials they used are now well known as the 'Towns and Transport'
problem. Participants were given the rule 'Every time I go to Manchester I travel by
car '. The cards that were shown each represented a journey made by the experimenter
with the destination on one side and the type of transport used to get there on the
other. The four cards were 'Manchester' (P), 'Leeds' (not-p), 'Car' (q) and 'Train'
(not-q). As in the abstract version of the task, participants were required to tum over
the card(s) in order to decide whether the experimenter's claim was true or false.
Wason and Shapiro found that significantly more people turned over the logically
correct answers Manchester (P) and train (not-q), compared with people who were
given the abstract version of the task.
Facilitation effects were also found on a task presented by Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi
and Legrenzi (1972) that came to be known as the 'Postal Rule' problem. In this
" ",: ..\.
thematic version of the selection task, participants were asked to imagine that they
were a postal worker testing the rule: 'If a letter is sealed then it has a 50 lire stamp
on it'. Participants were then shown a series of envelopes (rather than cards). The
envelopes were either lying face down so participants could see whether or not the
letter was sealed but could not see the value of the stamp on the front, or they were
lying face up so it was possible to tell what stamp was on the letter but not whether it
was sealed (see Figure 1.2). Most of the participants correctly selected the sealed
envelope (P) and the letter stamped less than 50 lire (not-q).
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FIGURE 1.2
Materials from the postal rule problem (Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, & Legrenzi, 1972)
Despite the apparent 'thematic facilitation effects' demonstrated in these pioneering
studies - as well as a few early replications of such facilitated conditional reasoning
with very similar tasks - the view that these experiments were revealing and enhanced
logicality purely as a function of realistic rule content, did not go unchallenged. For
example, Manktelow and Evans (1979) set out to determine whether or not the
matching bias established with the abstract task stood up to thematic content. They
used arbitrarily realistic rule content (e.g., 'If I eat haddock then I drink gin) and the
full negations paradigm (one of the few studies with thematic material to do so). A
control group was given the standard abstract task. The results deriving from their
'Food and Drinks' rules were surprising in that they failed to find the facilitation
effect found in previous studies. The matching bias effect, however, was present in
. .
both the experimental and the control groups. Manktelow and Evans then directly
replicated the Towns and Transport rule and again found no facilitation, instead
revealing a matching effect. They suggested that the facilitation found on the Postal
Rule by Johnson-Laird et al. (1972) was actually a memory effect because this rule
related directly to a real rule experienced by the participants that had been in force in
England prior to the 1972 study.
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Griggs and Cox (1982) attempted to clarify the issues surrounding thematic contents
in the selection task and named Manktelow and Evans' explanation as the 'memory-
cueing' hypothesis. In a series of experiments, they were eager to show that rules
using thematic content only facilitated correct selections when there was an
opportunity for participants to use 'prior experience' to help solve the problem. They
firstly replicated the Towns and Transport problem and, as predicted, found no
facilitation due to the arbitrary nature of the materials and the lack of any relation to a
'real' rule. Next, they repeated the Postal Rule problem. Griggs and Cox predicted
that this problem would produce no effects as their participants were from Florida and
would have no experience of the rule. Again, as predicted, they found no facilitation.
They then introduced a new problem known as the 'Drinking Age' rule problem. The
rule within this problem was based on an actual rule used in Florida at that time. The
four cards represented a person drinking in a bar with a type of drink on the other side
of the card. The cards used were: drinking beer (P), drinking coke (not-p), 22 years of
age (q) and 16 years of age (not-q). The rule used was: 'If a person is drinking beer
then that person must be over 19years of age'. The whole problem was set in context
with use of a short scenario that asked participants to imagine they were police
officers checking a bar to ensure that under-age people were not drinking alcohol. As
expected, very high facilitation effects were produced with most participants choosing
the beer drinker (P) and the person aged 16 years old (not-q).
Later studies attempted to find out exactly what caused the facilitation on this problem
and this resulted in variations in the context surrounding the violation-checking
scenario as well as the instructions accompanying the task. For example, Pollard and
Evans (1987) showed that the removal of the police officer scenario had detrimental
effects on performance, with participants performing at abstract task level. Evans,
Newstead, and Byrne (1993) suggested that memory-cueing can be used as the basis
of a general 'availability' theory of content effects. The suggestion is that specific
information and associations from memory influence the selections made in thematic
versions of the task. If facilitation is achieved it is due to correct responses being
made 'available' from prior experience and not necessarily down to a process of
logical reasoning. Some of these ideas (i.e., that certain information is 'relevant' in the
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task content) assisted the development of the heuristic-analytic theory by Evans (e.g.;
1984, 1989, 1998b; Evans & Over, 1996; 1997) which will be considered in a later
section below.
It soon became clear, however that the specific process of memory-cueing was not
able to explain all facilitation effects with thematic materials in the selection task.
Studies have shown that you do not have to be able to retrieve information from your
own experience in order to solve the task. For example, an experiment reported by
D'Andrade (presented by Rumelhart, 1980) gave a scenario where participants had to
imagine they were a manager in a Sears store where they had to check to see if sales
receipts complied with rules. The rule was 'If a purchase exceeds $30 then the receipt
must be approved by the departmental manager's signature'. The cards were
.... :
constructed so that they were receipts that showed the amount spent on one side and
the presence or absence of the manager's signature on the other side. Cards were $50
(P), $30 (not-p), a signed receipt (q) and an unsigned receipt (not-q). Most people
were able to solve this task correctly, selecting the receipt for over $30 (P) and the
unsigned receipt (not-q). However, very few people would have had direct experience
of the particular content of the task. This can also be seen in Johnson-Laird et al.'s
(1972) original study in that some of the British participants were given the postal rule
task that included Italian stamps (Le. they had not necessarily had experience of
posting letters in Italy).
<. ' ...... ,'_
At the end of the 1980s, then, it seemed far from clear what it was about certain tasks
that facilitated or did not facilitate performance on the selection task. However, as the
memory-cueing hypothesis lost favour, the enduring point was that facilitation might
be due to a more basic feature of the task, such as the understanding of social
regulations. The proposal, then, was that it may not matter so much whether reasoners
have had direct experience of a particular scenario for selection-task facilitation;
instead what is critically important is that reasoners have had experience of dealing
with rules and regulations in general, and therefore know what should happen when a
rule has been violated. It is this recognition by researchers that 'regulations' may be a
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key element of facilitated responding on thematic selection tasks that led to
subsequent work on 'deontic reasoning' that is described in the next section.
1.5.3 Changing the context of the task to a deontlc framework
Many of the thematic versions of the selection task discussed in the previous sectio~
involved the participant having to look for potential violations of the rule and not
having to determine the truth or falsity of a rule statement as in the abstract version of
the task. Since the late 1980s it has become increasingly apparent that there are, in
fact, two distinct types of selection task that have emerged over the course of its
history: the 'indicative' task and the 'deontic' task. The type is determined by the kind
of conditional that is used in the task as well as the surrounding instructional context
and scenario. Indicative tasks concern fact-based rules that may be true or false such
as 'If I go to work, then I travel by train'. Of course, the main example of the
indicative form of the task is the original abstract version; however, we can see from
the review of the studies in the previous section that there are some thematic tasks in
the literature that also take the indicative form (e.g., the Towns and Transportproblem
and the Food and Drink problem). In contrast to indicative selection tasks, deontic
versions of the task involve rules that are stated in order to direct people's behaviour
such as 'Ifyou travel by train then you must buy a ticket'. Because deontic rules have
a directive function (e.g., serving to encourage legal, moral, social, organisational or
prudential behaviours) they may be obeyed or disobeyed. Indeed, the violation-
checking scenario that typically contextualises such rules in selection task studies is
specifically geared towards tapping the occurrence of people disobeying the rule.
Such deontic rules along with violation-checking scenarios appear in both the Postal
Rule problem and the Drinking Age problem.
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Deontic rules were not explicitly tested in selection tasks until Cheng and Holyoak's
pioneering study in (1985) that was conducted to test their 'pragmatic reasoning
schemas' theory of facilitated selection-task performance. Instead of suggesting that
we have knowledge of particular rules based on prior experience, as the memory-
cueing hypothesis suggested, Cheng and Holyoak (1985) proposed that we have
knowledge about rules and regulations generally. Their theory advanced the idea that
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we all possess knowledge schemas (i.e., packages of knowledge regarding specific
domains like social regulations) and these' schemas provide rules for thought and
action. Importantly, Cheng and Holyoak argued that even without knowledge of a
particular deontic rule, it should still be possible to use scenario-based cues to evoke a
permission schema for an unfamiliar deontic rule, and thereby promote facilitated
selection-task performance.
Cheng and Holyoak gave participants the postal rule task (described earlier),
involving the rule 'If an envelope is sealed then it must have a 20 cent stamp on it',
and what they called the 'cholera task' involving the rule 'If a passenger's form says
ENTERING on one side then the other side must include cholera amongst the list of
diseases'. This problem contained the following scenario (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985;
pg 400):
"You are an immigration officer at the Intentional Airport in Manila, capital
of the Philippines. Among the documents you have to check is a sheet called
Form H. One side of this form indicates whether the passenger is entering
the country or in transit, while the other side of the form lists the names of
tropical diseases. You have to make sure that if the form says 'ENTERING'
on one side, then the other side includes cholera among the list of diseases.
Which of the following forms would you have to turn over to check?
Indicate only those that you need to check to be sure".
Participants then had four cards to choose from: one with 'Transit " one with
'Entering', one with 'Cholera, typhoid, hepatitis' and one with 'Typhoid, hepatitis ',
Participants received two versions of each task, one with no rationale (the standard
task) and one with a rationale. For the postal rule version the rationale was as follows
(Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; pg 400):
"The rationale for this regulation is to increase profit from personal mail,
which is nearly always sealed. Sealed letters are defined as personal and
must therefore carry more postage than unsealed letters".
32
In the cholera version instead of the form listing the tropical diseases, it listed
inoculations the passenger had had in the past six months and the rationale was
(Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; pg 401):
"This is to ensure that entering passengers are protected against the disease".
As well as presenting different rationales, Cheng and Holyoak (1985) also varied the
participants' prior experience with the rule. This was done by using different sets of
participants, one in America, who were not familiar with the postal rule, and one in
Hong Kong, who were familiar with the postal rule. It was expected that few of the
participants would have had experience of the cholera rule. Cheng and Holyoak
predicted (in line with their pragmatic reasoning schemas approach) that if the
rationale evokes a permission schema, then overall performance should be better in
the rationale than the no-rationale condition. The only no-rationale condition that
would do well would be the Chinese group on the postal rule as they had recent
experience of a similar rule. Performance in the conditions was exactly as predicted so
that rationales designed to evoke a permission schema facilitated performance on
tasks for which participants lacked specific experience.
Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) pragmatic reasoning schemas theory seems to provide
strong evidence that reasoning on the selection task improves under a deontic context.
Indeed, Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Oliver (1986) even went as far as to
demonstrate that people could do well on abstract rule forms such as 'if action A is to
be taken then precondition P must be satisfied' - but only when a pragmatic
reasoning schema was activated through appropriate instructional cueing. Despite the
compelling nature of the pragmatic reasoning schemas account, some evidence has
raised serious questions about its plausibility. For example, studies have shown that
some deontic rules simply do not facilitate good performance on selections tasks.
Consider the conditional 'ifsomeone stays overnight in the cabin then they must bring
a bundle of wood'. People reason well with this rule only when they are given
additional information to encourage them to think about the violating case, that is,
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someone who stays overnight and does not bring a bundle of wood (Gigerenzer &
Hug, 1992).
Another significant theory that attempted to explain facilitation on the deontic task
was put forward by Cosmides (1989). She proposed an evolutionary account that
suggested that facilitated performance on deontic selection tasks was due to the
operation of innate mechanisms, which she called 'Darwinian algorithms'. These
mechanisms are highly content-specific and are embodied within innate mental
modules. Cosmides argued that we have evolved these mechanisms in order to
maximise our ability to achieve our goals in social situations. She was particularly
interested in social exchange, where two people must co-operate for mutual benefit,
that is, where people make a social contract. This idea of social exchange can be seen
in the following rule: 'Ifyou take a benefit, thenyou pay the cost '.
Cosmides (1989) proposed that we have developed an innate module that deals with
cheater detection and that it has been crucial to do so from an evolutionary
perspective. A 'cheater' is someone who breaks a social contract rule: someone who
takes the benefit without paying the cost. Cosmides suggested that the facilitation
typically observed on deontic tasks occurs because the rules are embedded in these
social contracts and so we are able to detect 'cheaters', for example, someone who
does not use a high enough value of stamp, or someone who is not 18 years of age.
Cosmides (1989) claimed that a test of her theory would be to switch the social
exchange rule to: 'If you pay a cost, then you take a benefit'. On the normal social
exchange rule, when detecting a cheater, participants would chose the p and not-q
cards (also the logically correct cards). On the 'switched' social exchange rule,
however, participants would still be looking for the cheater but this would now
correspond to thenot-p and q cards (the reverse of the logically correct cards).
Cosmides' prediction was supported.
One key problem with Cosmides' theoretical position however, is that facilitation in
the selection task occurs for conditionals that are not social contracts, such as
precautions (e.g., Cheng & Holyoak, 1989; Girotto, Blaye, & Farioli, 1989; Hiraishi
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& Hasegawa, 2001; Manktelow & Over, 1991). Even children as young as nine years
of age seem to be able to reason very effectively about avoiding dangerous risks
(Girotto et al., 1989). Such findings have led Darwinian-algorithm theorists to add an
innate module for hazard management (see Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). As Byrne
(2005) points out, however, there are other kinds of deontic rule that seem distinct
from social contracts, costs and benefits, or hazard management, such as: 'ifwe are to
take care of the planet then we must plant more trees' or 'if you want spiritual
enlightenment then you must meditate ', Domain-specific accounts that are based on
Darwinian algorithms or pragmatic reasoning schemas may well just be far too
restricted in their scope of explanation (Byrne, 2005).
Even more damaging for these domain-specific views is recent evidence that not ,~ll
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social-contract conditionals will facilitate appropriate card selections (e.g., Liberman
& Klahr, 1996; Love & Kessler, 1995). As such, it does not seem to be the case that a
social-contract situation is sufficient to facilitate conditional reasoning. In addition to
social-contract rule-content, it seems crucial that participants are cued directly with an
explicit 'cheater-detection' framework (Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992). However, asking
people to check for cheaters - rather than to check whether a social contract has been
followed - seems to transform the selection task into a trivially straightforward
categorization task (see Sperber & Girotto, 2002, 2003). Thus, the 'check-for-
cheaters' instruction cues people simply to indicate which presented cards would be
an example of the category (i.e., cheater) that is predefined in terms of a specific
;'
combination of negative and positive traits. People tend to be readily capable of
identifying instances of a category when they know (or are told) its characteristic
traits (Sperber & Girotto, 2002) regardless of whether the category has evolutionary
significance (like a person who is a cheater) or not (like a glider).
1.5.4 Changes so that participants can envisage alternatives
Having had a brief foray into some of the main phenomena associated with
thematic-and specifically deontic-versions of the selection task, we now return in
this section to consider some key factors that appear to have marked effects on
35
people's success with the selection task when manipulated in the context of the
standard abstract and indicative form of the conditional rule.
One important task variant that was seen to have a profound facilitatory effect on card
selections was the so-called 'reduced array selection task' or RAST that was first
introduced by Johnson-Laird and Wason (1970). The RAST was specifically designed
to encourage participants to think only about consequent choices on the selection task,
with the idea that logical performance might be seen to increase. In the original
Johnson-Laird and Wason (1970) study, participants were asked to verify or falsify a
rule statement such as 'If they are triangles then they are black' that described the
contents of two boxes. In order to perform this task, participants were required to ask
for objects either from a box that contained only black figures or from a box that
contained only white figures. According to logic, they clearly need to search the white
box exhaustively and they do not need to look in the black box at all. All participants
eventually solved the problem and instructions that asked the participants to falsify
the rule promoted better performance than instructions that asked them to verify the
rule.
Subsequent research using the RAST (e.g., Wason & Green, 1984; Roth, 1979) has
provided strong evidence for facilitated logical responding using the standard
selection task but with the antecedent (p and not-p) choices absent, or even with the p
card replaced with another not-p card. Although these RAST manipulations increase
the selection of the not-q card, it has also been shown that when the standard four-
card task is presented immediately after the RAST there is no transfer of the
facilitation effect (Wason & Green, 1984).
Another way to manipulate the abstract, indicative selection task so as to facilitate
logical responding involves altering the wording of the associated instructions.
Yachanin and Tweney (1982) explored this factor in relation to abstract versus
thematic tasks in order to test the idea that the thematic-facilitation effect might have
something to do with the difference in the wording of the instructions on the thematic
task relative to the abstract one. They noted that abstract tasks typically use the 'true-
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false' instruction, for example requesting the participant to determine 'which card or
cards need to be turned over in order to decide whether the rule is true or false'.
Yachanin and Tweney argued that this instruction may be more challenging for
reasoners than asking them to decide whether or not the rule has been violated, as is
the typical instructional request with thematic versions of the task. On an abstract
version of the task Yachanin (1983, Experiment 1) did indeed find that performance
could be facilitated using a violation form of instruction, suggesting some support for
the hypothesis that a violation set may help cue the identification of falsifying cases.
1.6 Conditional Reasoning Theories as Applied to tire Selection Task
We have now seen that there is a vast wealth of research that has been conducted on
both abstract and thematic selection tasks over the 40 years since Wason's original
formulation of the standard indicative version of the four-card problem. In fact, the
previous review has been highly selective, aiming more to give a flavour of some of
the key studies and findings relating to the selection task rather than to provide a full
overview of the many hundreds of studies that have now been pursued using the
paradigm. As such, the review reflects only a relatively small proportion of the vast
amount of work that has been conducted with the selection task. Although we have
dealt with some important theoretical concepts-specifically the notions of pragmatic
reasoning schemas and Darwinian algorithms-we now progress toward a far more
in-depth consideration of theoretical issues in the present section.
The following review of conceptual issues will focus almost exclusively on theories
that have attempted to account for the pattern of performance observed on the
abstract, indicative selection task, as this task is the main focus of the present thesis.
As a reminder, participants make two specific errors on the affirmative 'ifp then q'
version of the abstract selection task: (1) they incorrectly select the q card, and (2)
they fail to select the not-q card. More generally, when using the full negations
paradigm with this task the evidence indicates a general tendency across all logical
cases for participants to select more matching cards (i.e., cards named in the
conditional rule) than mismatching ones.
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Over the last 20 years there have, in fact, been significant advances in explanations of
conditional reasoning with the abstract selection task, with three main accounts
tending to dominate theorising: (1) the mental models theory of Johnson-Laird and
Byrne (e.g., 1991, 2002); (2) the heuristic-analytic theory of Evans (e.g., Evans, 1984,
1996, 2006; Evans & Over, 1996); and (3) the information gain theory of Oaksford
and Chater (e.g., 1994, 1995, 200I, 2003). All of these theories are, in fact, aimed
more broadly at accounting for conditional reasoning beyond the selection task (and,
indeed, reasoning beyond the conditional rule form). For the purpose of the present
thesis, however, the primary focus will be on how these three theoretical accounts
have lent themselves to detailed explanations of response patterns that are observed
on the abstract selection task.
To facilitate this theoretical review, the following discussion will take each theory in
turn, and first present a summary of the overarching assumptions of the theory, before
then progressing to a critical discussion of how the theory may account for abstract
selection-task performance. The way in which each of these theories have been
applied to selection tasks involving content-based conditionals will mostly (though
'.. I
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not entirely) be left aside in an attempt to limit the scope of the review to the abstract
task that is so central to this thesis. This is despite the fact that each of these three
theories has been extended so as to afford detailed, domain-general accounts of
thematic selection tasks that avoid the pitfalls of the domain-specific models critiques
earlier (i.e., pragmatic reasoning schema theory and the Darwinian algorithm
account). For extensions of these theories to thematic selection tasks the reader is
referred to Byrne (2005) in the case of mental models theory, Evans and Over (1996)
for the Heuristic-Analytic theory, and Oaksford and Chater (1994) for the information
gain theory.
'.'
1.6.1 Mental models theory and the selection task
The early versions of the mental models theory that were proposed by Philip Johnson-
Laird (e.g., 1983)were particularly well-developed in relation to syllogistic reasoning.
The basic theory, however, has since been the subject of many revisions and
reformulations and has been extended to propositional, inductive and probabilistic
38
reasoning (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, 2002; Johnson-Laird, 1995, 2001;
Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, & Legrenzi, 1999) as well as counterfactual
thinking (e.g., Byrne, 2005). The theory proposes that the mind can be conceptualised
as embodying a set of procedures that are used to manipulate internal representation in
the form of 'mental models' (cf. Craik, 1943, and Wittgenstein, 1953, for important
forerunners of this idea). Mental models are analogue representations of how the
world would be if the premises of an argument were true. As such, the theory
proposes that reasoning is semantic in nature and, thereby, depends upon semantic
procedures for constructing and evaluating mental models.
As part of its procedural semantics the mental models theory encompasses three
reasoning stages (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). First, the reasoner has to interpret
and understand the presented information such as the premises of a syllogistic
argument. They do this by constructing models of the possible states of affairs
conveyed by the premises. The second stage is the description stage where the
reasoner has to combine the premises to obtain a description of the state of affairs that
they jointly represent. This description has to include something that the first model
did not represent, or was not previously explicit in a premise, for example, a putative
and semantically informative conclusion in the case of a syllogistic reasoning
problem. If the reasoner is unable to produce a description of this nature then no
conclusion is produced at this stage. If the reasoner can produce such a description
they move on to the third stage which is the validation process. This involves the
reasoner searching for alternative models that are consistent with the premises but
where the putative conclusion is false. If the reasoner finds these alternative models
then the conclusion is false and another conclusion needs to be searched for and
validated until there are none left. A conclusion is only valid if there are no alternative
models that falsify it.
The theory uses a formal notation to depict the mental representation of each premise
and the conclusion (e.g., see Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). This notation can be
demonstrated by examining at how the model theory accounts for the relative ease
with which people are known to draw the valid Modus Ponens inference in
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conditional reasoning compared with the relative difficulty that they have in drawing
the valid Modus Tollens inference (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). Consider the
following major premise:
If there is a circle then it is red
and the subsequent minor premise:
There is a circle
The notation associated with the theory would lead to the representation of the major
premise as follows:
[circle] red
Different models are represented on different lines with the square bracket formalism
indicating that circles are exhaustively represented with respect to red. This means
that circles cannot occur in any other model unless red also occurs in that model. The
three dots (ellipses) underneath this model denote the existence of implicit models
(i.e., further models of the rule that are possible but which have not yet been 'fleshed
out' and made explicit).
When given the additional information 'there is a circle' as a minor premise, it
follows that since 'circle' is exhaustively represented in the explicit model, then 'it
must be red'. The ease of deriving this inference from the minor premise corresponds
with the typically high rate of Modus Ponens inferences observed in the conditional
inference paradigm.
If we turn to the Modus Tollens problem, the major and minor premises would be as
follows:
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If there is a circle then it is red
It is not red
In this case no inference seems to follow immediately from the model of the major
premise:
[circle] red
This is because the case 'not-red' (i.e., =red where the symbol '..,' denotes negation) is
not explicitly represented. In order to draw the Modus Tollens inference, Johnson-
Laird and Byrne claim that the model needs to be fleshed out to represent all of the
true possibilities, which would require the reasoner to add extra models to their
mental representation as follows:
[circle] red
-'circle +red
-'circle red
The reasoner then has to grasp that the minor premise 'it is not red' rules out the first
and the third model, and because of this the conclusion follows that 'there is not a
circle'. The inference is made less often because not all reasoners will be successful at
pursuing the fleshing out of additional models.
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991, 2002) have also included an important psychological
constraint in the theory known as the 'principle of economy'. This suggests that due to
restricted working memory capacity reasoners will do as little work as possible, that
is, they will construct the minimum number of models with the minimum amount of
material represented explicitly. This explains why reasoners may fail to construct
counterexamples to current models or why they may be heavily influenced by the
effect of content because prior knowledge adds information to the models that are
constructed.
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So how does mental models theory deploy its core assumption to provide an account
of the response patterns observed for the standard abstract version of the selection
task? Let us start by examining the situation for an affirmative conditional rule such
as 'if there is an A on one side of the card then there is a 3 on the other side'. This
rule would be represented as:
[A] 3
The square brackets around the 'A' indicate that the A is represented exhaustively in
relation to the 3 (i.e., whenever an A occurs a 3 also occurs). The ellipses denote an
implicit model (i.e., that there are further models of the rule that are possible that have
0·,1 _,
not yet been made explicit). According to the principle of economy the reasoner'~ril
construct the minimum number of models with the minimum amount of material
represented explicitly. In other words they will tend to construct only the model as
depicted above. To account for selection task performance, however, the mental
models theory makes two further assumptions. First, participants only consider those
cards that are explicitly represented in their models of the rule (i.e., the 'A' and the '3'
cards in this case). Second, participants only go on to select those cards for which the
hidden value on the reverse side of a card has a bearing on the truth or falsity of the
rule (i.e., the 'A' card). Thus the failure to select the falsifying 7 card (i.e. not-q) on
the 'ifA then 3' rule reflects the fact that this term is not explicitly represented in the
reasoner's models of the rule.
The mental models account additionally proposes that some people will represent the
rule as a biconditional (i.e., with 'ifA then 3 • implying its converse 'If 3 then A ,), as
follows:
[A] [3]
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People who represent the rule as a biconditional would select both the 'A' card and
the '3' card (the other popular selection combination that is observed on the task), as
both these cases are explicitly represented in models and could bear on the rule's truth
or falsity.
In order to account for matching bias on the selection task with rules that contain
negations, Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) originally suggested that negated
components give rise to the expansion of models to include the affirmative
counterparts of negated terms. Such affirmative (matching) values would then lead to
card selections if hidden values impacted on the rule's truth of falsity. For example, a
negated-consequent rule such as 'ifA then not 3 J would be represented as follows:
[A] -,3
3
Since both the 'A' card and the '3' card have hidden values that impact on the truth or
falsity of the rule, and since these values are both explicitly represented in ~~d~i~:
then these cards would tend to be selected by participants. This is precisely what is
seen in selection-task studies (e.g., Evans, 1984).
In their more recent formulation of the mental models theory, however, Johnson-Laird
and Byrne (2002) have discarded the suggestion that the affirmative counterparts of
negated terms are added to mental models. Instead, they now subscribe to Evans and
Handley's (1999) mental model theory revisions that have overcome contradictions in
its account of the selection task when viewed in conjunction with the account of
conditional inference tasks. This new mental models theory of the selection task
embodies the 'simple unadorned principle of truth [whereby]mental models represent
true assertions, whether they are affirmative or negative, but not false assertions'
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, p.699). According to this view, all conditionals are
initially modelled with only the True Antecedent and True Consequent cases.
Reasoners attempt to combine each card value with the model to draw an inference
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about the logical consequence of hidden values. Matching bias arises in the course .of
fleshing out models. For example, in trying to combine the critical False Consequent
card (e.g., 7) with the model of the rule 'IfA then 3', nothing appears to follow (see
below) because of its implicitly-negated (i.e., 'non-matching') status:
[A] 3
7
With these recent revisions, then, the mental models theory can not only provide a
generic account of how conditional rules are represented across different conditional-
reasoning tasks that are studied in the literature (including the selection task and
conditional inference tasks), but it can also afford a compelling explanati~n ~tth~
pattern of matching card selections seen on the indicative selection task using the full
negations paradigm.
1.6.2 Heuristic-analytic theory and the selection task
Evans (1984, 1989) proposed a theory of reasoning, known as the heuristic-analytic
theory. This was later developed and extended by Evans and Over (1996) into what
they referred to as 'relevance theory', although recently Evans (2006) has reverted to
the 'heuristic-analytic' distinction in a revised version of his earlier heuristic-analytic
theory. Evans' new heuristic-analytic theory fully embraces ideas about dual
processes determining reasoning responses. The heuristic-analytic theory did, in fact,'
develop out of an earlier dual-process theory first proposed by Wason and Evans
(1975) in an attempt to account for their observation that the verbal explanations that
participants gave for their card choices were discrepant from their actual card choices.
Wason and Evans (1975) tested participants using two rules implementing the use of
negatives as proposed by Evans and Lynch (1973). Participants received conditional
statements of the form 'if A then 3' (abstract affirmative) first and then 'if A then not 3'
(abstract negative) and were asked to give verbal justifications for their choices on the
task. Results showed that regardless of the existence of a negative in the rule, card
selections remained the same (i.e., choices still reflected the matching bias effect with
participants choosing both the p and q cards). On the affirmative version of the rule
., : " -.:t,
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this choice is incorrect according to normative logic, whilst on the negative version of
the rule this choice is correct according to normative logic. However, although card
choices remained the same, verbal justifications were found to be very different.
When given the negative rule participants would provide justifications in terms of
falsifications, so they would talk about disproving the rule, whereas on the affirmative
rule participants talked about proving the rule. Wason and Evans' (1975) dual-process
theory attempted to account for these observations by suggesting that card selections
were caused by an unconscious matching bias and that the verbal explanations made
were really just rationalisations of choices.
The heuristic-analytic theory of Evans that was proposed through the 1980s and 1990s
and up to the present day (e.g., Evans, 1984, 1989, 1996, 2006) provides a re-
formulation of the earlier Wason and Evans (1975) dual-process account. In essence,
the heuristic-analytic theory proposes that it is first important to determine what
people are reasoning about before it is possible to make theoretical claims about how
they are reasoning. In all of his heuristic-analytic theories Evans proposes that
reasoning takes place in two stages. First there is a heuristic stage where pre-attentive
processes deem certain information as relevant and select it for further processing.
Second, there is an analytic stage which serves to generate an inference or judgement
from the selected information. This is done consciously using explicit processes.
Evans argues that any information that is deemed to be irrelevant at the first, heuristic
stage is unlikely to be processed further. Evans (e.g., 1989) has further argued that
heuristic processes are unconscious because of their pre-attentive nature, that is,
heuristic processes primarily function to determine what participants will attend to
and think about (i.e., what they will see as being 'relevant' to the task at hand). Errors
and biases can, therefore, occur during reasoning either because logically relevant
. . ~
information is selected out or because logically irrelevant material is selected In at the
heuristic stage. Evans' heuristic-analytic theory is, therefore, first and foremost an
attentional one.
Evans' heuristic-analytic theory (e.g., Evans & Over, 1996) is closely linked to other
dual-process theories of cognition as discussed above in relation to the rationality
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debate, including Reber's (1993) dual-process account of implicit and explicit
learning, and Stanovich's (1999, 2004) dual-system framework. According to the
dual process account of reasoning, both System 1 and 2 cognition are present in all
human beings (Evans, 2003). The System 2 in Reber's theory is the part that is linked
to Evans' (1989) analytical stage of reasoning. This system provides humans with
many advantages over animals. It is the part of the system that allows us to represent
possibilities (as shown across a variety of different reasoning and judgement tasks;
e.g. see Evans and Over; 1996). As with higher animals, we can make decisions based
upon our past previous experience, which is often shaped by reinforcement. This is
System 1 decision making. However, we can make decisions differently to this if we
want to, as we can think about future consequences and imagine possible outcomes of
our decisions. We may make these decisions after analysing the probability and utility
of these possibilities. This is System 2 thought. This ability to engage in System 2
thinking is the thing that distinguishes us from other animals as it is not available to
them. The psychological literature, however, is full of evidence of biases and failures
.' :' .. ;.' ""'-JU-j
to make consequential decisions or provide logical errors and occurs because most of
the time people are engaging in System 1 thinking.
If we apply the heuristic-analytic theory to the abstract selection task, Evans argues
that evidence for the effect of relevance is reflected in biases such as matching,
whereby cards appear relevant when their features match those named in the
conditional rule. Within the heuristic-analytic theory the biases that are claimed to
determine card selections are, in fact, attributed to the operation of two heuristics: the
so-called if-heuristic and the not-heuristic (the latter is also referred to as the matching
heuristic). The suggestion is that the linguistic function of 'if enhances the relevance
for True Antecedent cases because it directs attention to the situation where the.
antecedent is true and away from the situation where it is false. The linguistic function
of 'not' is to direct attention to the proposition it denies. Evans argues that negation is
not commonly used in natural language to assert new information but, instead, to deny
presuppositions (see also Wason, 1966). For example, if we take the sentence 'Today
I went shopping' and then add 'not' so that it becomes 'Today I did not go shopping',
we can see that the topic of the sentence remains the same, that is, it is still about
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shopping, but the comment (or meaning of the sentence) has changed. Because the
topic remains the same, participants stay focussed on this and still choose cards that
are mentioned in the rule (i.e., the presence of negations has little if any effect on card
selections in the selection task).
In summary, then, when faced with an abstract task the heuristic-analytic theory
proposes that participants rely purely on linguistic cues to guide their card selections
(Le. card selections are driven by the function of the if and not heuristics). However,
when presented with a context, as happens in a realistic version of the rule, selections
are claimed to be determined by pragmatic cues (rather than linguistic ones) and
participants use content-specific rules of inference. One suggestion is that people's
card selections may be guided by specific knowledge of counterexamples to stated
rules that derive from their memory for similar situations (Griggs and Cox, 1982). For
example, in the Drinking Age problem participants have prior knowledge about
drinking laws and cases of rule violations that may be cued directly by the use of a
police-officer scenario. In essence, the given rule and scenario make certain
information appear relevant, leading to the correct response of the p card and the not-q
card so as to detect a potential violating instance of the rule. Because the pragmatic
cues are stronger in these contexts than linguistic cues, participants do not succumb to
o • ;
matching bias on realistic versions of the selection task.
Evidence for the heuristic-analytic theory in terms of matching bias has also been
identified on other conditional reasoning tasks. The truth table task, for example,
requires that participants indicate which logical cases verify and which falsify
conditional statements. Matching bias is displayed when mismatching cases are more
likely to be classified as irrelevant. Conversely, relevant cases are sorted into true and
false and these decisions are clearly determined by logic. There is also considerable
evidence to suggest that matching bias is related to implicit negation on a task. This
can be seen on the selection task when the not-q card (e.g., a '7' card) is implicitly
. ',;. ""'\
represented as something that is not a q (i.e., that is not a 3). If explicit negation is
utilised in the abstract selection task (i.e., with cards showing values such as 'A', 'not-
A', '3' and 'not-3') then the matching bias effect should be eliminated because the
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lexical content of the rule and the card values will always match. This has been
\"
demonstrated on the truth table task as shown by Evans (1983) and later by Evans,
Clibbens, and Rood (1996). Evans et. al. (1996) permuted negation through a
conditional rule and found a significant reduction in matching bias and an increase in
logically correct responding. The results of this experiment were extended to a second
experiment using the selection task. Again, the use of explicit negation resulted in a
decrease in matching bias. However, there was no increase in logically correct choices
(see also Griggs & Cox, 1993; Jackson & Griggs, 1990; Kroger, Cheng, & Holyoak,
1993). One important issue here concerns the difference in effects of explicit negation
in terms of logical responding that is seen across the two paradigms that both involve
the same conditional rules. Why is it that on the selection task matching bias can be
. \,~
decreased with the use of explicit negation on cards, but there is no change in logical
" ! ~-,'
responding on the task? Evans et. al. (1996) argues that it is because on the selection
task participants are asked only to indicate the cards they would choose, and so the
task may not actually get people involved in explicit reasoning. The task does nothing
more than ask participants which cards are relevant, and it therefore only invokes the
use of the heuristic part of the system. In contrast, the truth table task requires not
only a judgement of relevance but also a further judgement of whether the cases are
true or false and so inevitably requires an analytical reasoning stage.
This is an important difference between the two tasks, and in light of this finding
Evans and Over (1996) revised certain aspects of the heuristic-analytic theory. One
. ~,':; :.: ',t.: :.~':
important revision concerned the specification of the processes involved in each stage.
In the heuristic-analytic theories that pre-dated Evans and Over (1996), heuristic
processes were only defined as preconscious processes which produced an explicit
representation of the relevant information. There then had to be some sort of
analytical processing to produce an observable outcome. It was assumed, then, that
the analytic stage took over from where the heuristic stage left off. Evans and Over
(1996) instead proposed that although tacit processes are responsible for relevance
and focusing, they may also lead directly to judgements and actions. Therefore, the
theory proposed that explicit reasoning processes may determine decisions, but need
not do so. Accordingly, on conditional truth table tasks explicit processes do lead to
., ,.'
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correct logical choices, as we have seen, but in the case of the selection task Evans
and Over (1996) claimed that participants' card choices are directly led by implicit,
heuristic processes (i.e., card choices are purely reflected by relevance). Indeed,
Evans and Over argued that participants do not engage in an analysis of the logical
consequence of turning each card but that time spent thinking on the selection task is
used to rationalise the choice that immediately appears relevant. Explicit reasoning,
then, may well occur on the selection task but it does not affect card choices. It is this
latter point that critically distinguishes the heuristic-analytic theory from the mental
models theory-which assumes that analytic processing not only arises on the selection
task but is functional in determining card selections (i.e., cards are only selected if
they impact on the rule's truth or falsity). Evans' (e.g., 1989) view is that any analytic
processing on the task serves only to rationalise heuristically-determined choices.
Some obvious questions that seem to arise at this point in relation to the heuristic-
analytic theory of reasoning might be 'what is the purpose of relevance?' or 'why is it
useful to limit the information that passes through to the explicit, analyti~ sy~t~~?;'
Evans and Over (1996) argue that in order to function intelligently we need to be able
to select from the huge amount of information that is available to us from our memory
and from our environment. The preconscious heuristic stage therefore selects
information that is perceived to be relevant. Conscious thought is applied to this
selected information and this is the most efficient and effective way for us to reason
and survive an environment saturated with complex information.
Recently, Evans and Over (2004) have embodied the heuristic-analytic theory within
their broader 'suppositional' theory of conditional reasoning, whereby conditionals
,:
focus attention on the supposition that the antecedent case hold true (a view entirely
consistent with the if heuristic) such that people will develop a single 'epistemic
mental model' that, by default, incorporates the True Antecedent case. More recently
still, Evans (2006) has linked his ideas about heuristic and analytic processes (as well
as his notion of 'suppositional' thinking) to a far broader and encompassing dual-
process concept of reasoning that incorporates what he refers to as 'three principles of
hypothetical thinking'. The principles are: the singularity principle, the relevance
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principle, and the satisficing principle (see also Evans, Over, & Handley, 2003).
Evans (2006) invokes these principles to argue that people will construct only one
mental model at a time with which to represent a hypothetical situation (singularity
principle). This model is pragmatically (i.e., heuristically) cued to be the most
relevant within the prevailing context (relevance principle). By default, this model
will represent the most probable or believable state of affairs. Finally, this model will
be subject to explicit (i.e., analytic) evaluation that complies with a satisficing
principle.
Evans (2006) argues that the singularity principle derives from the consideration that
the analytic system, whilst at the core of hypothetical thinking, has severely limited
processing capacity. Evans proposes that the other two principles reflect the
functioning of the heuristic and the analytic system. The relevance principle is
embedded within the heuristic system, whose primary purpose is to deliver both
knowledge-based and belief-based content to the analytic system. The satisficing
principle, on the other hand, is taken by Evans to reflect a fundamental bias in the
analytic system to operate on representations that it has been provided with via the
heuristic system, unless there are good reasons to 'give up' or overturn these
representations. Such satisficing-oriented processing, however, is deemed to be
perfectly rational in a world where one typically has to make decisions relatively
quickly without an endless analysis of possibilities (cf. Simon, 1982), who originally
coined the notion of satisficing as a boundedly-rational approach to decision making
in situations where it is impossible to optimise).
The revised heuristic-analytic theory can continue to explain many cognitive biases in
reasoning in a similar way to the original theory of Evans (e.g., 1984, 1989). That is,
biases can arise because the heuristic system fails to represent logical features of the
problem as being relevant or because it represents features that are logically irrelevant
to the task at hand. Evans (2006) suggests that the evidence indicates that such
heuristically-generated biases can be inhibited-at least to some extent:':'by' th~
operation of the analytic system, which intervenes in order to 'reset' default epistemic
mental models delivered to it by heuristic processing. However, the analytic system is,
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itself, viewed as being prone to biases of its own, particularly those that arise.fromthe
operation of the satisficing principle (i.e., the tendency for analytic processes to hold
on to representations that are merely 'good enough', which leads to the frequently
observed endorsement of fallacious inferences as well as confirmation tendencies in
hypothesis testing).
Evans' (2006) heuristic-analytic account of the abstract selection task is really no
different to his prior accounts, except, perhaps, in the fuller recognition that for most
participants the analytic system is seen to be actively engaged in the task (which
contrasts somewhat with Evans et al.'s, 1996, view - but not with the more developed
position of Evans & Over's, 1996). At the same time, the argument remains that a.t:lY
analytic processing that does occur on the selection task does not serve to alter ~l~iatl~
heuristic responses, but instead functions merely to rationalise such responses. The
critical new element of the revised heuristic-analytic account of the selection task is
the proposal that the satisficing principle can provide a neat account of why the
analytic system fails to override heuristically cued card choices. In particular, Evans
(2006) suggests that most people (except those of very high cognitive ability) will
treat verification and falsification on the task as though they are symmetrical. Thus,
participants will happily justify a choice of a matching card combination on the
grounds that it will prove the rule true or prove it false (as was, in fact, originally
shown by Wason & Evans, 1975). Since the standard task instruction refers to
discovering 'whether the rule statement is true or false', Evans argues that the analytic
system simply satisfices (accepting the heuristically-cued choice) whenever it can find
a verification or falsification justification. In practice, of course, this means that
heuristically-cued choices on the selection task will nearly always be accepted by
participants.
Recently, there have been a number of studies that propose that analytic reasoning
does alter participants' card selections on the abstract selection task. In particular,
studies by Feeney and Handley (2000) and Handley, Feeney, and Harper, (2002) have
presented a collection of experiments that present participants with a second
conditional rule that expresses an alternative antecedent to that contained within the
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first conditional rule. For example, Feeney and Handley (2000) presented participants
with an affirmative, indicative selection task with the rule:
'If the card has a letter A on one side then it has the number 3 on the other side '.
A second group were also presented with the rule:
'If the card has a letter L on one side then it as the number 3 on the other side '.
The outcome of this additional rule was a decreased tendency for people to select the
q card. Feeney and Handley explain this finding by suggesting that participants
actually are considering the unseen side of the cards and recognising the fact that
there might be either p or a letter that is not a p on the other side of the card.
Although this finding is at odds with the heuristic-analytic account, it can be argued
that the manipulation that Feeney and Handley introduce is significantly altering the
nature of the task such that the alternative antecedent possibility puts into question the
original rule, thus, allowing participants to think more thoroughly through the
consequence of turning the q card.
Other work by Roberts and Newton (2001) also makes a claim for analytic processes
playing an important part in selection-task performance. In two of their experiments,
they presented participants with a rapid response selection task where participants had
to respond to each card within 2 seconds of its presentation. They found that when
time was curtailed in this manner matching responding increased slightly compared to
that on the free-responding version of the task. Roberts and Newton propose that with
available time-as on the free-responding condition-analytic processes are
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responsible for the overturning of some matching responses. Roberts and Newton did
not, however, find statistically significant evidence for markedly improved logical
performance on the free-time version of the task relative to the rapid-response version.
The findings and implications of these studies will be considered in more detail later
on in the thesis.
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1.6.3 Information gain theory and the selection task
The concept of 'information gain' comes from the technique of 'rational analysis'
developed by J.R. Anderson (e.g., 1990, 1991), and was applied to the selection task
by Oaksford and Chater (e.g., 1994, 1996; see also Oaksford & Chater, 2003). The
information gain theory is a general theory of reasoning and takes the view that
cognitive behaviour is adapted to the structure of the environment and does not
depend on rules or models that other theories of reasoning propose. It is essentially a
theory at the computational level (i.e., a theory that attempts to state what the mind is
computing). It proposes that when in a reasoning experiment, participants are not
trying to test whether a rule is true or false, for example, but are instead looking for
information that will help them update their beliefs. Oaksford and Chater propose that
when engaged in reasoning our main aim is to gain information as this leads to a
decrease in uncertainty. The information we select in order to help us reduce
uncertainty is known as optimal data. They suggest that card selections in the
selection task are based on the information value of each card estimated in the form of
expected information gain. Oaksford and Chater's mathematical analysis of the
information value of cards shows, for example, that the selection of the matching q
card for the affirmative conditional can be more useful than the selection of the non-
matching (but logically appropriate) not-q card. In this way, the inform~tion' :~~i~'
theory of the selection task proposes that illogical matching choices may, in fact, be
deemed to be rational in terms of a probabilistic standard. It is important to note that
Oaksford and Chater's (e.g., 1994, 1995) analysis of the selection task also entails a
rarity assumption, which is that most properties of the world (including the properties
described by p and q in selection task studies) apply to a small set of objects, and that
people's strategies for testing or framing hypotheses are, by default, adapted to
situations where rarity holds (for supporting evidence see Anderson & Sheu, 1995;
McKenzie, Ferreira, Mikkelsen, McDermott, & Skrable, 2001; McKenzie &
Mikkelsen, 2000).
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The information gain theory presents a persuasive account of the matching effects
observed on affirmative conditional rules within the selection task. Moreover, because
the theory capitalises on Oaksford and Stenning's (1992) arguments that negations
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typically define high-probability contrast sets, it is also readily able to explain
antecedent and consequent matching effects observed for conditional rules containing
negated constituents (e.g., Oaksford, 2002a; Yama, 2001). So, for example, a rule
such as 'If there is an A on one side of the card then there is not a 3 on the other side'
is argued to designate a high probability true consequent category (any number that is
not a 3), whereas the false consequent category is represented by a very low
probability single case (the matching '3' card), whose rarity assures its high
information value.
Overall, then, the information gain account is able to accommodate a wide range of
evidence for matching effects in the standard selection-task paradigm. A final strength
. :;" ..
of the theory-and one which sets it apart from both the heuristic-analytic and the
mental models accounts-is its capacity to explain the considerable body of evidence
that has now been amassed for probabilistic influences on card selections (e.g., Green
& Over, 1997; Green, Over, & Pyne, 1997; Kirby, 1994; Oaksford, Chater, &
Grainger, 1999; Oaksford, Chater, Grainger & Larkin, 1997). So, for example, it has
been shown that card selections vary in ways predicted by information gain when P(P)
and P(q) are varied experimentally. Non-probabilistic theories are generally not
readily able to explain why probability manipulations should affect card selections,
only really being able to do so by invoking the idea that participants adopt different
task interpretations, with probabilistic manipulations affecting the proportion of
people adopting these different interpretations (see Oaksford &Wakefield, 2(03):.
In spite of the capacity of the information gain theory to explain an impressive range
of selection-task data, it has been claimed to have certain limitations. One problem
(cf. Evans, 2002) is the difficulty that the theory appears to have in explaining why
the use of explicit negations on cards in selection tasks completely removes matching
bias (e.g., Evans et al., 1996). This phenomenon is easily accounted for by the
heuristic-analytic theory, as all cards present matching values within an explicit
negations paradigm. Oaksford (2002a), however, has recently proposed that this
explicit negations effect may be a result of participants failing to engage their
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'normal' interpretative processes in this task variant-an explanation that is certainly
worthy of further investigation.
1.7Conclusions to Chapter 1
This chapter has provided an introduction to the psychological study of human
reasoning with conditional statements. A review of some of this work has shown how
central the issue of rationality is in understanding people's behaviour on conditional
reasoning tasks. In particular, the chapter has focussed on the range of findings
observed on the Wason selection task, where studies have embarked on a number of
manipulations (e.g. permuting negatives, the introduction of thematic and deontic
content, and altering the structure of the task, such as the number of cards or the
instructions given) in an attempt to improve logical responding on the task.
Another main driver in the selection-task literature has been to explain the common
pattern of logical errors observed on the abstract, indicative task, in particular the
evidence for responding being subject to a matching bias. In this respect, the present
chapter provided a detailed introduction to three contemporary theories of the
selection task that have all dedicated considerable effort to an explanation of both
matching bias and other reported selection-task phenomena. The mental models
theory (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, 2002), the heuristic-analytic theory (e.g.,
Evans, 1984; 1989; 2006; Evans & Over, 1996) and the information gain theory (e.g.,
1994, 1996; Oaksford & Chater, 2003) have all been shown to provide compelling
accounts of selection-task responses, in particular the matching-bias effect.
To distinguish between these aforementioned theoretical positions, however, an
approach is needed that allows the researcher to go beyond the actual selection
patterns that arise during selection-task performance. Such an approach can, it is
argued, take the form of methodologies that enable the collection of process-tracing
data. In particular, it is proposed that process-tracing techniques-including eye-
movement tracking and think-aloud reporting-can uncover valuable information
concerning what people are reasoning about when they are tackling abstract selection
tasks. Another process-tracing methodology, mouse-tracking-where participants
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indicate what they are thinking about using a mouse pointer}-has already been
deployed with the selection task, although perhaps with rather limited success for
reasons that will be explained in the next chapter. Indeed, because of these limitations
mouse tracking was not utilised in the present thesis, whereas eye-movement tracking
and think-aloud methods were central to the reported research. The next chapter will
review all three methods, think-aloud reporting, mouse-tracking and eye-movement
tracking, before progressing to a report of the experimental studies that were pursued.
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Chapter 2
Experiments 1 to 3
Chapter 1 presented an overview of three dominant theoretical accounts of people's
response patterns on abstract, indicative versions of the Wason selection task: (1) the
mental models theory of Johnson-Laird and Byrne (e.g., 1991, 2002); (2) the
heuristic-analytic theory of Evans (e.g., Evans, 1984; 1996, 2006); and (3) the
information gain theory of Oaksford and Chater (e.g., 1994, 2003). Chapter 1
concluded with the view that all three theories seem to be able to provide persuasive
explanations of selection-task responses, such that arbitrating between these accounts
purely on the basis of participants' response patterns is unlikely to prove fruitful in the
short term, even under various manipulations relating, for example, to task format,
rule form or problem instructions. Instead, it was suggested that a more productive
way to address the adequacy of existing selection-task theories may reside in the
deployment of methodologies that can provide behavioural data beyond card
selections by tapping into the cognitive processes underlying task performance to give
a process-oriented measure of performance.
There are, in fact, a number of studies that have attempted to address expli~itiy'~d
directly aspects of on-line processing of the selection task using a variety of so-called
'process-tracing' techniques. Examples of such techniques that have been used in
selection-task studies include the 'think-aloud' verbal-protocol methodology, whereby
reasoners concurrently verbalise all of their thoughts (e.g., Evans, 1995), and the
mouse-tracking methodology, which entails participants having to indicate those
aspects of the task that they are currently considering by means of a mouse pointer
(e.g. Evans, 1996; Roberts, 1998b).
The present chapter begins with a review of process-tracing studies that have
investigated selection-task behaviour. This review will critically discuss the findings
that have emerged from this existing body of research, and will also assess the
implications of process-tracing findings for the three selection-task theories presented
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in Chapter 1. One upshot of this review will be the proposal that eye-movement
tracking-which involves monitoring the moment-by-moment attentional transitions
that arise during task performance as reflected in the pattern and duration of eye-
fixations-may well provide an alternative and potentially more valid process-tracing
technique for examining reasoning processes on the selection task. This argument will
then pave the way to an overview of the first three experiments in this thesis, which
all attempted to deploy eye-movement monitoring to study behaviour on the abstract
selection task with the aim of furthering a theoretical understanding of processing on
this reasoning problem.
2.1 Verbal Protocols and the Selection Task
Throughout the history of psychological experimentation researchers have been keen,
, '.' ... ':. ~",
to gain an understanding of participants' thought processes and experiences as they
carry out tasks using a technique referred to historically as introspection. However,
the use of introspective methods in cognitive psychology has always been
contentious, as it has been commonly assumed that high-level thought processes such
as reasoning are not ones that can be introspected upon. For example, Nisbett and
Wilson (1977) set out a controversial attack on the use of introspection in social
judgement and decision-making research. They essentially argued that people do not
have awareness of the processes that determine their behaviour, and that verbal
reports can, therefore, be both inaccurate and misleading. Nisbett and Wilson reported
a number of experiments on attitude change where participants' reports indeed
seemed to demonstrate no apparent awareness of the stimuli influencing attitudes.';'
More recently, however, Ericsson and Simon (e.g., 1980, 1984) have presented a
much more positive view of verbal reports of task-based processing as a form of
psychological data, and argue that such verbal reports-or what they term verbal
protocols-appear to be a potentially invaluable source of information when set
alongside standard outcome measures that are derived from other observational
methods (e.g., response times and solution rates). Indeed, Ericsson and Simon (1980,
1984, 1993) went as far as to justify their proposals by developing a detailed
information-processing theory of cognition within which they locate the actual
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mechanism by which verbal reports are produced. In relation to this model, Ericsson
and Simon argue that verbal reports reflect the current contents of short-term memory
(or what is nowadays more commonly referred to as 'working memory'). These short-
term memory contents, in turn, reflect the focus of what the participant is attending to
at a given point in time. As such, verbal data are best viewed as being the 'products'
of cognitive processes rather than self-generated descriptions of the processes
themselves. This means that the researcher has the task of inferring underlying
processes from the observable verbal products of such processes, whilst the
participant producing the report is not in any way required to self-generate a
theoretical account of their own thought processes (in direct contrast to the basic
expectation with the use of introspective methods).
Critics who argue against the use of verbal-protocol methods in cognitive research
(e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) propose that participants' verbal reports of their
thoughts may not necessarily correlate with any observable behaviours that they
produce. In other words, it is possible that the information that is retrie~ed' "by;"~
participant at the time of the report is different to that which was functionally
important during actual performance on the task. This is a very legitimate concern
with the validity of verbal reports, as Ericsson and Simon (1993) themselves
acknowledge. In order to avoid this problem, however, Ericsson and Simon suggest
that it is advisable for researchers only to gain concurrent reports, that is 'think aloud'
reports that are collected at the time of experimental testing, as opposed to
retrospective reports that are collected after a task has been done. The belief that
concurrent verbal protocols are tapping into cognitive processing seems to be
warranted on the basis of the assumption that thought processes are a sequence of
states that each contain an end-product of cognitive processes. These informational
~ '. ,"
'products'-which may be retrieved from long-term memory, directly perceived and
recognised, or generated by means of inferential mechanisms-are reasonably stable,
and can therefore be verbalised. Any retrieval processes, recognition processes or
inferential processes that deliver this information, however, are not open to
verbalisation as they essentially arise at an automatic and tacit level outside of
conscious awareness.
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Another important claim made by Ericsson and Simon (e.g., 1980, 1993) is that when
participants are asked to think aloud, the thoughts themselves largely remain
unchanged by the added instruction to think aloud. Only if participants are asked to
explain or describe their thoughts does such 'reactivity' (i.e., distortion of the primary
task-based process) arise, because additional thoughts and concepts have to be
retrieved such that participants have to attend to information that would not normally
be needed to perform the task. Ericsson and Simon (e.g., 1993) describe three
different levels of verbalisation that can arise during verbal reporting, with each level
being associated with a greater degree of potential reactivity in relation to 'normal'
task-based processing. Level one verbalisation involves the articulation of information
that is normally heeded in a verbal form anyway (i.e., it is simply the vocalisation of
current thoughts). There are no intermediate processes in this case and the articulation
will take no special effort. Level two verbalisation involves articulating information
that is normally heeded in a non-verbal form. This verbalisation involves the
description or explanation of these non-verbal thoughts, but does not bring any new
information to bear in the process of task-oriented thinking. Because level two
verbalisation involves a re-coding process it has been observed to slightly slow down
primary task performance whilst not impacting upon the structure of the process (see
Ericsson & Simon, 1993, for relevant evidence). Level three verbalisation invoives
explanation of thought processes. This process is not simply reporting what is
currently held in short-term memory but requires the participants to link their thoughts
to earlier thoughts and information. Level three verbalisation is, therefore, very likely
to impact negatively on the nature of normal task-based thinking. Empirical evidence
supports this latter conjecture (see Ericsson & Simon, 1993, for a review).
So, in summary, any concerns about the validity and reliability of verbal reports are
avoided from Ericsson and Simon's perspective if three conditions prevail: (1) verbal
reports are obtained from the participant concurrent with task performance rather than
retrospectively; (2) participants are required only to verbalise information that they
-, . . \ ",~"
are heeding rather than to describe non-heeded information or selective aspects of
heeded information; and (3) data are analysed by the experimenter and not by the
participant. In the context of reasoning research, Evans (e.g., 1989) has concurred
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with the key proposals of Ericsson and Simon (e.g., 1993) and argues that participants
appear to have little difficulty in performing a concurrent think-aloud requirement
when tackling reasoning tasks, and the data that can be collected from such reports
seem perfectly valid and effective for tracing the locus of attention during cognitive
task performance.
Despite such a positive assessment by Evans (1989) of the potential role for verbal-
protocol assessments of reasoning performance, a review of the literature suggests
that there are, in fact, only a few published studies that have employed this method in
the context of research on the Wason selection task. Moreover, those few abstract
selection-task studies that have used verbalisation methods appear to have been in
. . '-',,~~".<'.,'
conflict with Ericsson and Simon's (1993) recommendation concerning the vital
importance of eliciting concurrent rather than retrospective reports from reasoners.
For example, a study by Green and Larkin (1995) utilised a post-hoc reporting
technique, whereby participants had explicitly to provide reasons for their card
selections when prompted by the experimenter. It could be argued that this post-hoc
approach tells us very little about the on-line focus of participants' moment-by-
moment attentional processing as might be gleaned from the use of a concurrent
verbalisation method. Another recent study by Stenning and van Lambalgen's (2002)
elicited verbalisations from participants tackling selection tasks as part of a Socratic
'tutorial dialogue' between the experimenter and the reasoner. As interesting as this
methodology certainly is, the technique may only have a limited bearing on the Issu"e
of individual reasoning processes divorced from the dynamics of didactic
conversations between students and tutors. Indeed Stenning and van Lambalgen
(2002, p. 281) themselves acknowledge that "Engaging subjects in dialogue
undoubtedly changes their thoughts, and may even invoke learning. The relation
between the reasoning processes evoked by the standard way of conducting the task,
and the processes reflected in subsequent dialogues is a relation that remains to be
clarified".
As well as the studies reported above, however, there are other abstract selection-task
studies that have utilised more reliable concurrent-reporting methods. Beattie. and
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Baron's (1988, Experiments 2 and 3) study, for example, provided evidence that
participants rarely mentioned alternative cards to the ones that they ended up
selecting-an effect that Beattie and Baron viewed as supporting the notion of a
heuristically-based matching process in line with Evans' (e.g., 1984) heuristic-
analytic theory. Participants were also seen to be overconfident about their card
choices and showed little sensitivity to the correctness of their selections. However,
Beattie and Baron's protocol coding scheme functioned at a fairly gross level of
analysis that focused on the classification of selection patterns and the categorisation
of responses to probe questions. Because of this, their coding scheme does not appear
to have been geared toward uncovering insights into the spontaneous analytic
processing that might be associated with card choices.
More recently, Evans (1995, Experiment 5) presented another protocol-analysis study
of behaviour on the abstract, indicative selection task. Protocols were analysed in two
distinct ways. First, they were scored for references to the facing sides of card~'.'Th~
percentage references were then divided according to whether the participant selected
the card or not. Second, protocols were scored for references to the hidden sides of
cards, and again these scores were broken down according to whether the card was
selected or not. Evans' analysis revealed that participants referred more often to the
facing sides of the cards that were selected than to the facing sides of cards that ended
up being rejected. More importantly, the second analysis showed an identical
tendency for participants to refer more to the hidden sides of selected cards than to the
hidden sides of non-selected cards. These findings were consistent with Beattie and
Baron's (1988) results. Evans argued that the findings also lent further support to his
"
heuristic-analytic theory, which claims that people only think about some of the cards
and not others, and that thinking about hidden sides of cards mostly serves to
rationalise decisions to choose such cards.
As these previous studies show, think-aloud verbal protocols appear to be a useful
methodology for use in studying reasoning processes. Although the protocol method
has been applied to a limited extent in studying processing on the abstract selection
62
task, it remains the case that there are no large-scale studies of the task that have
collected protocol data.
2.2. Mouse Tracking and the Selection Task
All of the various instantiations of Evans' heuristic-analytic theory (e.g., Evans, 1984,
1996, 2006) are consistent in assuming that selection-task responses for the majority
of reasoners can be accounted for in terms of the operation of heuristic processes.
Moreover, although some versions of the heuristic-analytic theory (e.g., Evans et al.,
1996) did seem to lean toward the proposal that participants do not engage in any
analytic reasoning on the selection task, Evans (e.g., 2006; see also Evans & Over,
2004) has recently clarified his position by proposing that analytic processes are
indeed applied on this task, but they only serve to rationalise choices (via a
satisficing-based mechanism) and play no actual part in altering those choices-
except, perhaps, in the case of those of higher intellectual ability, where analytic
processing may be sufficiently powerful to overturn default responses that are
delivered by the heuristic system.
Fundamentally, then, the heuristic-analytic theory of the selection task claims'th~t
card choices are not affected by any explicit, analytic reasoning but are, instead,
driven primarily by the operation of implicit, heuristic, processes. Evans (e.g., 1996)
has also suggested that cards that are rejected will be thought about very little, if at all
(really this is just the corollary of the view that selected cards will be thought about in
order to rationalise their selection). Evans (1996) also proposed that one way to
provide evidence for the heuristic-analytic account would be to demonstrate that
participants attend specifically to the cards that they end up selecting. Just such
evidence was, in fact, uncovered in a study by Evans, Ball, and Brooks (1987), who
used a computer presentation of the selection task with the full negations paradigm,
where the order in which decisions were made about each card was recorded. Based
I
on the assumptions of the heuristic-analytic theory, Evans et al. (1987) predicted that
cards that were considered first would be those that were deemed relevant and
subsequently selected. As predicted, a strong correlation was found between decision
order and choice. However, it is possible that this result merely reflects a preference
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for people to make 'select' decisions before 'reject' decisions, and that what is really
being shown in this decision-order paradigm is a response bias as opposed to an
attentional bias (Roberts, 1998b).
A later study by Evans (1996) aimed to explore this effect further and claimed to be a
stronger and more direct test of the heuristic-analytic theory. The two experiments
that Evans reported both included a mixture of abstract and thematic versions of the
selection task. Using a computer presentation of the tasks, participants were requested
to point the mouse cursor at cards that they were considering choosing, but only to
click the cursor on that card when they were sure they wanted to choose it. The
computer recorded cumulatively the time spent pointing at each card. Evans refers to
the latencies that were recorded as card inspection times. According to the heuristic-
analytic theory participants should only attend to cards that they end up selecting.
This is because-guided by linguistic cues (i.e., the 'if-heuristtc' and the 'matching-
heuristic '}-they will only attend to relevant cards (i.e., those cards named in the
rule). Heuristic, implicit processes lead to a decision to select what are perceived to be
relevant cards, and participants then use explicit thought processes to rationalise those
choices, which requires processing time. Evans (1996, p. 226), therefore, derived two
main predictions about card selections and the time that people should spend looking
at cards, as follows:
Prediction 1: Cards which are associated with higher selection rates
will also be associated with longer inspection times.
Prediction 2: On any given card, those participants who choose the
card will have higher inspection times than those who
do not.
If, however, participants were analysing the consequences of turning each card, then,
argued Evans (1996), the inspection-time paradigm should demonstrate equallooking
times on all four cards. Evans' data for both of his reported experiments supported his
predictions. Indeed, Evans found that differences in the times spent looking at
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selected cards compared to non-selected cards were sometimes as high as 13 seconds.
Evans observed this inspection-time effect for both abstract and thematic versions of
the selection task. He therefore claimed support for the heuristic-analytic theory;
individuals focus their attention on heuristically-cued 'relevant' information, attend
only to this information, and then go on to engage in non-consequential reasoning
aimed at rationalising decisions based on perceived information relevance.
There are, however, grounds for caution before accepting Evans' (1996) conclusions.
In particular, Roberts (1998b) has claimed that there could be a different explanation
for Evans' results. In a series of five experiments with variants of the basic mouse-
tracking and inspection-time paradigm, Roberts (1998b) first reduced, and then
eventually eliminated-and even reversed-the inspection-time effect. Roberts
claimed that a number of biases that derive from the mouse-tracking methodology
itself could be responsible for the inspection-time effects demonstrated by Evans
(1996). Roberts proposes that there are two key biases that are created by participants
having to divide their attention between the selection task and the mouse-tracking task
(which is used to show which card is under consideration). He calls these biases
sensory leakage andforgetting to move the mouse. Sensory leakage means that cards
could be viewed, considered and rejected before the mouse has had a chance to reach
them. Participants could well be looking at all four cards for at least some of the time,
but this information does not get 'logged' by the methodology. Forgetting to move the
mouse could occur because participants may be so engaged in the problem that they
simply forget to move the mouse to show what cards they are currently considering.. .
These latter two task-format biases would result in inflated inspection times on cards
that the mouse cursor was left on.
Roberts also suggests a third bias, hesitation bias, which is the tendency to hesitate
before making an active decision. He argues that in the selection task participants are
only required to make a decision about cards they are going to choose, and any pause
before these choices could result in inflated times over the chosen cards. These three
biases, then, would provide an artefactual explanation of the data presented by Evans
(1996), as opposed to an explanation based on the theoretical claim that choices on
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this task are guided by heuristics processes and that the inspection-time effect arises
from the analytic rationalisation of to-be-selected cards.
Roberts (1998b) was able to remove all three artefactual biases by making
modifications to the task. After a replication of Evans' first experiment, Roberts
attempted to remove sensory leakage and forgetting to move the mouse by ensuring
that participants were only allowed to see one card at a time. Each card was 'blacked
out', and pointing the mouse cursor over the required card allowed the participant to
view the card. As this was done, the time was again recorded cumulatively. The
evidence revealed a reduced inspection-time effect for this study. To eradicate the
hesitation bias that is caused by only making active decisions, a third experiment
required that participants make active choices over all four cards, either registering a
'yes' (select decision) or a 'no' (reject decision). This causes inspection times to be
inflated over all four cards, thus counteracting the effect of the hesitation bias. Again,
a reduced inspection-time effect was evident in this situation. The fourth experiment
by Roberts used both individual card presentation and forced 'yes/no' decisions, so
removing all three sources of bias. This resulted in the complete eliminatio~ ~l~h~
inspection-time effect. Roberts' final experiment reversed the inspection-time effect
using a de-selection task that required participants to make active decisions about
cards that they did not want to select. The results showed the reverse of the
inspection-time effect demonstrated in Experiment 1, where times were now longer
for cards that were not selected than for those cards that were selected. Roberts
(1998b) concludes that the inspection-time effect appears to be artefactual and is due
to the sources of task-format bias that he identifies.
However, Evans (1998a) argues that there is still plenty of evidence to suggest that
card selections are guided by heuristic processes (see Evans, 1984; Evans, Clibbens,
& Rood, 1996) and that Roberts' experiments show that task manipulation, and not
just relevance, can affect what is attended to on the selection task. Evans claims that
Roberts' findings do not damage the heuristic-analytic theory, but instead call into
question the use of the mouse-tracking methodology as a valid process-tracing
technique. However, if the inspection-time paradigm could be utilised in a different
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way, for example, by using a more sensitive and direct measure of on-line attentional
processing, then the paradigm might still prove to be a useful way to investigate the
role of heuristic and analytic processes in reasoning. It is argued here that the
inspection-time effect would lend itself extremely well to another well-known
methodology for investigating the role of internal processes in cognition: that of eye-
movement tracking.
2.3 Eye-movement Tracking and the Selection Task
Eye-movement tracking has been used extensively to investigate the on-line locus of
attentional processing on many different tasks (e.g., Fisher, 1999; Klein, Kingstone, &
Pontefract, 1992; Reuter-Lorenz & Frendrich, 1992). Recently, too, the methodology
has been deployed very successfully in reasoning and problem solving contexts, for
example, in the study of insight problem solving (Grant & Spivey, 2003; Knoblich,
Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001), sentence-verification processes (e.g., Underwood, Jebbett, &
Roberts, 2004), conditional inference (Schaeken, Fias, & d'Ydewalle, 1999; Schroyens,
Schaeken, Fias, & d'YdewalIe, 2000), and syllogistic inference (Ball, Phillips, Wade, &
Quayle, 2006; Espino, Santamaria, Meseguer, & Carreiras, 2005).
Although it is possible to move attention covertly (i.e., without moving the eyes), it is
.,',.' ,~~..: ,,;~.\ \, ':'l
generally acknowledged that with visually-based stimuli it is far more efficient to move
the eyes rather than merely to move attention (e.g., He & Kowler, 1992; Sclingensiepen,
Campbell, Legge, & Walker, 1986). Moreover, there is substantial evidence indicating
that attention actually precedes a saccade to a new location (Hoffman & Subramaniam,
1995; Kowler, Anderson, Dosher, & Blaser, 1995), that attentional movements and
saccades are obligatorily linked (Deubel & Schneider, 1996), and that the length of a
fixation or a gaze (which may involve two or more continuous fixations on the same
location) provides a very good index of ease of processing (Liversedge, Paterson, &
Pickering, 1998). In sum, in complex information-processing tasks such as reading or
display-based reasoning, the coupling between eye location and the locus of ongoing
attentional processing is likely to be very tight indeed (see Rayner, 1998, for further
pertinent arguments).
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Given that previous work suggests that eye-movement tracking may allow for a detailed
investigation of on-line attentional processing, together with the fact that Ev~s'(i996)
study clearly possessed a number of methodological problems, the present thesis set out
to employ the eye-tracking methodology in order to examine on-line attentional
processing in the selection task. A key motivation behind this research endeavour was
to try to produce some novel process-tracing data that might help to inform the current
theoretical understanding of reasoning processes on the abstract selection task.
2.4 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 aimed to employ the eye-movement tracking methodology within Evans
(1996) inspection-time paradigm as a replacement for the more problematic mouse-c.
.. ' .'_
tracking methodology. The use of eye-movement tracking as a measure of attentionalr-
processing should result in the eradication of all three sources of task-format bias
identified by Roberts (1998b), thereby enabling the predictions of Evans' (e.g., 1996, ..
2006) heuristic-analytic theory to be investigated more directly. As participants did
not need to use a mouse pointer to make their. selections there was no longer the
possibility of hesitation bias causing inflated times over active choices. Sensory
leakage and forgetting to move the mouse were also no longer problematic, and, given
the strong link between attentional processing and eye movements, there was little
likelihood of participants looking at one card and thinking about another, or forgetting
to move their eyes to a card that they were thinking about.
. . :. . .:..,\,:,1';:, ;'
Experiment 1 used only abstract, indicative versions of the selection task within a full
negations paradigm (cf. Evans et aI., 1996). As such, participants were presented with
a total of four selections task, with conditional rules being constructed by
systematically permuting the presence of affirmative versus negative components in
the antecedent and consequent cases of the rule. The four tasks were not presented by
computer-as in the Evans (1996) and Roberts (1998b)-but on A4 cards in front of
the participant, allowing eye movements to be calibrated and tracked throughout the
trials. The eye tracker logged cumulative dwell times for each card. All four selection
tasks were also shown to participants in a slightly non-standard format as presentation
was constrained by the use of the eye tracker. The rules and instructions appeared as
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normal, but cards were presented in a 2 x 2 array, as was done in the study by Evans,
Ball, and Brooks (1987).
The heuristic-analytic theory (Evans, 1996, 2006) predicts that participants should
think more about the cards that they end up selecting than those that they end up .
rejecting because of the operation of analytic rationalisation processes in the case of
the former but not the latter. Thus, in line with the heuristic-analytic theory it was
expected that: cards that were more likely to be selected would have longer inspection
times than cards that were less likely to be selected (Prediction 1); and that for any
given card, those people who selected it would have longer inspection times than for
those who did not select it (Prediction 2).
2.4.1 Method
Design
The design was principally a correlational one in which two types of measure,s weXt,
taken: (1) whether or not a card was selected; and (2) the associated inspection time
for the card.
Participants
Participants were 34 undergraduates at the University of Derby who participated in the
experiment in order to gain course credit. They had not had any teaching on the
psychology of reasoning before this experiment.
Materials and apparatus
Reasoning tasks
The standard negations paradigm was used that permuted negative components:
through an indicative conditional rule of the basic form 'Ifp. then q, to produce four
rules (see Table 2.1 below). Participants were tested individually and all participants
received all four problems. Each problem was presented at an angled table directly in
the participant's line of vision. Participants sat at a chair that could be raised or
lowered in order to get the best calibration. The angled table was located
approximately 60 em in distance from where the participant was sitting. The problems
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were presented individually on white A4 sheet with the conditional rule at the top of
the page, a reminder of the instructions in the middle of the page, and the four cards in
the lower part of the page in a 2 x 2 arrangement. The location of the cards in the four
possible positions on the sheet was randomised for every presentation, as was the
order of problem presentation.
TABLE 2.1
Four types of conditional rules used showing negated components and logical cases.
Logical case
TA FA rc FC
A J 3 7
P not-p q not-q
E L 2 5
P not-p not-q q
0 S 9 4
not-p p q not-q
T N 8
not-p p not-q q
Rule
If A then 3
If E then not 5
If not S then 9
If not N then not 8
TA = True antecedent. FA = False antecedent. 'I'C = True consequent, Fe = False consequent. Bold
type indicates those cards that match those in the named rule. Logical choices for all four rules are TA
and Fe.
Eye tracking eguipment
The eye-tracker that was used was the Applied Science Laboratories 4000 system.
This system is video-based and uses a near-infrared light source and two video
cameras. The 'scene' camera locates the participant in their environment, and the
'eye' camera produces a close-up image of one eye. The light source is guided
through an arrangement of mirrors and lenses into the participant's eye and produces a
'retinal reflex' (which effectively makes the pupil appear bright) and a 'corneal
image' reflection (a very bright smaller reflection off the front surface of the eye). The
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relationship between these two reflections changes as the participant's eye moves: and
this relationship is used to calculate point-of-gaze coordinates. Using this system a
participant's point-of-gaze can be determined to an accuracy of approximately one
degree of visual angle.
Before point-of-gaze recording takes place, the relationship between the pupil and
corneal reflections must be determined when the participant is looking at known
points on the scene plane (the image on the scene camera). This is done using a 3 x 3
grid of nine evenly spaced points which are placed at the same location as the to-be-
presented stimulus. The relationship between the corneal and pupil reflections is
stored by the computer as the participant serially fixates on the nine calibration points.
Using the data from the nine calibration points, it is then possible to interpolate the
point-of-gaze across the whole scene.
During the experiment, the point-of-gaze was superimposed onto the scene video
image as a small dark square. This was videotaped and later used in the data analysis
along with a fixation data-file produced by the eye-tracking system that recorded time
data and horizontal and vertical point-of-gaze coordinates, sampled at 50 times per
second. In order to get accurate and detailed information about point-of-gaze, it was
important to use this fixation data-file as well as the video scene record. An algorithm
that considers both spatial and temporal characteristics was used to convert the raw
point-of-gaze coordinates into fixations. To group the raw data into fixations' the
algorithm used a basic spatial threshold of one degree visual angle, with a minimum
fixation duration of 100 msecs. This fixation algorithm was supplied with the ASL
system and is equivalent to other algorithms that have been reported in the literature
(e.g., see Nodine, Kundel, Toto, & Krupinski, 1992).
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. They were seated at a viewing distance of 60 cm
from the presented materials and were asked to sit as still as possible whilst their eyes
were calibrated using a 9-point presentation matrix. Once the participant's point-of-
gaze coordinates had been determined, participants were presented with the general
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task instructions. These appeared separately from the four selection task themselves.
Participants had as long as they wanted to read these general instructions, which were
as follows:
This study is concerned with people's logical reasoning ability and will
entail you having to tackle a total of four problems. Each of these problems
will appear on a separate sheet in front of you. Each problem consists of
four cards and a rule that applies to those cards. This rule may be true or
false. The cards have been constructed so that each one always has a letter
on one side and a single figure number on the other side. Naturally only one
side of each card will be visible to you.
For each problem your task is to decide which card or cards need to be
turned over in order to discover whether or not the rule is true. When you .':
make a decision in relation to each problem, please point briefly at the card
or cards you feel need to be turned over using the hand-held pointer.
Once the participants had read through the instructions silently to themselves, the
experimenter also read them aloud. This was done to ensure that the participant had
time to grasp fully the requirements of the experiment. Each of the four selection-task
problems was then presented one at a time in a random order. Participants indicated
their selection responses with a 20 cm metal pointer, which was employed to avoid
any interference to the eye-movement recording that may have occurred if participants
had been required to raise their hand to the scene plane in order to use a finger t<?
point at their card choices.
2.4.2 Results
Coding the inspection-time data
To enable use of the fixation data as a quantitative measure of eye-movement
behaviour, the fixation data-file had to be considered alongside the scene-video record
so that precise fixation data could be extracted from the point where the study
material for each selection task was presented. To this end, a computer-based system
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was used, referred to as EMAT (Eye Movement Analysis Tool; Mugglestone, 1999),
which allowed both the fixation data-file and the scene-video record to be linked
together to ensure accurate temporal synchronisation. EMAT employs a Windows PC
environment, and its basic components include: (1) a video recorder with a RS232
interface card (to allow video 'timecode' information to be accessed by the
computer); (2) a personal computer with a video overlay card; and (3) bespoke
software written in MS Visual Basic. EMAT allows the video scene to be viewed via
a video playback window and the video recorder can be operated through the system.
When conducting the experiment, the calibration process and the calibration chart for
each participant were recorded on to the video before the rest of the material was
presented. The recording of the fixation data-file began at the same time as the video
was set to record. This was marked on the video with a timecode overlaid onto the
scene. Temporal synchronisation was achieved by locating the position on the
videotape where the timecode started. This point was then used to create a link
between the fixation data-file and the video scene. This link between the fixation data-
file and the video scene was made anew for each participant.
The EMAT system allows for analysis of fixation data in relation to specific 'areas of
interest' on the scene video, including, the number offixations in any areas of interest
and the total fixation times in those areas of interest. To achieve this a scaling
procedure relates the coordinates of the fixation data-file to the pixel values in the
scene-video playback window. This made it possible to superimpose the point-of-gaze
information from the fixation data-file onto the video scene. The scene video already
had a point-of-gaze cursor that was superimposed (by hardware) at the time of the
experiment, and the fixation point plotted by the EMAT system was then expected to
follow this original point-of-gaze cursor exactly. This was particularly useful as it was
possible to see any errors in scaling or timing immediately, and problems could then
be easily rectified.
To analyse the data from the current study, areas of interest were created by drawing
around the four cards in the selection task. This created a template that was used
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throughout the coding stage. Whilst the fixation data-files and video scene were
played together, the EMAT system produced a score of the total dwell time (sum of
all fixations) on each of the four cards, for each problem, for each participant. These
times were converted to an Excel file, and it was these total times that provided the
'card inspection time' data that were used in subsequent statistical analyses. Neither
re-fixations nor first fixation points where measured, and this was the same for all
eye-tracking experiments in the thesis. Note that for each selection task, the coding
process was halted immediately after each participant had made their final decision,
that is, at the instant that the pointer moved away from the last chosen card.
Statistical analysis
Card selection frequencies
The selection frequencies and the mean inspection times for all cards are shown in
Table 2.2(b). The primary concern was to see whether or not the pattern of selections
conformed to that found in the literature. Using negated components we should expect
to find: (1) a clear matching effect on all four logical cases, and (2) a preference for
TA over FA with TC and FC choices intermediate (although some studies report a
verification bias as well as matching bias when negation is controlled, for example,
see Krauth, 1982; Reich & Ruth, 1982).
Matching indices (as described by Evans, Ball, & Brooks, 1987) were computed for
each participant across each rule by comparing the frequency of selections which
match or mismatch [see Table 2.2(a)]. A one-tailed Wilcoxon test showed that more
antecedent matching cards were selected than mismatching ones (p = .003), and that
more matching consequent cards were selected than mismatching ones (p = .05).
Mean percentage frequency of selections is shown in Table 2.2(b). A significant
difference was found on a Friedman test for the frequency of choices of the four
logical cases, (x. = 34.02, df = 3, p < .001). As the literature suggests, there was a
large preference for TA choices over all other cases, and FA was the least popular
choice. There was also a preference, although smaller, for TC over FC, which as
suggested above could be evidence for a verification bias as well as matching bias.,
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The selection data are therefore typical of what are usually observed in the negations
paradigm.
Card inspection times
An exploratory investigation of the inspection-time data showed that they would not
be suitable for parametric statistical analysis as they were positively skewed. In this
situation a logarithmic transformation is an appropriate transformation to perform
(Miles & Shevlin, 200 I). A constant of 0.2 was added to each score prior to its
transformation. (This problem was encountered for Experiments 1 to 4 and so the
same transformation was used throughout). For clarity of interpretation, means after
transformation but converted back to their original units are reported where
applicable.
Prediction 1 states that cards with higher selection frequencies will have higher mean
inspection times associated to them. There should, therefore, be a correlation between
the frequency with which a card is selected and the mean inspection time for that card.
Mean inspection times and the percentage frequency of card selections are shown in
Table 2.2(b). A correlation analysis showed that there was indeed a strong association
between selection frequencies and inspection times: r = .55, N = 16, p = .028
(transformed data).
The second analysis tested Prediction 2: that for each card on each rule the
participants who chose that card would spend more time looking at it than participants
who did not. For this analysis, Evans (1996) computed point biserial correlations
between selections (1 to indicate selected cards or 0 to indicate non-selected cards)
and the inspection times across all participants, and found that for each of the 16
correlations there were significantly more positive correlations than would be
expected by chance.
75
TABLE 2.2
(a) Formulae for comparing matching indices across (i) antecedent cases and (ii) consequent cases;
(b) Percentage frequency of card selections and overall mean inspection times (seconds) and log times
(seconds) for each item in Experiment 1 (N=34).
(a)
Matching indices - one-tailed Wilcoxon comparisons across:
(i) matching antecedent (TA:I + TA: 2 + FA: 3 + FA:4) versus mismatching antecedent (TA:3 + TA:4 + FA:I + FA:2)
(ii) matching consequent (TC:I + TC:3 + FC:2 + FC:4) versus mismatching consequent (TC2: + TC4: + FCI: + FC:3).
(b) Card
TA FA TC FC
Rule Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
1. Ifp then q Frequency of selections 88.2 8.8 35.3 14.7
Natural data: time 1.42 1.22 0.42 0.59 1.29 1.27 0.75 0.96
Transformed data: log time 0.10 0.32 -0.34 0.32 0.03 0.36 -0.19 0.38
-.- -~.~_-_- - .-
Transformed data: corrected time 1.06 0.26 0.87 0045
2. If P then not q Frequency of selections 70.6 20.6 20.6 29.4
Natural data: time 2.19 2.18 1.14 2.32 0.98 1.73 0.59 0.20
Transformed data: log time 0.21 0041 -0.12 0042 -0.16 0041 0.10 0.37
Transformed data: corrected time 1.42 0.56 0049 1.06
3. If not p then q Frequency of selections 52.9 23.5 64.7 29.4
Natural data: time 1.39 1.52 1.50 1.06 2.26 2.39 0.98 1.05
Transformed data: log time 0.02 0041 0.16 0.25 0.22 0040 -0.04 0.30
Transformed data: corrected time 0.85 1.25 1.46 0.71
4. If not p then not q Frequency of selections 55.9 35.3 50.0 32.4
Natural data: time 1.69 2.12 1.91 2.00 1.58 2.20 1.92 1.69
Transformed data: log time 0.07 0.43 0.10 0.48 0.02 0044 0.17 0.39.
Transformed data: corrected time 0.98 1.06 0.85 1.28
Mean 66.9 20.1 42.7 26.5
Note: TA = true antecedent; FA = false antecedent; TC = true consequent; FC = false consequent.
It is recognised here, however, that the use of the correlation is unsatisfactory-as
also noted by Roberts (1998b)-the problem being due to the imbalance in numbers
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of selected and non-selected cards. Roberts suggests a slightly different analysis to see
whether for each of the 16 cards the mean inspection time is greater for the people
who select a particular card than for those who do not. Table 2.3(a) shows the mean
inspection times for selected and non-selected cards for all 16 cases. On the
transformed data, the difference between mean times on selected and non-selected
cards was in the expected direction for 15 of 16 cards (correlations range from -0.08
to 0.60),p = .001, two-tailed with the binomial test.
Roberts (1998b) argues that one potential problem with the Prediction 1 and
Prediction 2 analyses is that they lack statistical power because they are item analyses.
He therefore attempts a more powerful analysis of the data at the participant level, and
makes the following prediction:
Prediction 3: For each participant, mean inspection times should be
longer for the cards that they have selected than for
those that they have not selected.
For each individual, two means were calculated from the transformed data and a
within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed [see Table 2.~(b)]..
This confirmed Prediction 3, that inspection times were longer for the cards that we;e:·
selected than those that were not, F(I, 33) = 65.13, MSE = 2.08,p < .001.
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TABLE2.3
Mean inspection times for selected and non-selected cards, for Experiment 1 showing
(a) inspection times (in seconds) for each item, and b) inspection times (in seconds)
and log times (in seconds) overall by participants (N= 34).
(a) by items
Selected Not Selected
Mean Mean
Rule Card N TD ND N TD ND
1. Ifp then q TA 30 1.28 1.55 4 0.24 0.43
FA 3 1.00 1.37 31 0.22 0.33
TC 12 1.18 1.64 22 0.76 1.11
FC 5 1.84 2.10 29 0.33 0.52
2. Ifp then not q TA 24 2.09 2.80 10 0.49 0.73
FA 7 1.58 1.81 27 0.42 0.97
TC 7 1.54 2.41 27 0.35 0.61
FC 10 1.58 0.51 24 0.90 0.63
3. If not p then q TA 18 1.58 2.13 16 0.38 0.56
FA 8 1.12 1.30 26 1.28 1.56
TC 22 1.94 2.75 12 0.87 1.36
FC 10 1.22 1.66 24 0.56 0.70
4. If not p then not q TA 19 1.54 2.30 15 0.52 0.93
FA 12 1.75 2.67 22 0.80 1.50
TC 17 1.46 2.27 17 0.46 0.88
,
FC II 2.14 2.70 23 0.98 1.54
" .:.",
(b) by participants Selected Not selected
Mean SD Mean SD
Natural data 2.16 1.40 0.90 0.65
Transformed data: log time 0.24 0.24 -0.11 0.27
Transformed data: corrected time 1.54 0.58
Note: TD = transformed data (in original units); ND = natural data; TA = true antecedent, FA = false
antecedent, TC = true consequent, Fe = false consequent.
Despite finding support for the three predictions, one possible criticism for
interpreting these findings as support for Evans' heuristic-analytic theory, is that
although there is evidence that people select more matching than mismatching cards, r., ;.'~ _
f ~ .•
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together with evidence that people spend longer inspecting selected cards than
rejected cards, the analysis doesn't show that these two findings hold conjointly (i.e.,
that people who select matching cards are the same people as those that spend longer
looking at selected cards). The heuristic-analytic theory would predict reliab.l~
differences between selected and non-selected inspection times for both matching and .
mismatching cards. Therefore, it is possible to derive two more predictions from the
theory:
Prediction 4(a) For each participant the mean inspection time will
be longer for the matching cards they select than for
those they reject; and
Prediction 4(b) For each participant, the mean inspection time will
be longer for the mismatching cards they select than
for those they reject.
Planned contrasts were carried out and provided good support for both predictions.
For the matching-selected versus matching-rejected comparison, the respective mean
inspection times were 1.71 sand 0.82 s (transformed data in natural units) which was
highly reliable, F(I, 24) = 47.98, MSE= 1.84,p < .001. For the mismatching-selected
versus the mismatching-rejected comparison, the mean inspection times were 1.50 s
and 0.43 s (transformed data in natural units), which was also highly reliable, F(1, 24)
= 59.14, MSE= 4.59,p < .001.
2.4.3 Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 appear to provide good support for the three predictions
derived from Evans (1996, 2006) heuristic-analytic theory. The results demonstrate
that cards that are selected are inspected for longer than cards that are not selected.
Utilising the eye-tracking methodology has eliminated the sources of bias identified
by Roberts and has left a robust inspection-time effect. It is noted, however, that the
present inspection times are relatively shorter than the times reported by Evans
(1996). This is important because Evans makes claims about the processes involved
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during the time participants spend looking at cards. It is possible that extreme outliers
in Evans' (1996) study could account for the longer-duration inspection-time data that
he obtained (see Roberts, 1998b, for related arguments).
It also seems that Prediction 4 continues to demonstrate good support for the
heuristic-analytic theory. It is useful to note that Evans (1996, 1998a) has clarified
that 'relevance' effects can extend well beyond matching cards in determining
selections. For example, on the abstract task Evans (1989) proposed the if-heuristic to
drive the selection of the true antecedent card across all rules regardless of whether or
not these cards have matching status. He has also found that when selection patterns
vary-as they do across thematic versions of the selection task-they can still be
interpreted as arising from relevance judgements (Evans, 1996). So, when people
make different card selections from one another, all that is happening is that different
linguistic, pragmatic or attentional factors have cued relevance via heuristic processes.
Before accepting the findings of Experiment 1 as definitive evidence for the heuristic-
analytic theory, however, it is important to be aware of a further possible bias arising
from the design of this experiment. In this experiment the task involved participants
pointing to the cards that they wanted to choose. The total inspection time on a
selected card, therefore, included both: (1) the time spent looking at the card during its
consideration by the reasoner, and (2) the pointing-response time-as the task only
required participants to make active responses (i.e., pointing) for cards that they
wanted to select. This procedural requirement, therefore, could have had the same
effect on inspection times as the hesitation bias that Roberts (1998b) described and
dealt with in his Experiment 3 (i.e., it could have inflated the inspection times for
selected cards over rejected ones). The concern, then, is that the reliable inspection-
time findings observed in Experiment 1 could, once again, be a consequence of a
methodological artefact that has inadvertently confounded the results (I am grateful to
Max Roberts for comments and discussions that led to the identification of this
problem).
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An artefact-based explanation of the findings of Experiment 1 could be rejected 'if it
could be demonstrated that any time inflation arising from an active decision
requirement would be inadequate, in itself, to account for the full difference in
inspection times between selected and non-selected cards. On examination of the
video files for instances when card selections occurred, it could be noted that the
actual time taken from when a participant initiated the movement of the pointing
device to the time when they registered the card selection was always very short
(usually around 0.5 s and seldom taking longer than 1 s). In contrast, the mean
inspection-time difference between selected cards and non-selected cards was 1.26 s
(natural data); 0.96 s for transformed data in original units), which indicates that
around 0.5 s of the inspection-time difference between selected and non-selected
cards could not be accounted for by a pointing artefact. Therefore, this small, residual
inspection-time effect may well be a reflection of the predicted influence of an
analytic rationalisation process.
2.5 Experiment 2
Although Experiment 1 seems to provide support for an inspection-time effect as
predicted by Evans (e.g., 1996, 2006), the support is weakened due to the identified
pointing bias that may arise from the fact that participants were only required to make
active choices for cards that they wanted to select. The purpose of Experiment 2 was
to remove the pointing bias by fully separating the process of registering the selection
of cards from the process of reasoning on the task.
For each presented selection task in Experiment 2, then, participants were instructed
to press a button to activate a light (situated above the problem) that indicated when
they were ready to make their decisions. This light was visible on the recording of the
participant's eye movements, and so at the data-analysis stage it was possible to omit
the pointing time from the cumulative inspection-time scores for selected cards.
If the inspection-time effect on selected cards observed in Experiment 1 was purely
due to this pointing bias then a reduced (or possibly completely eliminated)
,'.' ,,-I
inspection-time effect would be expected in Experiment 2. However, if the inspectlon~
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time effect remained despite eradicating the pointing bias, then this would lend very
good support to the heuristic-analytic account of reasoning on the selection task as
proposed by Evans (e.g., 1996,2006).
2.5.1 Method
Participants
Participantswere 30 undergraduates at the University of Derby who participated in the
experiment in order to gain course credit. They had not had any teaching on the
psychologyof reasoningbefore this experiment.
Materials and apparatus
All materials and apparatus were identical to those used in Experiment 1.
Additionally, participants were given a small button-box to hold in their non-favoured
hand. Before making their selection decisions participants were required to press the
button, which briefly activated a light to indicate that they were ready to make their
choices.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 1, except that the instructions
were modified slightly to incorporate the use of the button-box:
This study is concerned with people's logical reasoning ability and will
entail you having to tackle a total of four problems. Each of these problems
will appear on a separate sheet in front of you. Each problem consists 0("
four cards and a rule that applies to those cards. This rule may be true or
false. The cards have been constructed so that each one always has a letter
on one side and a single figure number on the other side. Naturally only one
side of each card will be visible to you.
For each problem your task is to decide which card or cards need to be
turned over in order to discover whether or not the rule is true. Once you
have reached a point where you think you know which card or cards need to
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be turned over then please press the button on your hand-held button-box.
This will momentarily activate a light so that the experimenter knows that
you are ready to indicate your selections. The experimenter will then ask
you to point at the card or cards that you feel need to be turned over using
the hand-held pointer.
As in Experiment 1, the experimenter went through the instructions with the
participants to ensure that they understood them. Again each task was presented
separately. Responses were made using a 20 em metal pointer.
2.5.2 Results
Coding tire inspection-time data
The process of data coding was identical to that of Experiment 1. However the
pressing of the button activated a small light above each of the selection-task
problems that were presented. At the coding stage, when this light appeared the
coding of the data was halted. This meant that unlike Experiment 1, inspection times
now did not include the time it took participants to make their decisions. The pointing
.. { /'\ '.
bias was, therefore, fully eliminated in the analysis of data for Experiment 2.
Statistical analysis
Card selection frequencies
Matching indices again showed significant effects in line with the matching bias
hypothesis. A one-tailed Wilcoxon test revealed more antecedent matching cards were
selected than antecedent mismatching ones (p = .02) and more consequent matching
cards were selected than mismatching ones (p = .004). Again, mean percentage of
frequency can be seen at the bottom of Table 2.4. A significant difference was found
for the frequency of choices of the four logical cases (X= 44.17, df = 3, p < .001,
Friedman test). Again, there was a preference for TA choices over all other cases with
FA being the least popular choice. There was also a preference for TC over FC, which
again could indicate a verification bias.
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Card inspection times
Analyses of the inspection-time data were identical to those of Experiment 1 using
log-transformed data. The frequency of selections and mean inspection times for each
card can be seen in Table 2.4. The correlation between selection frequency and mean
inspection time was significant, r = .62, N= 16,p = .007.
TABLE2.4
Percentage frequency of card selections and overall mean inspection times (in
seconds) and log times (in seconds) for each item in Experiment 2 (N = 30).
Card
TA FA re FC
Rule Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
1. Ifpthenq Frequency of selections 86.7 6.7 60.0 3.3
Natural data: time 3.73 3.80 1.67 1.67 3.57 3.19 2.21 2.64
Transformed data: log time 0.43 0.40 0.07 0.47 0.44 0.37 0.13 0.49
Transformed data: corrected time 2.49 0.98 2.55 1.15
2. If P then not q Frequency of selections 83.3 23.3 13.3 43.3
Natural data: time 5.04 4.75 3.04 5.26 2.39 4.02 4.74 6.00
Transformed data: log time 0.55 0.41 0.24 0.44 0.18 0.43 0.42 0.50
Transformed data: corrected time 3.35 1.54 1.31 2.43
3. Ifnot p then q Frequency of selections 53.3 16.7 56.7 33.3
Natural data: time 5.98 11.15 5.44 7.59 5.70 7.67 4.30 5.87
Transformed data: log time 0.43 0.53 0.54 0.42 0.51 0.50 0.43 0.47
Transformed data: corrected time 2.49 3.27 3.04 2.49
4. Ifnot p then not q Frequency of selections 60.0 30.0 50.0 36.7
Natural data: time 4.46 3.57 5.12 4.91 5.15 5.82 7.15 9.73
Transformed data: log time 0.53 0.38 0.55 0.42 0.53 0.41 0.60 0.49
Transformed data: corrected time 3.19 3.35 3.19 3.78
Mean 57.3 19.2 45.0 29.2
Note: TA = true antecedent; FA = false antecedent; TC = true consequent; FC = false consequent
,'''- ,"
" '~', -e. ~
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Table 2.5(a) shows the mean inspection times (before and after transformation) for
selected cards and non-selected cards for each of the 16 cards. For transformed data
the difference between mean inspection times on selected and non-selected card times'f .
was in the expected direction for 13 of the 16 cases (correlations range from -0.09 to
0.49) which is significant on the binomial test, p = .004, two-tailed.
Despite having removed the biases identified by Roberts and in Experiment 1, there
was still a reliable inspection-time effect. This was confirmed using a participant-level
analysis where the pairs of mean inspection times [see Table 2.5(b)] for each
participant for selected and non-selected cards were compared using ANDV A, F(l,
29) = 43.25, MSE = 0.98,p < .001.
Again, two separate contrasts (by-participants) were undertaken to determine the
reliability of the selected versus non-selected difference for matching cards (3.25 s vs.
2.43 s; transformed data in natural units), and for mismatching cards (3.60 s vs. 1.31
s). Both contrasts were reliable, F(1, 23) = 5.06, MSE = 0.41,p = .034, and F(l, 23) =
41.38, MSE = 3.92,p < .001, respectively.
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TABLE2.5
Mean inspection times for selected and non-selected cards, for Experiment 2, showing
(a) inspection times (in seconds) for each item, and b) inspection times (in seconds)
and log times (in seconds) overall by participants (N= 30).
a) by items
Selected Not Selected
Mean Mean
Rule Card N TD ND N TD ND
1. Ifp then q TA 26 2.43 3.29 4 2.82 6.56
FA 2 4.93 4.98 28 0.85 1.43
Te 18 2.62 3.23 12 2.49 4.09
Fe 1 10.98 10.98 29 1.06 1.91
2. If P then not q TA 25 3.69 5.41 5 2.14 3.18
FA 7 3.43 5.35 23 1.18 2.34
Te 4 1.42 1.53 26 1.28 2.52
Fe 13 3.35 6.40 17 1.89 3.47
3. Ifnot p then q TA 16 3.97 9.72 14 .1.50 _1.69 .._.:._
FA 5 3.04 4.58 25 3.35 5.61
Te 17 3.69 4.73 13 2.37 6.97
Fe 10 4.37 7.39 20 1.84 2.76
4. Ifnot p then not q TA 18 4.59 5.67 12 1.84 2.66
FA 9 2.96 3.82 21 3.60 5.67
Te 15 4.07 5.94 15 2.55 4.36
Fe 11 4.17 8.37 19 3.52 6.44
b) by participants Selected Not selected
Mean SD Mean SD
Natural data 5.33 4.61 3.34 3.39
Transformed data: log time 0.56 0.29 0.31 0.33
Transformed data: corrected time
: .:.'1
3.43 1.84
: :-,::
Note: TD = transformed data (in original units); ND = natural data; TA = true antecedent, FA = false
antecedent, Te = true consequent; Fe = false consequent
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2.5.3 Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 show that despite removing all sources of task-format
biases-including the pointing bias identified in relation to Experiment I-there
remained a strong inspection-time effect, as predicted by Evans' (1996, 2006)
heuristic-analytic theory. One interesting point of difference between the inspection-
time effect seen in Experiment 2 and Experiment I, however, is that the mean,
participant-level, inspection-time difference between selected and non-selected cards
in Experiment 2 (1.99 s for natural data; 1.59 s for transformed data in original units)
was actually greater than that in Experiment I, where the pointing bias was
potentially present (1.26 s for natural data; 0.96 s for transformed data in original
units). One cause of this finding might be the response-collection method used in
Experiment 2, whereby participants alerted the experimenter before making their
decisions. It is possible that this technique actually served to amplify the size of the
inspection-time effect, so that participants repeated the processing of the cards so as to
be sure of their selections before committing themselves. This explanation does not,
of course, undermine the evidence for the predicted inspection-time imbalance that
occurs between selected and non-selected cards, as the amplification of the effect can
only occur if the effect is there in the first place.
The presence of the inspection-time effect in Experiment 2 is very different to that of
Roberts (1998b) in his Experiment 3 (forced 'yes/no' choice on each card) and his
Experiment 4 (forced 'yes/no' choice on each card combined with individual card
presentation). Roberts' task modifications addressed the problem of hesitation bias
and caused the inspection-time effect firstly to be reduced and then to be lost
completely. By requiring participants to attend to each card individually, Roberts
argued that the perceived relevance of the cards may have been altered, causing each
one to appear equally relevant, so reducing the inspection-time effect. Roberts
suggests that Evans' (1996) inspection-time effect is weakened because there is no
competition between other information as there is when the cards are presented
together. Once this method is combined with a forced 'yes/no' choice on each card,
then participants are further encouraged to think about the alternative values of each
card.
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It is possible, then, that the inspection-time effect as predicted by the' heuristic-
analytic theory is, indeed, non-existent, or, alternatively, that the way in which
Roberts has altered the selection task has disrupted the normal processes on the task
and caused his null results. However, if an inspection-time effect was found with
forced decisions for each card using the eye-movement methodology, this would go
against the view espoused by Roberts, and would instead, be good support for the
heuristic-analytic theory. It could also mean that Roberts' findings were not due to the
non-standard task-format but rather because the mouse-pointing methodology lacks
the sensitivity to detect inspection-time effects. In other words, mouse pointing may
simply be a very poor process-tracing method that is unable to detect inspection-time
effects, unlike eye-movement tracking, which affords a greater sensitivity in
measuring momentary fluctuations in the allocation of attention to cards. In orderto
assess these ideas, forced select/reject decisions were required for all cards within the
selection-task study that was run in Experiment 3.
2.6 Experiment 3
The aim of Experiment 3 was to investigate the use of the forced-decision task, where
select/reject choices were enforced for all presented cards. Experiment 3 was,
therefore, a replication of Roberts' (1998b) Experiments 3 and 4, which were
designed to standardise any influence of the hesitation bias that is caused by
participants making active decisions only about those cards that they want to choose,
as having to make an active decision for all cards avoids any localised inflation' of
inspection-times for just selected cards that might arise with the standard presentation
of the selection task. Roberts required participants to make an active decision about
each card by adding a 'yes' and a 'no' button under each card. He found that the
inspection-time effect was considerably reduced in this paradigm, only finding
support for the more powerful by-participants analysis (Prediction 3) in that mean
inspection times for selected cards were higher than mean inspection times for non-
selected cards.
Evans (1998a) agrees that on this version of the task participants are bound to
consider each card, and therefore it would be expected that the inspection-time effect
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would be weakened. He argues, however, that being forced to attend to a card that
would normally be ignored does not mean that cards will necessarily be perceived as
more relevant. Evans argues that although attention and relevance are compatible
concepts they are not the same thing, citing evidence of the matching bias effect on
truth-table tasks to support his claim. Evans (1972) showed that on a construction
version of the truth-table task, participants show a preference to construct cases that
match the lexical content of the rules. However, later studies employed the evaluation
version of the task where participants are presented with cases that conform to the
rule, contradict it or are irrelevant to the rule. Evans (1975) notes that this change of
task makes no difference to participants' choices; they still exhibit matching bias
although their attention has been drawn to cases that they would not normally
consider.
Using the 'yes-no' decision technique is also another way to negate the influence of a
. :' • "f (.~
possible pointing bias as identified in Experiment 1. Within the 'yes/no' paradigm,
any inflation in the allocation of attention to a card that results from the need to point
at it in order to register a decision would be equal for all cards. In terms of
predictions, then, it was hypothesised-in line with the heuristic-analytic theory-that
an inspection-time effect would still emerge in Experiment 3, even with the use of the
'yes-no' paradigm. Although this could be seen as a risky prediction, it was believed
that the sensitivity of the eye-tracking method should enable the detection of small but
reliable differences in inspection-times across cards. If this occurred, then this finding
would seem to provide very good support for the heuristic-analytic account.
2.6.1 Method '",
Participants
Participants were 31 undergraduates at the University of Derby who participated in the
experiment in order to gain course credit. They had not had any teaching on the
psychology of reasoningbefore this experiment.
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Materials and apparatus
All materials and apparatus were identical to those used in Experiments 1, but below
every card two separate boxes labelled 'yes' and 'no' (separated horizontally by 0.8
cm) were placed at a distance of about 1 cm from the card's lower edge.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that used in Experiments 1, except that participants
were required to make an active decision about every card presented to them. The
instructions reflected the changes to the task:
This study is concerned with people's logical reasoning ability and will
entail you having to tackle a total of four problems. Each of these problems
will appear on a separate sheet in front of you. Each problem consists of
four cards and a rule that applies to those cards. This rule may be true or
false. The cards have been constructed so that each one always has a letter
on one side and a single figure number on the other side. Naturally only one
side of each card will be visible to you.
For each problem your task is to decide which card or cards need t~be' \...
turned over in order to discover whether or not the rule is true. If you decide
that a card needs to be turned over then please point to the 'yes' box under
the card. If you decide that a card doesn't need to be turned over then point
to the 'no' box below the card. You will need to make a decision about each
of the cards presented to you.
As in Experiments 1 and 2, the experimenter went through the instructions with the
participants to ensure that they understood them. Again, each task was presented
separately and responses were made using a 20 cm metal pointer.
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2.6.2 Results
Coding the inspection-time data
The same procedure was used for coding the data as in Experiments 1 and 2. Coding
was halted when participants had finished making decisions about all four cards, that
is, when the pointer was moved away from the final card on which a decision had
been made.
Statistical analysis
Card selection frequencies
Support was again found for the matching-bias hypothesis as the matching indices
showed significant effects. A one-tailed Wilcoxon test showed that more antecedent
matching cards were selected than mismatching ones (p = .004) and more consequent
matching cards were selected than mismatching cards (p < .001). Mean percentage
frequency data are shown at the bottom of Table 2.6. A significant difference was
again found for the frequency of choices of the four logical cases (X = 31.45, df = 3, p
< .001, on a Friedman test). As with the previous two experiments there was a clear
preference for TA choices over all other cases. FA was again the least popular choice
and there was again a preference for TC over FC choices indicating a possible
verification bias.
Card inspection times
Log-transfonned data were analysed as in Experiments 1 and 2. The frequency of
selections and mean inspection times for each card can be seen in Table 2.6. Identical
analyses of the inspection time data as in Experiment 1 and 2 were performed, The
correlation between selection frequency and mean inspection time was significant, r =
.61, N = 16, P = .011 (transformed data).
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TABLE 2.6
Percentage frequency of card selections and overall mean inspection times (in
seconds) and log times (in seconds) for each item in Experiment 3 (N = 31).
Card
TA FA TC FC
Rule Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
1. If P then q Frequency of selections 90.3 16.1 74.2 16.1
Natural data: time 2.19 1.53 1.67 1.68 1.68 1.44 1.30 0.92
Transformed data: log time 0.31 0.25 0.15 0.33 0.18 0.27 0.09 0.30
Transformed data: corrected time 1.84 1.21 1.31 1.03
2. If p then not q Frequency of selections 90.3 29.0 16.1 64.5
Natural data: time 3.46 3.78 2.31 2.51 2.84 3.42 3.07 2.46
Transformed data: log time 0.39 0.38 0.25 0.38 0.28 0.43 0.41 0.31
Transformed data: corrected time 2.26 1.59 1.71 2.31
3. If not p then q Frequency of selections 61.3 25.8 83.9 22.6
Natural data: time 2.65 2.50 2.45 2.11 2.90 2.56 2.33 2.16
Transformed data: log time 0.32 0.36 0.28 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.25 0.38
Transformed data: corrected time 1.89 1.71 2.09 1.58
4. If not p then not q Frequency of selections 48.4 51.6 45.2 51.6
Natural data: time 1.96 1.57 2.61 2.34 2.08 1.55 2.56 2.02
Transformed data: log time 0.22 0.34 0.30 0.38 0.24 0.35 0.34 0.31
Transformed data: corrected time 1.50 1.80 1.54 1.99
Mean 72.6 30.6 54.9 38.7
Note: TA = true antecedent; FA = false antecedent; TC = true consequent; Fe = false consequent.
Mean inspection times (before and after transformation) for selected cards and non-
selected cards for each of the 16 cards are given in Table 2.7(a). For transformed data
the difference between mean inspection times for selected and non-selected cards was
in the expected direction for 9 out of the 16 cases (correlations range from -0.14 to
0.74) which is non-significant on the binomial test, p = .80 (two-tailed). However, the
more powerful individual-level analysis across the pairs of mean inspection times [see
Table 2.7(b)] for each participant for selected and non-selected cards was undertaken
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using ANOVA, and revealed a significant difference across cards, F(1, 30) = 14.87,
MSE= .11,p = .001.
TABLE2.7
Mean inspection times for selected and non-selected cards, for Experiment 3, showing
(a) inspection times (in seconds) for each item, and b) inspection times (in seconds)
and log times (in seconds) overall by participants (N = 31).
a) by items
Selected Not Selected
Mean Mean
Rule Card N TD ND N TD ND
1. Ifp then q TA 28 1.80 2.20 3 2.09 2.09
FA 5 1.99 2.48 26 1.12 1.51
Te 23 1.28 1.57 8 1.54 2.01
Fe 5 0.78 0.90 26 1.09 1.38
2. If P then not q TA 28 2.31 3.56 3 1.84 2.51
FA 9 3.11 4.26 22 1.18 1.52
Te 5 2.89 3.16 26 1.54 2.78
Fe 20 2.20 2.55 11 2.68 4.02
3. If not p then q TA 19 2.04 3.10 12 1.66 1.93
FA 8 1.42 1.91 23 1.80 2.63
Te 26 2.31 3.00 5 1.31 2.38
Fe 7 1.31 1.90 24 1.71 2.45
4. If not p then not q TA 15 1.54 1.75 16 1.39 2.18
FA 16 2.20 3.26 15 1.46 1.91
Te 14 1.35 1.84 17 1.71 2.27
Fe 16 2.20 2.84 15 1.75 2.26
b) by participants Selected Not selected
Mean SD Mean SD
Natural data 2.74 1.63 2.10 1.27
Transformed data: log time 0.33 0.22 0.25 0.21
Transformed data: corrected time 1.94 1.58
Note: TO = transformed data (in original units); NO = natural data; TA = true antecedent; FA = false
antecedent; TC = true consequent; Fe = false consequent.
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Two separate planned contrasts (by-participants) were performed in order to assess
the reliability of the selected versus non-selected difference for matching cards (2.20
s vs. 1.71 s; transformed data in natural units), and for mismatching cards (2.09 s vs.
1.46 s). Both contrasts were reliable: F(l,19) = 5.82, MSE = 0.28, p = .026, and
F(1,19) = 11.53, MSE = 0.53, p = .04, respectively.
2.6.3 Discussion
After removing all three task-format biases identified by Roberts (l998b), that is,
sensory leakage, forgetting to move the mouse, and hesitation prior to registering
active decisions, Experiment 3 still provided support for Evans' (1996) Prediction 1
(i.e., that cards with higher mean selection frequencies will also have higher mean
inspection times). Thus, there was still a strong association between selection rates
and time spent inspecting the cards. Evans' (1996) Prediction 2 (i.e., that for each card
people who choose it will have longer inspection times than those who do not choose
it) was not supported, but the more powerful individual-level analysis (Prediction 3)
proposed by Roberts (1998b) was supported: overall, the cards that individuals select
have longer inspection times than those cards that they do not select.
Despite creating a situation where participants are forced to look at all four cards and
whereby any influences of active response requirements were equalised across all
cards, it appears that the focus of participants' attention has actually only been
affected very slightly relative to what was observed in Experiment 1 and 2, that is,
there is just a small decrease in the size of the inspection-time effect overall compared
to the previous two experiments. In particular, the participant-level data for
Experiment 3 reveal the smallest inspection-time imbalance between selected and
rejected cards across the three experiments (0.64 s for natural data; 0.36 s for
transformed data in original units). However, this occurrence is not very surprising
when Evans' (l998a) argument is considered: that just because participants are forced
to look elsewhere on the task does not necessarily mean that heuristic processes are
not involved in directing attention (see Evans, 1998a, and Roberts, 1998a, for related
arguments). The key point is that even this response-compelled attention (as Roberts,
1998a, describes it) does not seem to undermine the presence of the inspection-time
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effect. Taken together, the results of Experiment 3 provide good support for the
heuristic-analytic account of selection-task performance.
2.7 General Discussion of Experiments 1, 2 and 3
Evans' (e.g., 1996, 2006) heuristic-analytic theory of the people's selections on the
abstract selection task claims that preconscious, heuristic processes direct attention
towards cards which appear relevant (which end up being selected) and away from
cards that seem irrelevant (which in tum are rejected), whilst conscious analytic
processes only serve to rationalise decisions that have already been made on the basis
of relevance. Experiments 1, 2 and 3 aimed to test the predictions of the heuristic-
analytic theory, which proposes that an inspection-time effect should be observable
when people engage in the task, that is, people should consider cards that they end up
selecting for longer than those that they end up rejecting because of the operation of
analytic rationalisation processes that are almost solely aimed at justifying
heuristically-determined choices on this task.
The three experiments used a direct measure of on-line attentional processing, that of
eye-movement tracking. which is a more sensitive, moment-by-moment index of the
locus of participants' attentional focus during the task. As well as being a more
sensitive method than previously used by Evans (1996) and Roberts (l998b), the eye-
tracking methodology also allowed for the removal of task-induced biases that
Roberts (1998b) has suggested may be the sole reason for the inspection-time effect
that Evans (1996) observed.
In Experiment 1, a standard selection-task paradigm was employed. In this version
active, pointing responses were registered for selected cards only. Although a robust
inspection-time effect was observed, the required pointing response for only selected
cards meant that the experimental condition may have inadvertently introduced a
possible methodological artefact, in that the time taken to point to selected cards could
have caused inflated inspection-times on these cards compared to non-selected ones.
Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to eradicate such a pointing bias. Experiment 2
separated the reasoning part of the task from the selection of cards by monitoring
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inspection-times only up to the moment directly prior to participants making their
decisions. In Experiment 3, the pointing bias was equalised across all four cards since
participants were asked to make a yes or no decision for every card on the task. Both
Experiments 2 and 3 established reliable inspection-time effects, although the effect in
Experiment 3 was slightly reduced in magnitude.
The inspection-time effect, as predicted by Evans' (1996, 2006) heuristic-analytic
account of the selection task, appeared to be highly reliable across Experiments 1 to 3,
despite differences in the problem formats and decision requirements. A failure to
support the inspection-time effect with the eye-tracking methodology could have
caused serious problems for the heuristic-analytic account, and could have bought into
doubt the theoretical assumptions of the theory (Roberts, 1998a, 1998b). The fact that
the present dataset support the validity of an inspection-time effect seem to attest to
the validity of Evans' heuristic-analytic predictions.
It is also noteworthy that despite the methodological problems that might have
undermined Evans' (1996) mouse-tracking and inspection-time findings, a subsequent
study by Roberts and Newton (2001) reported three new selection task experiments
that added methodological improvements to the basic mouse-tracking approach.
These new experiments indicated that mouse-pointing measures can be sensitive to
effects predicted by the heuristic-analytic framework. In particular, one modification
involved the use of 'change' tasks, whereby participants were given cards that were
either presented as selected or non-selected and they had to change them where
necessary. Results demonstrated a reliable association between card selection and
increased inspection times. Roberts and Newton (2001) accept that this result does
provide support for the view that heuristic-induced biases influence choices.
Roberts and Newton (2001) also presented two further studies (Experiments 2 and 3)
using a rapid-response selection task (requiring a card decision within 2 s of its
presentation) that led them to propose an important caveat concerning the adequacy of
the heuristic-analytic theory-although they remained broadly favourable toward this
account. They note that their rapid-response tasks raised levels of matching for
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consequent cards on certain rule forms (without changing levels of logical
responding) in comparison with free-time tasks. This suggests that analytic processing
arising in free-time situations may serve to overturn candidate cards cued through
attentional heuristics, in contradiction to Evans' heuristic-analytic account, but in line
with mental models proposals (see also Feeney & Handley, 2000; Handley, Feeney, &
Harper, 2002, for other evidence claiming the involvement of models-based analytic
processing in variants of the abstract selection task). It is possible, however, that the
analytic effects that influence card selections identified by Roberts and Newton
(2001) may be restricted to a subset of individuals, with a majority responding
equivalently under both speeded and unspeeded conditions. Thus the heuristic-
analytic theory may capture the behaviour of most individuals, whilst other accounts
(e.g., mental models theory) may better describe the processing of a subset of
individuals (see Stanovich & West, 1998, for evidence of individual differences in
responding on the selection task).
One important question is whether other contemporary theories of the selection task
can incorporate the reliable inspection-time effect found in these experiments. The
first account to consider is Oaksford and Chater's (1994) information gain theory. It
seems that this theory would have difficulty in dealing with the inspection-time effect
as the account suggests that people derive expected information gains for each card,
and this should presumably take an equivalent amount of time for each card whether a
card ends up being selected or rejected. However, it is somewhat improper to critique
this theory in relation to its apparent inability to explain the findings of inspection-
time experiments because as it currently stands, the information gain account is a
computational-level theory of what needs to be computed by the cognitive system,
rather than an algorithmic-level theory that specifies the detailed nature and time-
course of the processing steps that occur in card selection. Although information gain
theory offers a compelling account of many selection-task results, it will only be able
to accommodate inspection-time findings by specifying a process model of selection-
task behaviour.
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The next theory of selection-task performance to consider is the recent instantiation of
the mental models account (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). This theory proposes that
with indicative versions of the selection task people will think about each of the
presented cards in turn, and then select only those cards that could impact on the
rule's truth or falsity. This account would seem to predict equivalent inspection times
for all cards, as reasoners attempt to integrate each card with their model of the
conditional to determine the impact on the rule's truth or falsity.
One important aspect of the data from Experiments 1 to 3 that warrants some further
consideration in relation to the heuristic-analytic theory is the fact that participants
generally were observed to spend only a very short amount of time inspecting the
cards, regardless of whether they went on to select them or not. If the inspection-time
data are examined across the experiments it can be seen that inspection times ranged
from 1.54 s to 3.43 s for selected cards and from 0.58 s to 1.84 s for non-selected
cards (transformed data in original units in all cases). Roberts and Newton (2001) also
report a small inspection-time effect, finding the difference between selected and
rejected cards was just 0.30 s. There would appear to be two key explanations for this
smaller than expected inspection-time effect. One is that rationalisation processes are
occurring very quickly, rather than being slow in nature; the other is that
rationalisation processes are not occurring at all (though the latter account would still
require some explanation to be provided for the small but reliable inspection-time
effect that clearly does exist). Further details of the specific aspects of cognitive
processing that may give rise to the small inspection-time effect with the selection
task will be explored in the next chapter, in the context of the subsequent series of
experiments that formed part of the present thesis.
Overall, then, the eye-tracking methodology has now been established in relation to
selection-task research in Experiments 1, 2 and 3, and can profitably be applied in
future research to investigate the inspection-time effect without the risk of any
methodological artefacts having a bearing on the results. In addition, it appears that
Evans' (e.g., 1996, 2006) heuristic-analytic theory of selection-task performance may
provide a better account of card inspection-time data than other contemporary theories
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of the selection task. However, the small inspection-time effect that was produced
across Experiments 1 to 3-which has also been reported elsewhere in the literature
(Roberts & Newton, 2001)-certainly warrants further investigation. It is this feature
of the inspection-time effect that motivated the four experiments that are reported in
Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Experiment 4 to 7
Although the experiments reported in Chapter 2 produced good evidence for a reliable
inspection-time effect-with selected cards being considered for a longer time than
rejected cards-the actual magnitude of this effect remained small in all three
experiments. For example, across Experiments 1 to 3, mean by-participants inspection
times for selected cards ranged from 1.54 s to 3.43 s, and for non-selected cards from
0.58 s to 1.84 s (transformed data in original units in all cases). Thus, selected cards
were only being inspected for, at best, a second or so longer than non-selected ones.
On first sight, then, the relatively small magnitude of the inspection-time effect seems
to be inconsistent with Evans' (e.g., 1996, 2006) view that the effect may be
attributable to the functioning of analytic rationalisation processes that are applied to
to-be-selected cards in order to justify heuristically-determined choices. Surely,
rationalisation processes should take more than a second or so to apply, since
establishing a satisficing-based analytic justification for a to-be-selected card should
presumably be a non-trivial operation?
There seem to be two main explanations for this apparent anomaly of a small
inspection-time effect. First, the notion that a satisficing-driven rationalisation process
should take a relatively long time to execute may well be misconceived. Research by
Wason and Evans (1975), for example, explored the justifications that people
provided for card selections, and revealed a phenomenon that they dubbed secondary
matching bias. This is the tendency for participants to explain card selections in terms
of the matching values that might be present on the reverse sides of cards. For
example, given the conditional rule 'If there is an A on one side of the card then there
is a 3 011 the other side', it is common for participants to give an explanation of the
selection of the 'A' card by stating that a '3' on the other side (i.e., a matching value)
would 'verify' the rule. Whilst this rationalisation process is conscious, evaluative and
analytic, it may, however, be guided by the rapid, heuristic cueing of information.
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There is no a priori reason to assume, then, that the analytic rationalisation of to-be-
selected cards should take longer than a few seconds to achieve, if it is accepted that
this rationalisation process can be guided by secondary matching heuristics.
There is, however, an alternative-and at least equally plausible-explanation for the
small magnitude of inspection-time effect observed in Chapter 2. This explanation
revolves around the idea that the analytic rationalisation of to-be-selected cards does
indeed take place relatively slowly, but occurs primarily when participants re-inspect
the rule presented to them, rather than when they inspect the actual cards. Instances of
rule re-inspection occurred very frequently in all three eye-movement tracking
experiments reported in Chapter 2. For example, the average frequency of rule re-
inspection for Experiment 1 across all four problems was 7.50 (SD = 3.14), for
Experiment 2 was 8.00 (SD = 4.97) and for Experiment 3 was 7.70 (SD = 3.01).
These data can be broken down further in terms of re-inspection frequencies for each
rule type within each experiment, as depicted in Table * below:
Table *: Mean rule re-inspection frequencies across all four rules in Experiments 1-3.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Mean (SI» Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Total mean
Ifp then q 6.00 (1.87) 5.00 (2.00) 5.80 (1.30) 5.60
If P then not q 5.60 (1.95) 6.S0 (5.45) 10.20 (3.96) 7.53
If not p then q 9.00 (3.39) 9.40 (6.47) 6.80 (1.64) 7.S7
If not p then not q 9.40 (3.65) 10.80 (4.09) 8.00 (3.0S) 9.47
Table * shows that overall, the affirmative rule (If p then q) receives the lowest
number of re-inspections and that the double negation rule ut not p then 1I0t q)
receives the highest number of re-inspections. The single-negation rules (Ifp then not
q and If 110t P then q) lie in-between the extremes of the affirmative and double
negation rules in terms of the number of re-inspections that they receive. These data
confirm that people are re-inspecting rules a number of times within this presentation
paradigm. More importantly, such evidence is compatible with the possibility that
such rule re-inspection may be associated with time spent rationalising card choices.
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3.1 Experiment 4
In an attempt to arbitrate between the two aforementioned explanations for the small
magnitude of the inspection-time effect in the selection task, a new eye-movement
tracking experiment was conducted-again using the abstract task with the full
negations paradigm. This experiment set out to separate temporally the rule
presentation from the card presentation for each task, so that participants were unable
to spend time thinking about card selections whilst re-inspecting the associated
conditional rule. It was predicted that if rationalisation processes are normally
associated with rule re-inspection, then the visual absence of the rule might serve to
shift the rationalisation process on to the to-be-selected cards themselves-hence
increasing the magnitude of the inspection-time effect from that observed in
Experiments 1 to 3. On the other hand, if similar inspection-time magnitudes were
observed in this new experiment to those seen in Experiments 1 to 3, then this would
suggest that analytic rationalisation processes indeed operate rapidly, perhaps guided
by the automatic heuristic cueing of matching values for hidden sides of cards.
3.1.1 Method
Design
The design was a correlational one in which two measures were taken: whether or not
a card was selected, and the associated inspection time for the card.
Participants
participants were 30 undergraduates at the University of Derby who gained course
credit for their involvement. Participants had not had any teaching on the psychology
of reasoning.
Materials and apparatus
All materials and apparatus were identical to those used in Experiment 3, except that
for each selection task the rule presentation was separated from the presentation of the
associated cards (i.e., the rule was first presented on one sheet and followed the 2 x 2
arrangement of cards on another sheet).
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Procedure
Apart from the use of a rule-separation technique, the basic experimental procedure in
this experiment was identical to that adopted in Experiment 3 (i.e., a forced-choice
'yes/no' decision was required for all presented cards). The following instructions
reflect the small changes to the procedure that were necessitated by the employment
of the rule-separation method:
This study is concerned with people's logical reasoning ability and will
entail you having to tackle a total of four problems. Each problem
consists of four cards and a rule that applies to those cards. This rule may
be true or false. The cards have been constructed so that each one always
has a letter on one side and a single figure number on the other side.
Naturally, only one side of each card will be visible to you.
For each problem your task is to decide which card or cards need to be
turned over in order to discover whether or not the rule is true. If you
decide that a card needs to be turned over then please point to the 'yes'
box under the card. If you decide that a card doesn't need to be turned
over then point to the 'no' box. You will need to make a decision about
each card presented to you.
Please note that for each problem the rule will be presented on a separate
sheet of paper to the associated cards. This means that you will need to
commit each rule to memory before you tackle each problem. You have
30 seconds to do this.
As in Experiments 1 to 3, the experimenter went through the instructions with the
participants to ensure that they understood them. Again, each task was presented
separately and responses were made using a 20 cm metal pointer.
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3.1.2 Results
Coding the inspection-time data
The same procedure was used for coding the data as in Experiment 3. Coding was
terminated when a participant had finished making their decisions about all four cards
on a task (i.e., when the pointer was moved away from the final card for which a
'yes/no' decision had been made).
Statistical analysis
Card selection frequencies
Before the inspection-time data were examined, standard statistical analyses were
performed (as described by Evans, Ball, & Brook, 1987) to assess the pattern of card
selections, and to see whether the data conformed to the response findings typically
observed in the literature. A one-tailed Wilcoxon test showed that more antecedent-
matching cards were selected than antecedent-mismatching ones (z = -3.81, p < .001)
and that more consequent-matching cards were selected than consequent-mismatching
ones (z = -3.99, p < .001). A Friedman test indicated a significant difference for the
frequency of choices across logical cases (X = 24.46, df = 3, p < .001). As the
literature suggests, there was a large preference for TA choices over all other cases
and FA was the least popular choice. There was also a preference, although smaller,
for TC over FC, which, as suggested in Chapter 2, could be evidence for a verification
bias as well as a matching bias. Overall, then, the card-selection data revealed a
typical response pattern to that seen in the selection-task literature.
Card inspection times
Selection frequencies and mean inspection times (before and after transformation) for
all cards are shown in Table 3.1. The first analysis tested Prediction 1: that cards with
higher selection frequencies will have higher mean inspection times. The results
indicated a strong association between selection frequencies and inspection times: r =
.55, N = 16, p = .014 (transformed data).
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TABLE3.1
Percentage frequency of card selections and overall mean inspection times (in
seconds) and log times (in seconds) for each item in Experiment 4 (N = 30).
Card
TA FA TC FC
Rule Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
1. Ifp then q Frequency of selections 100.0 3.3 76.7 0.0
Natural data: time 2.49 1.68 2.02 1.51 2.55 1.43 1.81 0.94
Transformed data: log time 0.36 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.39 0.22 0.26 0.21
Transformed data: corrected time 2.09 1.62 2.25 1.62
2. If p then not q Frequency of selections 73.3 26.7 23.3 53.3
Natural data: time 3.46 2.38 2.26 1.48 2.47 1.66 3.99 2.67
Transformed data: log time 0.47 0.33 0.32 0.25 0.36 0.25 0.53 0.29
Transformed data: corrected time 2.75 1.89 2.09 3.19
3. If not p then q Frequency of selections 56.7 43.3 76.7 40.0
Natural data: time 3.14 3.81 4.89 4.34 4.00 2.62 2.85 1.85
Transformed data: log time 0.36 0.38 0.56 0.37 0.53 0.30 0.41 0.26
Transformed data: corrected time 2.09 3.43 3.19 2.37
4. If not p then not q Frequency of selections 36.7 60.0 33.3 56.7
Natural data: time 3.16 3.07 3.67 3.41 2.72 2.19 3.69 3.14
Transformed data: log time 0.39 0.35 0.46 0.34 0.37 0.29 0.47 0.32
Transformed data: corrected time 2.25 2.68 2.14 2.75
Mean 66.68 33.3 52.5 37.5
Note: TA = true antecedent; FA = false antecedent; TC = true consequent; FC = false consequent.
The second analysis tested Prediction 2: that for any given card, mean inspection
times for individuals selecting it will be greater than for those not selecting it. Table
3.2(a) shows the mean inspection times for selected and non-selected cards for all 16
cases. For two of the cards, 100% selection or non-selection rates were recorded. This
meant that comparing mean inspection times for selections and non-selections was
impossible for these cards. For the remaining 14 cards the difference between mean
times on selected and non-selected cards (on transformed data) was in the expected
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direction for 6 of the 14 cards (correlations ranged from -0.34 to 0.43). This was not
significant on the binomial test, indicating a failure to support Prediction 2.
The third analysis involved a test of the more powerful Prediction 3 proposed by
Roberts (1998): that for each participant, mean inspection times should be longer for
the cards that they have selected than for those that they have not selected. For each
individual, two means were calculated from the transformed data, and a within-
participants analysis of variance was performed [see Table 3.2(b)]. This confirmed
Prediction 3; inspection times were longer for the cards that were selected than those
that were not, F(1, 29) = 5.64, MSE = 0.06, p = .024.
Finally, two separate planned contrasts were carded out in order to assess the
reliability of the selected versus non-selected difference for matching cards (2.75 s vs.
2.43 s: transformed data in natural units), and for mismatching cards (2.26 s vs. 1.84
s; transformed data in natural units). Both contrasts were reliable: F(1,17) = 6.36,
MSE= 0.22, P = .022, and F(1,17) = 19.27, MSE = 0.43, P < .001, respectively.
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TABLE3.2
Mean inspection times for selected and non-selected cards, for Experiment 4, showing,
(a) inspection times (in seconds) for each item, and b) inspection times (in seconds)
and log times (in seconds) overall by participants (N = 30).
a) by items
Selected Not Selected
Mean Mean
Rule Card N TO NO N TO NO
1. Ifp then q TA 30 2.49 2.09 0
FA 1 6.36 6.41 29 1.87 1.54
Te 23 2.45 2.14 7 2.89 2.55
Fe 0 30 1.81 1.62
2. If p then not q TA 22 3.43 2.55 8 3.53 3.19
FA 8 3.37 2.97 22 1.86 1.62
Te 7 2.13 1.94 23 2.58 2.09
Fe 16 4.42 3.78 14 3.50 2.68
3. If not p then q TA 17 4.27 2.82 13 2.28 1.66
FA 23 5.40 3.78 17 4.50 3.19
Te 23 3.97 3.19 7 4.10 3.43
Fe 12 2.24 1.84 18 3.26 2.82
4. If not p then not q TA 11 2.60 2.14 19 3.48 2.31
FA 18 4.24 3.19 12 2.82 2.04
Te 10 2.32 1.66 20 2.92 2.43
Fe 17 2.87 2.20 13 4.76 3.69
b) by participants Selected Not selected
Mean SO Mean SO
Natural data 3.31 1.49 2.92 1.64
Transformed data: log time 0.44 0.20 0.38 0.16
Transformed data: corrected time 2.55 2.20
Note: TO = transformed data (in original units); NO = natural data; TA = true antecedent; FA = false
antecedent; 'I'C = true consequent; Fe = false consequent.
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3.1.3 Discussion
Overall, the inspection-time analyses for Experiment 4 provided good support for the
predictions of Evans' (e.g., 1996, 2006) heuristic-analytic account of selection-task
performance, although it must be acknowledged that one of the heuristic-analytic
predictions (i.e., Prediction 2) failed to show a reliable effect. This may, however, be
a consequence of the lack of power associated with the by-items analysis for this
prediction.
The main rationale for running Experiment 4 was to begin to investigate the issue of
the relatively small magnitude of the inspection-time effect observed in Experiments 1
to 3 (as well as in Roberts and Newton's, 2001 study). One possible hypothesis was
that people might be engaging in analytic rationalisation processes as they re-inspect a
presented rule (rather than when looking at the to-be-selected cards themselves). By
separating the presentation of the rule and the presentation of the cards an increase in
the inspection-time effect for the actual cards might be found, which would support a
rule re-inspection hypothesis. The alternative hypothesis was that analytic
rationalisation does take place almost entirely during inspection of to-be-selected
cards, but that this rationalisation happens very quickly.
In relation to these alternative hypotheses the present data seem definitive [Table
3.2(b)]. The mean inspection-time difference for selected cards versus non-selected
cards was 0.35 s. Although this difference in inspection times was reliable, it was still
small, indicating that people attended to to-be-selected items for only about a third of
a second more than to-be-rejected items. This does not lend any support to the rule re-
inspection hypothesis (i.e., that people are engaging in rationalisation processes whilst
looking back at the conditional rule), otherwise an increased inspection-time effect
should have arisen when the rule was absent from the display. The results instead
suggests then that analytic rationalisation is a fairly rapid process on abstract
selection-task problems. It is the detailed nature of these apparently rapid
rationalisation processes that the remaining experiments in this thesis will go on to
investigate.
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3.2 Experiment 5
In investigating the reliable inspection-time effect that supports key tenets of Evans'
(e.g. 1996, 2006) heuristic-analytic account of the selection task, Experiment 4
provided evidence to suggest that the rationalisation process that produces the
'inspection-time effect occurs extremely quickly. Such rapid deployment of a
conscious, analytic process to justify heuristically-determined choices may, at first
sight, seem anomalous. As was noted previously, it might be expected that such
rationalisation should instead demand quite a slow and ponderous mode of thinking.
However, we also mooted previously the idea that rapid rationalisation may not be
such a strange notion after all if it is assumed that the rationalisation process is, itself,
driven by the heuristically-cued consideration of possible values that might appear on
the hidden sides of cards (i.e .• through the operation of secondary matching bias; see
Wason & Evans, 1975). Indeed, these notions fall directly out of the most recent
version of Evans' heuristic-analytic theory (Evans, 2006), where it is argued that most
people (except those of very high cognitive ability) will treat verification and
falsification on the abstract selection task as though they are symmetrical, and so will
happily satisfice when they deploy their analytic system, simply justifying a choice of
a matching facing and hidden combination on the grounds that this will prove the rule
true or prove it false (e.g., in the case of the False Consequent matching card on the
negated-consequent rule form).
To investigate the nature of the analytic processing that is occurring on the selection
task a method is required that allows the experimenter to have direct access to the
processes as they occur. One respected method that allows this to be done is the use of
verbal 'think aloud' protocols. As discussed in Chapter 2, this method has been used
extensively in the reasoning and problem solving literatures and has been particularly
popular since the publication of Ericsson and Simon's (e.g., 1980, 1993) research
assessing the validity of the approach. Ericsson and Simon's (1993) review of a wide
range of studies that had used verbal protocol techniques concluded that the elicitation
of concurrent think-aloud reports from a participant engaged in task performance can
provide a highly accurate and complete index of the current contents of short-term
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memory, in that whatever is consciously attended to by a participant is also
verbalisable.
As discussed in Chapter 2, however, there is a general lack of published experiments
that have utilised the verbal protocol method with abstract, indicative versions of the
selection task. One study by Goodwin and Wason (1972), using only affirmative
conditionals, showed that an insight into the task was demonstrated when people were
asked to provide a written justification of their answers. In particular, when people
selected the correct cards, they talked about falsifying the conditional whereas when
people produced the typical errors that occur of the task people produced a
verification explanation. In a related experiment, Wason and Evans (1975) used both
affirmative (ifp then q) and negative (ifp then not q) statements and found that whilst
people could provide insightful solutions for the negative rule, such insight was absent
for the affirmative rule. Wason and Evans proposed that card choices were
unconsciously determined by matching processes and then rationalised by a separate
conscious and verbal process.
More recently, Evans (1995, Experiment 5) presented a protocol analysis of the
indicative selection task. Protocols were scored for references to the facing sides of
cards as well as for references to the hidden sides of cards. Both scores were
calculated separately for selected versus rejected cards. Evans' analysis indicated that:
(1) participants referred more often to the facing sides of the cards that were selected
than to the facing sides of cards that ended up being rejected; and (2) participants
referred more often to the hidden sides of the cards that were selected than the hidden
sides of cards that ended up being rejected. These findings were consistent with
Beattie and Baron's (1988) results from an earlier protocol study. Evans (1995)
suggested that his results lend support to the heuristic-analytic account; people only
think about some of the cards and not others, and thinking about hidden sides of cards
mostly serves to rationalise decisions to choose such cards.
Although Evans' (1995) protocol-based support for the role of relevance effects and
rationalisation processes in the selection task appear persuasive there are a number of
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important factors that should be noted. Evans' findings derive from the analysis of
four distinct experimental conditions that involved very small sample sizes (i.e., Ns of
3, 3, 4, and 5). As well as this, Evans used arbitrarily thematic selection-task materials
(as opposed to purely abstract problem content), and certain experimental conditions
entailed highly non-standard judgement instructions. Additionally, Evans' statistical
analysis of his dataset using chi-squared tests was potentially problematic in that
participants contributed multiple data points to both the selected and non-selected
cells of the contingency tables. Finally, Evans' analyses did not focus on the
important issue of the content of people's references to potential values that may
reside on the hidden sides of cards.
It is possible, then, that gaining an understanding of whether secondary matching bias
effects (Wason & Evans, 1975) are associated with hidden-side references would be
especially valuable for an insight into why the processing of selected cards evidenced
in inspection-time studies seems to be increased only to a small (though reliable)
degree relative to non-selected cards. There seems to be clear scope for replicating
Evans' (1995) protocol-based findings with an increased sample size, more
conventional task features-including the employment of standard abstract
problems-and traditional task instructions. Pursuing such a replication was the
primary aim of Experiment 5. The heuristic-analytic predictions that have been
applied effectively in previous inspection-time studies were adapted (e.g., Evans,
1996; Experiments 1-4 of the present thesis; Roberts, 1998b) so as to enable more
powerful statistical tests to be pursued of the heuristic-analytic theory in terms of
people's references to the facing and hidden sides of selected and non-selected cards.
Three key predictions were therefore established:
Prediction 1: Cards that are associated with higher selection rates
will also be associated with more references to their
facing sides.
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Prediction 2: For any given card, those participants who select it will
refer more to its facing side than those participants who
do not select it.
Prediction 3: For each participant, their mean number of references
to the facing sides of selected cards should be higher
than to the facing sides of non-selected cards.
The latter participant-level prediction is a version of that promoted by Roberts
(l998b) in the context of card inspection-time analyses, and is argued to be a more
powerful test of the heuristic-analytic account than either Prediction 1 or Prediction 2,
which involve item-level analyses. All three predictions have been stated solely in
terms of references to the facing sides of cards. It is also possible, however, to restate
each of these predictions so that they apply equally to the analysis of references to the
hidden sides of cards. Such re-stated predictions would be entirely in line with the
claim of the heuristic-analytic theory (e.g., Evans 1995, 1996, 2006) that
rationalisation processes serve merely to justify card choices, thereby promoting
increased references to hidden sides of selected cards relative to the hidden sides of
non-selected ones. Both sets of predictions were adopted for the purpose of the
present experiment.
Finally, one further prediction was derived from Evans' (1996, 2006) heuristic-
analytic theory that is associated to the content of people's explicit references to the
hidden sides of cards. This prediction was as follows:
Prediction 4: The total pool of references to hidden sides of cards
should be dominated by references to potential
matching values that might appear on the reverse sides
of cards relative to either mismatching values or
negated matching values.
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This last prediction derives from the assumption that secondary matching heuristics
may guide the analytic rationalisation processes associated with to-be-selected cards
(Wason & Evans, 1975).
3.2.1 Method
Participants.
Participants were 30 undergraduate volunteers from the University of Derby who took
part in the experiment to gain course credit. Participants had not received any tuition
on the psychology of reasoning.
Materials and apparatus.
The experiment involved selection tasks employing the same abstract conditional rules
within the standard negations paradigm as in Experiments 1 to 4. Again, each
participant received four versions of the task. Each problem was presented on a single
A4 page. The rule was positioned at the top of the page, a reminder of the task
requirement appeared in the middle of the page, and the pictures of the four cards were
presented in the lower half of the page in a 2 x 2 arrangement. The location of cards
within each array was always random. The experiment was carried out in an audio-
recording suite to enable participants' think-aloud protocols to be recorded.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. They were initially told about the essential
nature of the experiment and an explanation was provided of the 'think-aloud'
requirement. To help clarify the expectations surrounding the think-aloud procedure
and to put participants at their ease, a brief, video-based demonstration was provided
of someone verbalising whilst carrying out a moderately difficult problem-solving task
involving the rebuilding of a pyramid structure using jigsaw-like building blocks.
Subsequent to this demonstration the following written instructions were presented:
This study is concerned with people's logical reasoning ability and will
entail you having to tackle a total of four problems. These problems will
appear on separate sheets in front of you. Each problem consists of four
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cards and a rule that applies to those cards. This rule may be true or false.
The cards have been constructed so that each one always has a letter on
one side and a single-figure number on the other side. Naturally only one
side of each card will be visible to you.
For each problem your task is to decide which card or cards need to be
turned over in order to discover whether or not the rule is true. It is all
right for you to change your mind as you work through a problem, and I
will not record any decisions until you tell me what your final choice or
choices are.
Whilst you are reading through each problem and deciding how to solve
it, please remember that I would like you to think aloud. As I've
explained, you should find it quite natural to say aloud whatever happens
to come into your head whilst you are working on these tasks. If you do
fall silent for any length of time, however, I will gently prompt you to try
and keep thinking aloud.
Once the participant had read the instructions the experimenter re-read them aloud and
provided an opportunity for participants to seek clarification concerning any of the
study requirements. The four problems were then presented in a random order.
3.2.2 Results
Protocol coding, reliability assessment, and normality checks
Before inferential analysis, the verbal protocols were transcribed and then coded using
three categorisation systems. The first system, inspired by Evans (1995, Experiment
5), involved examining each participant's protocol and, for each rule, identifying their
unique references to the facing sides of each of the four presented cards. Frequency
counts of the number of references per card were then calculated and provided a
measure for use in subsequent statistical analyses. In applying this first scheme any
references to facing card sides that occurred when participants were making or
confirming their final card selections were not coded. This would avoid the possibility
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of obtaining artefactual support for heuristic-analytic predictions arising from the fact
that only selected cards needed to be actively registered by participants. Any
references to facing sides arising at the selection-registering phase would artificially
inflate the frequency-count of mentions to selected cards, since it is only these cards
that need to be referred to explicitly. This would have been a similar problem as
identified in Experiment 1 in terms of a 'pointing bias' that could have arisen when
registering card selections (which could have inflated inspection times for such cards).
This conservative measure of references to facing sides provides a stronger test of
heuristic-analytic predictions than the coding scheme applied by Evans (1995,
Experiment 5), which appears not to have considered such methodological artefacts.
Frequency counts for each participant's total number of references per card were then
calculated in order to provide a measure for use in subsequent statistical analyses.
The second categorisation system was identical to the previous one in all respects,
except for its focus on participants' references to hidden sides of each of the presented
cards. Two coders independently applied both of the aforementioned categorisation
schemes to the full set of verbal protocols. Inter-coder reliability checks revealed a
very high degree of consistency between coders (i.e., 97% inter-coder agreement), and
there was no evidence of systematic divergences between coders in their categorisation
of discrete references to the facing or hidden sides of each logical case. The codes
applied by the thesis author were used for all subsequent analyses associated with the
experimental predictions.
The third categorisation system involved sub-categorising each reference to a hidden
side in terms of the specific letter or number content mentioned in that reference. This
coding scheme used the following four sub-categories, which are illustrated in terms
of participants' potential references to what might have been on the other side of the A
card associated with an 'If A then 3' rule: (1) a reference to a matching item (e.g.,
mentioning the possibility of a '3' on the other side of the 'A' card); (2) a reference to
mismatching item (e.g., mentioning the possibility of a number such as a '7', on the
other side of the 'A'); (3) a reference to a negated matching item (e.g., stating that
there could be a number that is 'not a 3' on the reverse of the 'A'); and (4) a non-
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specific reference to what might be on the other side of the card (e.g., when
participants stated how 'It is important to see what's on the other side of the A',
without qualifying such a comment further). It should be noted that whilst other sub-
categories are possible in addition to the four described here (e.g., references to
negated mismatching items), the present four sub-categories successfully captured the
full range of content that was distinguished in participants' references to the hidden
sides of cards. As there was only limited scope for miscategorising references using
this scheme (i.e., the new codes simply reflected a more detailed breakdown of the
explicit references to hidden card sides that had already been identified) it was not
necessary to pursue inter-coder reliability checks on the application of these codes.
Statistical analysis
Descriptive analysis of the data revealed that they were positively skewed. Log
transformations applying a constant of 0.4 was used for both the facing-side and the
hidden-side data transformations and were found to stabilise variances successfully.
For clarity of interpretation the results section reports means both before
transformation and converted back into their original units after transformation.
Card selection freguencies
The first concern was to assess whether the four selection tasks elicited the standard
pattern of card selections observed in the literature (i.e., more matching than
mismatching choices across antecedent and consequent cases). Matching bias was
examined once again using the procedures adopted by Evans, Ball, and Brooks (1987).
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (one-tailed) revealed that more antecedent-matching cards
were selected than antecedent-mismatching ones (p = .01), and that more consequent-
matching cards were selected than consequent-mismatching ones (p < .001). This
pattern of results is, therefore, typical of that seen for selection tasks within the
negations paradigm.
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TABLE 3.3
Percentage frequency of card selections and overall mean references to facing and
hidden sides for each item in Experiment 5 (N = 30).
Card
TA FA TC FC
Rule Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
1. Ifp then q Frequency of selections 90.0 16.7 60.0 10.0
Facing Side - ND 1.37 0.85 0.57 0.94 0.90 0.71 0.53 0.90
Facing Side - TD 1.19 0.29 0.67 0.28
Hidden Side - ND 0.87 0.78 0.17 0.46 0.53 0.51 0.17 0.38
Hidden Side - TD 0.67 0.08 0.38 0.09 0.67
2. If p then not q Frequency of selections 86.7 10.0 10.0 63.3
Facing Side - ND 1.53 1.14 0.37 0.67 0.37 0.67 0.80 0.85
Facing Side - TD 1.22 1.30 1.30 0.53
Hidden Side - ND 1.13 0.86 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.31 0.53 0.63
Hidden Side - TD 0.89 0.04 0.06 0.34
3. If not p then q Frequency of selections 60.0 43.3 66.7 43.3
Facing Side - ND 1.30 1.29 1.07 1.08 1.17 1.26 0.90 1.27
Facing Side - TD 0.86 0.70 0.75 0.49
Hidden Side - ND 0.87 1.07 0.83 1.21 0.73 1.02 0.47 0.86
Hidden Side - TD 0.56 0.43 0.39 0.23
4. If not p then not q Frequency of selections 60.0 46.7 33.3 53.3
Facing Side- ND 1.13 1.14 1.10 0.92 0.70 0.84 1.10 1.03
Facing Side - TD 0.75 0.78 0.43 0.75
Hidden Side - ND 0.47 0.86 0.60 0.72 0.20 0.41 0.63 0.72
Hidden Side - TD 0.25 0.38 0.11 0.39
Mean 74.2 29.2 25.0 42.5
Note: TA = true antecedent; FA = false antecedent; TC = true consequent; FC = false consequent, ND =
natural data.; TD = transformed data (in original units).
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Verbal protocol analyses
The statistical analyses examined the four predictions, identified above, that derive
from Evans' (e.g., 1996, 2006) heuristic-analytic account. As noted previously,
Prediction 1, Prediction 2 and Prediction 3 apply equivalently to the measure of
references to the facing sides of cards and to the measure of references to the hidden
sides of cards, so all predictions have two sets of analysis: one for the facing sides and
one for the hidden sides.
The first analysis tested Prediction 1: Cards associated with higher selection rates will
be associated with more references to their facing (and hidden) sides. This analysis
involved exploring the correlation across all 16 cards between the overall mean
references to a card side and the card's associated selection frequency (refer to Table
3.3). The correlation for the facing sides showed that there was a strong positive
association between the mean number of references to facing sides and card selection
frequencies, r = .94, N = 16, P < .001 (transformed data). The correlation between
selection frequency and mean references to hidden sides was also significant, r = .89,
N = 16, p < .001 (transformed data).
The second analysis tested Prediction 2: that for any given card, mean references to a
card side for individuals selecting it would be higher than for those who did not.
Assessing Prediction 2 involves determining, for each card, whether the mean reference
to a card side is higher for selectors than non-selectors. Mean references to facing and
hidden sides for each card are given in Table 3.4. After transformation, mean references
to facing sides for 16 out of 16 cards were greater for selectors than non-selectors (p <
.001), two-tailed with the binomial test. Mean references to hidden sides for 15 out of 16
cards were greater for selectors than non-selectors cases, significant with the binomial
test (p = .001, two-tailed).
118
TABLE3.4
Mean number of references to facing and hidden sides (by items) for selected and
non-selected cards, for Experiment 5 (N = 30).
Selected Non-selected
Facing Hidden Facing Hidden
Rule Card N TD ND TD ND N TD ND TD ND
1. Ifp then q TA 27 1.30 1.44 0.72 0.93 3 0.51 0.67 0.20 0.33
FA 5 1.11 1.60 0.53 0.80 25 0.19 0.36 0.02 0.04
Te 18 1.26 1.33 0.67 0.78 12 0.15 0.25 0.09 1.67
Fe 3 1.64 2.00 0.51 0.67 27 0.20 0.37 0.06 0.11
2. If P then not q TA 26 1.34 1.54 0.89 1.12 4 0.75 1.50 0.89 1.25
FA 3 2.00 2.00 0.51 0.67 27 0.10 0.19 -0.01 0.00
Te 3 2.00 2.00 1.01 1.00 27 0.10 0.19 -0.01 0.00
Fe 19 0.89 1.05 0.58 0.74 11 0.15 0.36 0.07 0.18
3. If not p then q TA 18 1.74 2.00 1.08 1.33 12 0.15 0.25 0.09 1.67
FA 13 1.42 1.54 0.89 1.31 17 0.32 0.71 0.20 0.47
Te 20 1.01 1.40 0.53 0.90 10 0.36 0.70 0.18 0.40
Fe 13 1.15 1.62 0.75 1.08 17 0.18 0.35 -0.01 0.00
4. If not p then not q TA 18 1.05 1.50 0.41 0.72 12 0.38 0.58 0.05 0.08
FA 14 1.38 1.50 0.80 1.00 16 0.41 0.75 0.13 0.25
Te 10 0.92 1.20 0.26 0.40 20 0.26 0.45 0.06 0.10
Fe 16 1.51 1.69 0.86 1.06 14 0.25 0.43 0.08 0.14
Note: TA = true antecedent; FA = false antecedent; 'I'C = true consequent; Fe = false consequent. NO =
natural data; TD = transformed data (in original units).
The third prediction was Roberts (1998) participant-level analysis. It tested that for each
individual, the mean references to sides of cards should be higher for selected than for
non-selected cards. Two mean references to facing side scores and hidden side scores
were calculated for each person from the transformed data [Table 3.5]. A within-
participants analysis of variance (ANOV A) provided good support for Prediction 3 for
both facing sides, F(l, 29) = 115.44, MSE = 2.54, P < .001, and for hidden sides, F(l,
29) = 106.43, MSE= 2.13,p < .001.
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TABLE3.5
Mean number of references to facing and hidden sides (by participants) for selected
versus non-selected cards for Experiment 5.
Selected Non-selected
Facing Hidden Facing Hidden
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
1.52 0.51 0.98 0.49 0.46 0.49 0.16 0.26
0.22 0.13 0.05 0.19 -0.19 0.22 -0.32 0.12
1.26 0.73 0.24 0.07
ND
TD (log)
TD
Note: ND = natural data; TD (log) = transformed data (in log'" units); TD = transformed data (in
original units).
Secondary matching bias predictions were assessed pertaining to Prediction 4 by
taking the total pool of references to hidden sides of cards produced by all 30
participants, and then computing the distribution of references within this pool across
the four sub-categories of reference-type (i.e., inatching items, mismatching items,
negated matching items, and non-specific references). This analysis revealed that the
mention of matching values dominated people's verbalisations concerning what might
appear on the reverse sides of cards (64% of references) in relation to the mention of
negated matching values (35% of references), mismatching values « 1% of
references) and unspecified values « 1% of references).
3.2.3 Discussion
The predictions that were derived from Evans' (e.g., 1996, 2006) heuristic-analytic
account of the selection task were supported in Experiment 5. The results demonstrate
that selected cards are associated with more attention than non-selected cards, which
can be seen by the number of explicit references to both their facing sides and their
hidden sides. This particular finding in relation to the hidden sides of the cards appear
to lend support to Evans' claimed role for analytic rationalisation processes during
selection-task performance. So although the to-be-selected cards encourage
participants to consider what values might be on their reverse sides, this consideration
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does not seem to the change the fact that these cards tend to end up selected (otherwise
the link between references to hidden sides and card selection would be broken). One
interpretation of the findings, then, is that thinking about the hidden sides of cards
appears to have a minimal functional role in determining card choices (at least for a
substantial number of participants). Instead it seems that thinking about the hidden
sides of the cards mainly serves to confirm decisions to go ahead and choose such
cards (cf. Evans, 1995, p. 168).
The experiment also addresses the issue of what people are actually thinking about
when they consider the reverse sides of cards. The findings are clear-cut. First,
participants do not think at all about potential mismatching values that may appear on
the reverse sides of cards. This may be taken as further support for the heuristic-
analytic view that people tend not to see mismatching values as having any relevance
to their decision-making during the evaluation of conditional statements. Second, the
finding that people's consideration of hidden values is dominated by matching
possibilities seems to be in line with Wason and Evans' (1975) notion that secondary
matching heuristics may cue people's analytic accounts as to why values on the hidden
sides of cards justify selection of those cards. This evidence for secondary matching
effects in abstract selection tasks also helps make sense of card inspection-time
findings (as reported in Experiments 1 to 4), which suggest that analytic rationalisation
processes are rapid in nature. Rationalisation might well be expected to be extremely
fast if people's justifications are facilitated by the heuristic cueing of 'relevant' (i.e.,
matching) values that could appear on the reverse sides of cards.
3.3 Experiment 6
The verbal protocol method in Experiment 5 was successful in a number of ways.
First, the results of the study supported the predictions that can be derived from the
heuristic-analytic theory of the selection task. Second, the findings are also in line
with results from previous mouse-tracking and eye-tracking studies of card inspection
times and from verbal protocol studies (Evans, 1995, 1996; Experiments 1 to 4 in the
present thesis). Third, Experiment 5 was additionally able to clarify the important role
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played by secondary matching processes when people are referring to the hidden sides
of to-be-selected cards.
There is, however, an interesting task-presentation issue associated with Experiment 5
that seems to warrant further empirical examination. To explain this issue, we first
note that two experiments in the present research programme (Experiments 3 and 4)
used a forced-choice methodology, whereby participants had to register 'select/don't
select' decisions for all presented cards (see also Evans et al. 1987; Roberts, 1998b,
Experiment 3). Experiment 5, however, employed a standard methodology whereby
participants only had to register their 'select' decisions. All of the previous
experiments that have used a forced select/reject requirement have still demonstrated
that matching responses dominate selections, even though participants are required to
attend and respond to cards that were normally paid little attention. Another important
finding from the present research programme (Experiment 3) is that the inspection-
time effect (whereby selected cards are looked at for longer than rejected cards) is
also not totally undermined by the use of a 'select/don't select' decision requirement,
although the effect does seem to be reduced in magnitude, presumably because
rejected cards now become associated with at least some (enforced) consideration.
What is of general interest here, then, is the issues of what, exactly, people think about
when they are compelled to inspect cards that they would not ordinarily attend to? In
particular, do people who are making card selections within the 'select/don't select'
paradigm think beyond the facing sides of those cards that they choose to reject?
According to the heuristic-analytic theory people should not think about what might
be on the hidden sides of to-be-rejected cards. The enforced decision requirement
would mean that people would have to attend to such cards as they are required to
make an active 'don't select' response to them, but the fact that these cards should be
rapidly deemed irrelevant means that analytic rationalisation processes would not be
called upon (cf. Evans 1998a). In summary, rationalisation processes in the selection
task (and perhaps more generally too) are assumed to be asymmetrical, in that people
only pursue analytic justifications for cards that they wish to select (as cued by
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relevance), but not for cards which they wish to reject (on the basis of perceived
irrelevance ).
Experiment 6 was undertaken to test these heuristic-analytic predictions in relation to
the enforced-decision paradigm by, once again, using verbal protocol analysis. The
experiment used the same abstract selection tasks and think-aloud instructions
employed in Experiment 5, except for the presence of enforced 'select/don't select'
requirements for all cards. In order to test fully the heuristic-analytic theory, the
equivalent set of predictions for both facing and hidden card sides as used in
Experiment 5, was employed. It was expected that there would be some possible
weakening of effect sizes for the facing side predictions (Prediction 1, Prediction 2,
and Prediction 3) owing to the enforced decision procedure. However, the previous
inspection-time data from Experiment 3, led to the expectation that the basic finding
of increased attention to selected cards over rejected ones would remain intact (i.e.,
people would give to-be-rejected cards only a minimal amount of explicit
consideration, dwelling instead on to-be-selected cards). In terms of predictions for
the hidden sides of cards, effects of broadly similar magnitude to those that arose in
Experiment 5 for Prediction 1 to Prediction 4 were anticipated (i.e., participants were
not expected to think about the reverse sides of to-be-rejected cards any more than in
the standard selection-task paradigm).
3.3.1 Method
Participants
Participants were 30 undergraduate volunteers from the University of Derby, who
obtained course credit for their involvement in the study. No participants had received
prior tuition concerning the psychology of reasoning.
Materials and apparatus
The selection-task materials and apparatus were identical to those used in Experiment
5, except that under each card participants were now also presented with small 'yes'
and 'no' decision boxes (separated horizontally from the card by 0.8 cm) at a distance
of about 1 cm from its lower edge.
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Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 5, with the exception that instructions
were modified to include reference to the presence of 'yes' and 'no' response boxes
below each card. The instructions therefore read as follows:
This study is concerned with people's logical reasoning ability and will
entail you having to tackle a total of four problems. These problems will
appear on separate sheets in front of you. Each problem consists of four
cards and a rule that applies to those cards. This rule may be true or false.
The cards have been constructed so that each one always has a letter on
one side and a single-figure number on the other side. Naturally only one
side of each card will be visible to you.
For each problem your task is to decide which card or cards need to be
turned over in order to discover whether or not the rule is true. You will
need to make a 'tum/don't tum' decision about all the cards presented to
you. The 'yes' and 'no' boxes underneath each card are present to remind
you that you must make a 'tum/don't tum' decision for every card. It is
all right for you to change your mind as you work through a problem, and
I will not record any decisions until you tell me what your final answers
are for each card.
Whilst you are reading through each problem and deciding how to solve
it, please remember that I would like you to think aloud. As I've
explained, you should find it quite natural to say aloud whatever happens
to come into your head whilst you are working on these tasks. If you do
fall silent for any length of time, however, I will gently prompt you to try
and keep thinking aloud.
As in Experiment 5, once the participant had read the instructions the experimenter
then read them aloud once more to enable any clarification to be sought concerning the
task requirements. The four problems were presented in a random order.
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3.3.2 Results
Protocol coding, reliability assessment, and normality checks
Transcribed protocols were coded using identical categorisation and scoring schemes
as had been applied in Experiment 5. Inter-coder reliability checks revealed a high
level of consistency between coders in their application of the categorization schemes
pertaining to references to facing and to hidden sides of cards (i.e., 95% inter-coder
agreement). The codes applied by the thesis author were used for all subsequent
analyses associated with the experimental predictions (Prediction 1 to Prediction 4).
Statistical analysis
Again, descriptive analysis of the data revealed that they were positively skewed. Log
transformations were applied, but this time a constant of 0.6 was used for the facing-
side data transformations and 0.2 for the hidden-side data transformations. These
transformations were found to stabilise variances successfully. For clarity of
interpretation means are reported both before transformation and converted back into
their original units after transformation.
Card selection frequencies
Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests (one-tailed) revealed that more antecedent-matching
cards were selected than antecedent-mismatching ones, p < .001, and that more
consequent-matching cards were selected than consequent-mismatching ones, p <
.001. The standard matching-bias pattern is, therefore, strongly evident in the card-
selection responses associated with this enforced decision paradigm.
Verbal protocol analyses
The mean number of references to the facing and the hidden sides of each card, and
each card's overall selection frequency, are presented in Table 3.6. The correlations
for PI between mean references to card sides and selection frequencies were
significant for facing sides, r = .88, N = 16, P < .001 (transformed data), and for
hidden sides, r = .94, N = 16, p < .001 (transformed data).
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TABLE 3.6
Percentage frequency of card selections and overall mean references to facing and
hidden sides for each item in Experiment 6 (N = 30).
Card
TA FA TC Fe
Rule Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
1. Ifp then q Frequency of selections 80.0 23.3 80.0 16.7
Facing Side - NO 1.57 0.82 0.93 0.74 1.43 0.77 0.90 0.71
Facing Side - TO 1.44 0.75 1.26 0.72
Hidden Side - NO 0.67 0.55 0.17 0.38 0.60 0.50 0.10 0.31
Hidden Side - TO 0.43 0.07 0.39 0.04
2. If P then not q Frequency of selections 86.7 33.3 33.3 70.0
Facing Side - NO 1.87 0.90 0.83 0.70 0.93 0.83 1.37 0.81
Facing Side - TO 1.74 0.66 0.75 1.22
Hidden Side - NO 1.10 0.96 0.27 0.45 0.30 0.65 0.67 0.61
Hidden Side - TO 0.67 0.12 0.12 0.40
3. If not p then q Frequency of selections 56.7 46.7 66.7 43.3
Facing Side - NO 1.43 1.33 1.30 0.95 1.40 1.10 0.77 0.57
Facing Side - TO 1.18 1.06 1.14 0.63
Hidden Side - NO 0.90 1.24 0.53 0.68 0.67 0.92 0.37 0.56
Hidden Side - TO 0.45 0.26 0.33 0.17
4. If not p then not q Frequency of selections 56.7 50.0 40.0 50.0
Facing Side - NO 1.17 0.75 1.27 1.05 1.10 0.76 1.00 0.95
Facing Side - TO 1.02 0.99 0.95 0.72
Hidden Side - NO 0.50 0.57 0.60 0.62 0.33 0.55 0.53 0.68
Hidden Side - TO 0.27 0.34 0.15 0.26
Mean 70.0 38.3 55.0 45.0
Note: TA = true antecedent; FA = false antecedent; TC = true consequent; FC = false consequent. NO =
natural data; TO = transformed data (in original units).
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TABLE 3.7
Mean number of references to facing and hidden sides (by items) for selected and
non-selected cards, for Experiment 6 (N = 30).
Selected Non-selected
Facing Hidden Facing Hidden
Rule Card N TD ND TD ND N TD ND TD ND
I.lfp then q TA 24 1.49 1.58 0.52 0.75 6 1.31 1.50 0.16 0.33
FA 7 0.99 1.14 0.13 0.29 23 0.69 0.87 0.05 0.13
Te 24 1.40 1.50 0.51 0.71 6 0.95 1.17 0.07 0.17
Fe 5 1.35 1.40 0.09 0.20 25 0.63 0.80 0.03 0.08
2. If P then not q TA 26 1.64 1.81 0.67 1.12 4 2.09 2.25 0.69 1.00
FA 10 1.10 1.20 0.29 0.50 20 0.47 0.65 0.06 0.15
Te 10 1.10 1.30 0.45 0.80 20 0.60 0.75 0.02 0.05
Fe 21 1.31 1.48 0.45 0.81 9 0.99 1.11 0.16 0.33
3. If not p then q TA 17 1.22 1.29 0.48 0.76 13 1.10 1.62 0.39 1.07
FA 14 1.14 1.36 0.40 0.71 16 0.95 1.25 0.16 0.38
Te 20 1.22 1.35 0.39 0.60 10 0.99 1.50 0.23 0.80
Fe 13 0.63 0.77 0.20 0.39 17 0.63 0.77 0.15 0.35
4. If not p then not q TA 17 1.31 1.17 0.46 0.71 13 0.69 0.85 0.10 0.23
FA 15 1.35 1.53 0.61 0.87 15 0.66 1.00 0.16 0.33
Te 12 1.14 1.17 0.31 0.58 18 0.81 1.06 0.07 0.17
Fe 15 0.72 0.93 0.36 0.67 15 0.72 1.07 0.18 0.40
Note: TA = true antecedent; FA = false antecedent; 'I'C = true consequent; Fe = false consequent, ND =
natural data; TO = transformed data (in original units).
Mean references to sides of cards (both before and after transformation) for selections
and non-selections, for each of the 16 cards, are given in Table 3.7. For transformed
data, the difference between mean references to facing sides for selected and non-
selected cards was in the expected direction for 13 out of 16 cases (two ties), which
was significant with a binomial test, p = .021, two-tailed. The difference between
mean references to hidden sides for selected and non-selected cards was in the
expected direction for 15 out of 16 cases, which was significant with a binomial test, p
= .001, two-tailed.
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To assess Prediction 3 the more powerful participant-level analyses using ANOV A
was used. which revealed (see Table 3.8) a significant difference in the mean
references to/acing sides for participants' selected versus non-selected cards, F(1, 29)
= 4.62, MSE = .04, p = .04, and a significant difference in the mean references to
hidden sides for participants' selected versus non-selected cards. F(1, 29) = 8.94, MSE
= AD, p = .006.
TABLE 3.8
Mean number of references to facing and hidden sides (by participants) for selected
versus non-selected cards for Experiment 6.
ND
TD (log)
TD
Selected Non-selected
Facing Hidden Facing Hidden
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
1.33 0.47 0.67 0.47 1.10 0.48 0.37 0.27
0.23 0.12 -0.27 0.25 0.17 0.14 -0.43 0.20
1.08 0.34 0.88 0.17
Note: ND = natural data; TD (log) = transformed data (in log'" units); TD = transformed data (in
original units).
Finally, secondary matching bias predictions associated with Prediction 4 were
assessed by calculating the distribution of all participants' references to hidden sides
across the four sub-categories of reference-type: matching items, mismatching items,
negated matching items, and non-specific references. The mention of matching values
dominated participants' comments about what might appear on the reverse sides of
cards (62% of references) in relation to the mention of negated matching values (33%
of references), mismatching values and unspecified values « 3% of references in each
case). This distribution of references to hidden sides across these four categories is
strikingly similar to the distribution observed in Experiment 5.
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3.3.3 Discussion
As with Experiment 5, the results of Experiment 6 were consistent with the
predictions of the heuristic-analytic account of performance on abstract versions of
the selection task. The results specifically show that people referred more to the
facing and hidden sides of those cards that they ended up selecting relative to those
cards that they ended up rejecting. This finding thus persists despite the use of an
enforced-decision paradigm which requires people to give at least some attention to
cards that they might ordinarily simply ignore on the basis of their perceived
irrelevance to the task they are engaged in. It was also anticipated that effect sizes in
relation to Predictions 1,2 and 3 would differ slightly from those in Experiment 5. In
particular, it was predicted that the magnitude of the effect size for facing-side
predictions would weaken as participants are forced to attend to all four cards in order
to register a 'select/don't-select' decision for each of them. In relation to the hidden-
side predictions it was anticipated that there would be no real change in the magnitude
of the effect size as participants were not expected to think any more about the reverse
sides of the to-be-rejected cards even when they were forced to consider their facing
sides.
These expectations were shown to be correct in all respects. For example, in relation
to the Prediction 2, item-based analysis, whereas 16 out of 16 cards in Experiment 5
showed increased references to facing sides for selectors compared to non-selectors,
this dropped slightly to 13 out of 16 cards in Experiment 6. In contrast, there was no
such drop between Experiments 5 and 6 in terms of references to hidden sides for
selectors compared to non-selectors across cards (i.e., 15 out of 15 cards showed
expected differences in both experiments). A similar pattern of changes to effect
magnitudes was seen across Experiments 5 and 6 in relation to the P3 participant-
based analyses. From Tables 3.5 and 3.8 it can be seen that the mean difference in
references to facing sides for selected versus non-selected cards dropped quite
markedly from 1.02 references in Experiment 5 (i.e. 1.26 minus 0.24) to 0.20
references in Experiment 6 (i.e., 1.08 minus 0.88), whereas the mean difference in
references to hidden sides for selected versus non-selected cards dropped less
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strikingly from 0.66 references (i.e., 0.73 minus 0.07) In Experiment 5 to 0.17
references (i.e., 0.34 minus 0.17) in Experiment 6.
3.4 Experiment 7
Experiments 5 and 6 aimed to employ concurrent verbal protocols to investigate
heuristic-analytic predictions regarding what people think about when they are
engaging in abstract versions of the selection task. Experiment 5 used a standard
selection-task paradigm, where active, select decisions were only required for those
cards participants felt needed to be selected. In contrast, Experiment 6 assessed the
impact on the content of people's thinking of imposing an enforced 'select/don't-
select' decision requirement on all four cards associated with each presented task.
Overall, Experiments 5 and 6 uncovered very good protocol-based evidence to
support the view that the perceived 'relevance' of information has a major influence
on both the heuristic and the analytic processing that arises during abstract selection-
task performance, as predicted by Evans' heuristic-analytic theory (e.g., 1996,2006).
In particular, Experiments 5 and 6 both demonstrated that selected cards are
associated with more attention than non-selected cards, which can be seen by the
number of explicit references that people make to their facing sides as well as their
hidden sides. In addition, thinking about the hidden sides of cards appears to have
little functional role in determining card choices, instead serving mainly to confirm
decisions to choose such cards. Finally, in relation to the important issue of why the
inspection-time effect seen in Experiments 1 to 4 might be so small in magnitude,
Experiments 5 and 6 provided data that support the view that any analytic
rationalisation processes applied to to-be-selected cards may be rapid in nature
because of the apparent role of secondary matching processes that cue people to think
about matching values that may be on the reverse sides of matching cards. The finding
that people's consideration of hidden values is also dominated by matching
possibilities seems to be entirely in line with Evans' (2006) notion of a satisficing-
oriented rationalisation process underpinning much analytic reasoning.
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There does, however, seem to be yet one more issue that needs investigating in
relation to these verbal-protocol experiments. A remaining concern is that it may well
be that the actual act of carrying out of a concurrent think-aloud requirement
interferes with the normal processes of reasoning that occur on the selection task.
There is, in fact, no a priori reason to expect such reactivity given Ericsson and
Simon's (e.g., 1993) arguments about Levelland Level 2 verbalisation processes
being largely immune to such reactive effects on primary task-based processes. But it
would seem to be better to eliminate-through empirical means-any possibility that
the think-aloud requirement may have a reactive effect on the normal process of
reasoning on the abstract selection task.
One way to examine the reactivity issue empirically would be to run a study that
required participants to produce verbal protocols whilst simultaneously taking a
measure of their eye-movements. If the eye-movement data were disrupted-for
example, if the inspection-time effect found in Experiments 1 to 4 was eradicated,
reversed, or even of far greater magnitude-then this would provide evidence for a
reactive effect of the verbalisation requirement on the normal processing that occurs
during selection-task performance. Any demonstration of such reactivity could
seriously weaken the protocol-based evidence for the heuristic-analytic theory
obtained in Experiments 5 and 6. If, however, the eye-movement-based inspection-
time effect under a verbal-protocol requirement was identical or very similar to that
observed in the previous eye-tracking experiments in this thesis, then the findings
from Experiment 5 and 6 would seem to be validated, and the support that these
findings lend to the heuristic-analytic theory would likewise appear to be sound.
Experiment 7 set out to examine the reactivity issue head on. To this end, a selection-
task experiment was established that employed the full negations paradigm with an
enforced-decision requirement, in addition to an instructional request for participants
to provide concurrent verbal protocols during their task-based processing. Whilst
these verbal protocols were being generated, participants' eye-movements could also
be tracked using the same technique as in previous experiments. The eye-tracking data
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could subsequently be analysed to assess whether concurrent verbalisation had any
effect on the nature or magnitude of the inspection-time effect.
The eye-tracking data could also provide information as to whether there was any
effect of the verbalisation requirement on the overall time taken for card selections
associated with the presented tasks. This issue is not related to reactivity effects, but is
instead directly concerned with arbitrating between the possible role of Levell versus
Level 2 verbalisation processes in protocol production with the selection task. As
discussed earlier, Level 1 verbalisation is simply the vocalisation of current thoughts
that are in a verbal form anyway, and it is therefore viewed as neither impacting on
problem-solving times nor on the structure of the thinking process (cf. Ericsson &
Simon, 1993). Evans (e.g., 1989) would argue that reasoning with the selection task is
primarily verbally-based, and therefore no influence of verbalisation on the time-
course (or structure) of thinking would be expected. Level 2 verbalisation, in contrast,
involves vocalising current thoughts that are in a non-verbal form. Because this
involves a re-coding process, it has been observed to slow down primary task
performance (whilst not impacting upon the structure of the process; see Ericsson &
Simon, 1993, for relevant evidence). Johnson-Laird (e.g., 1985) has suggested that
reasoning involves model-based mental representations that may utilise a visuo-spatial
mental substrate. As such. verbalisation that arises during reasoning might be
expected to involve an element of re-coding from model-based, visuo-spatial
representations to verbal output. This re-coding might well lead to a detectable effect
of a Level 2 verbalisation requirement on the time-course of thinking, generally
extending inspections times uniformly across all cards.
3.4.1 Method
Participants
Participants were 31 undergraduate volunteers at the University of Derby who took
part in the experiment in order to gain course credit. Participants had not received any
tuition on the psychology of reasoning.
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Materials and apparatus
The same selection tasks employing the same abstract conditional rules within the
standard negations paradigm were utilised as in Experiments 1 to 6. As before, each
participant received four versions of the task. Each problem was presented on a single
A4 page. The rule was positioned at the top of the page, a reminder of the task
requirement appeared in the middle of the page, and the pictures of the four cards were
presented in the lower half of the page in a two-by-two arrangement. The location of
cards within each array was always random. Under each card participants were also
presented with small 'yes' and 'no' decision boxes (separated horizontally from the card
by 0.8 cm) at a distance of about 1 cm. from its lower edge. As this experiment involved
the use of both eye-tracking and verbal-protocol methodologies, the problems were
presented vertically on an angled table at a distance of approximately 0.6 m from the
participant. The participant was seated in an adjustable chair so that their position and
height in relation to the eye-tracker could be optimised. There was audio-recording
equipment present within the laboratory to record the participant's verbal protocols. The
eye-tracking equipment and setup were identical to those used in Experiments 1 to 4.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. The basic nature of the experiment was
explained to them in terms of the use of eye-tracking equipment and the requirement
for them to produce concurrent verbal protocols. The experimenter then went through
the expectations concerning the think-aloud procedure particularly carefully, with the
use of the video example as employed in Experiments 5 and 6. Participants then had
their eye-movements calibrated using the nine-point calibration matrix, as in
Experiments 1 to 4. Once the participants point-of-gaze coordinates had been
determined, participants were presented with the task instructions as follows:
This study is concerned with people's logical reasoning ability and will
entail you having to tackle a total of four problems. These problems will
appear on separate sheets in front of you. Each problem consists of four
cards and a rule that applies to those cards. This rule may be true or false.
The cards have been constructed so that each one always has a letter on
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one side and a single figure number on the other side. Naturally only one
side of each card will be visible to you.
For each problem your task is to decide which card or cards need to be
turned over in order to discover whether or not the rule is true. If you
decide that a card needs to be turned over then please point to the 'yes'
box under the card. If you decide that a card doesn't need to be turned
over then point to the 'no' box below the card. You will need to make a
decision about each of the cards presented to you. It is alright for you to
change your mind as you work through a problem, and I will not record
your 'turnldon't tum' decisions until you tell me that they are your final
answers.
Whilst you are reading through each problem and deciding how to solve
it, please remember that I would like you to think aloud. As I've
explained, you should find it quite natural to say aloud whatever happens
to come into your head whilst you are working on these tasks. If you do
fall silent for any length of time, however, I will gently prompt you to try
and keep thinking aloud.
Participants had the chance to read through the instructions and seek clarification
concerning any of the study requirements.
3.4.2 Results
Coding the inspection-time data
The same procedure for coding the data was used as in Experiments 1 to 4. Coding
was halted when participants had finished making decisions about all four cards, that
is, when the pointer was moved away from the final card on which a decision had
been made.
Coding the verbal protocol data
Owing to technical problems during data acquisition the audio-channel on the video
system failed to record the think-aloud verbalisations of participants. This problem
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was only identified subsequent to full data collection from all participants. As such, it
was not possible to code or analyse and verbal protocol data in this experiment.
Whilst unfortunate, this technical failure was not viewed as giving rise to a major
problem with the experiment since its primary aim was to examine the possible
existence of changes in eye-movement data that may have been engendered by the
instruction to think aloud. rather than to examine changes in the think-aloud data that
may have arisen from eye-movement tracking. Indeed, the eye-tracking procedure
itself is highly non-invasive such that it would be most unlikely to have any reactive
effect on the production of think-aloud protocols.
Statistical analysis
Descriptive analysis of the data revealed that they were positively skewed.
Logarithmic transformations applying a constant of 0.8 were employed to normalise
the data and to stabilise variances. For clarity of interpretation means both before
transformation and converted back into their original units after transformation are
reported.
Card selection frequencies
The same analysis to investigate the presence of a matching-bias pattern in responding
was undertaken as in all previous experiments. Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests (one-
tailed) revealed that more antecedent-matching cards were selected than antecedent-
mismatching ones, p = .001, and that more consequent-matching cards were selected
than consequent-mismatching ones, p = .003. The standard matching-bias pattern is,
therefore, strongly evident in the card-selection responses associated with the present
enforced-decision paradigm that also involved the deployment of eye-movement
tracking and verbal-protocol methodologies.
Card inspection times
Selection frequencies and mean inspection times (before and after transformation) for
all cards are shown in Table 3.9. The first prediction linked to the heuristic-analytic
theory was tested, that is, that cards with higher selection frequencies will have higher
mean inspection times. The analysis revealed a strong association between selection
frequencies and inspection times, r = .62, N = 16, p = .010 (transformed data).
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The second analysis tested Prediction 2 that derived from the heuristic-analytic
theory: that for any given card, mean inspection times for individuals selecting it will
.I
be greater than for those not selecting it. Table 3.1O(a) shows the mean inspection
times for selected and non-selected cards for all 16 cases. The difference between
mean times on selected and non-selected cards (on transformed data) was in the
expected direction for 14 of the 16 cards. This was significant on the binomial test (p
= .004), showing good support for Prediction 2.
TABLE 3.9
Percentage frequency of card selections and overall mean inspection times (in
seconds) and log times (in seconds) for each item in Experiment 7 (N = 31).
Card
TA FA TC FC
Rule Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
1. Ifp then q Frequency of selections 93.5 12.9 80.6 9.7
Natural data: time 6.73 4.33 3.88 2.42 6.53 4.99 4.51 3.08
Transformed data: log time 0.80 0.28 0.62 0.22 0.78 0.28 0.65 0.28
Transformed data: corrected time 5.51 3.31 5.23 3.67
2. If p then not q Frequency of selections 93.5 16.1 29.0 61.3
Natural data: time 7.88 5.54 5.74 4.87 4.57 3.10 6.55 3.98
Transformed data: log time 0.85 0.30 0.70 0.33 0.65 0.28 0.80 0.27
Transformed data: corrected time 6.28 4.21 3.67 5.51
3. If not p then q Frequency of selections 67.7 45.2 61.3 38.7
Natural data: time 8.06 9.54 10.35 9.91 9.74 8.18 8.30 7.50
Transformed data: log time 0.78 0.37 0.91 0.34 0.89 0.36 0.83 0.34
Transformed data: corrected time 5.23 7.33 6.96 5.96
4. If not p then not q Frequency of selections 67.7 48.4 61.3 48.4
Natural data: time 5.64 4.41 8.42 9.21 6.81 4.46 6.64 5.61
Transformed data: log time 0.73 0.27 0.80 0.38 0.80 0.29 0.71 0.32
Transformed data: corrected time 4.57 5.51 5.51 5.09
Mean 80.6 30.7 58.1 39.5
Note: TA = true antecedent; FA = false antecedent; TC = true consequent; FC = false consequent.
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The more powerful heuristic-analytic prediction, Prediction 3, is that for each
participant, mean inspection times should be longer for the cards that they have
selected than for those that they have not selected. For each individual, two means
were calculated from the transformed data, and a within-participants analysis of
variance was performed [see Table 3.1O(b)]. This confirmed Prediction 3: Inspection
times were longer for the cards that were selected than those that were not, F(l, 30) =
20.50, MSE = 0.35, p < .001.
TABLE3.10
Mean inspection times for selected and non-selected cards, for Experiment 7, showing
(a) inspection times (in seconds) for each item, and b) inspection times (in seconds)
and log times (in seconds) overall by participants (N = 31).
a) by items
Selected Not Selected
Mean Mean
Rule Card N TD ND N TD ND
l.lfp then q TA 29 5.66 0.14 2 3.37 0.00
FA 4 5.97 6.54 27 3.09 3.49
Te 25 5.37 6.66 6 4.95 5.97
Fe 3 8.53 8.7 28 3.37 4.13
2. If p then not q TA 29 6.12 7.33 2 9.67 10.10
FA 5 9.20 10.93 26 3.67 4.74
Te 9 4.21 5.62 22 3.47 4.13
Fe 19 6.12 7.27 12 4.57 5.42
3. If not p then q TA 21 6.12 9.40 10 3.99 5.24
FA 14 10.95 14.86 17 5.37 6.64
Te 19 8.11 10.71 12 5.66 8.22
Fe 12 6.44 9.03 19 5.66 7.83
4. If not p then not q TA 21 4.82 5.95 10 4.10 4.99
FA IS 8.97 12.57 16 3.47 4.52
Te 19 7.14 8.36 12 3.57 4.35
Fe IS 4.70 6.22 16 5.37 7.03
b) by participants Selected Not selected
Mean SD Mean SD
Natural data 8.48 4.26 5.39 2.60
137
Transformed data: log time
Transformed data: corrected time
0.85
6.28
0.19 0.70
4.21
0.17
Note: TD = transformed data (in original units); ND = natural data; TA = true antecedent; FA = false
antecedent; TC = true consequent; FC = false consequent.
3.4.3 Discussion
The rationale for Experiment 7 was to assess any possible reactive effects of a verbal
think-aloud requirement on normal processing with abstract versions of the selection
task. To explore this reactivity issue, Experiment 7 involved participants producing
concurrent verbal protocols during selection-task performance whilst an eye-
movement measure of their inspection-time behaviour was simultaneously recorded.
It was predicted that any evidence for reactivity caused by the verbalisation
requirement would reveal itself as either a switched, eradicated or largely increased
inspection-time effect for selected versus rejected cards. The results revealed,
however, that the basic direction and size of the inspection-time effect remained
stable, with selected cards being inspected for reliably longer than rejected cards.
The existence of a largely unaltered inspection-time effect under a think-aloud
requirement runs counter to any notion of reactivity on normal task processing arising
from the need to produce a concurrent verbalisation. Moreover, the lack of reactivity
means that the verbal protocol evidence from Experiments 5 and 6 has been
substantiated: It would seem that concurrent verbal-protocol data arising in the
selection task can provide an accurate index of the content and structure of ongoing
thinking processes. In addition, it is important to note that the basic replication of the
inspection-time effect serves, once again, to demonstrate the robustness of the effect
under different instructional manipulations. The robustness of the effect seems to
provide further support for Evans' (e.g., 1996, 2006) heuristic-analytic theory of the
abstract selection task.
The eye-movement data also enabled an examination of a second issue, which
concerned the potential role of Level 1 versus Level 2 verbalisation processes during
protocol production with the selection task. In relation to this issue, it is noteworthy
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that inspection times for cards were generally slightly longer in duration (by a few
seconds) across all cards in Experiment 7 relative to cards in Experiments 1 to 4. This
intriguing observation seems to have two possible interpretations. The first is that
Level 2 verbalisation is involved in the selection task, which entails a re-coding
process taking place from visuo-spatial representations. This re-coding process would
require a brief amount of time to achieve, thereby adding some processing time to the
task. The fact that all of the cards are equally associated with an increase in inspection
times (compared with the earlier eye-tracking experiments reported) may actually fit
in with Johnson-Laird and Byrne's (2002) notion that all cards should be subjected to
some consideration in the selection task in order to check their status in relation to the
rule's truth or falsity. The trouble with taking the general increase in inspection times
for all cards as support for the mental model theory, however, is that the inspection-
time effect (i.e., longer consideration of selected versus rejected cards) seems itself to
be incompatible with the model theory, since the consideration of all cards should
break the observed link between longer inspection times and card selection. An
alternative explanation for the general increase inspection times for all cards in
Experiment 7 involves the suggestion that even a Level 1 verbalisation requirement
can slow down normal thinking. Although contrary to Ericsson and Simon's (e.g.,
1993) original proposals, there does appear to be a body of emerging evidence to
support this proposal (Anderson, 1985; Biggs, Rosman, & Sergenian, 1993; Erber &
Fiske, 1984).
Overall, then, Experiment 7 has demonstrated that engaging in the production of a
concurrent verbal protocol during performance with abstract versions of the selection
task does not produce any disruptive effect on the normal nature and organisation of
reasoning processes-at least as detected by eye-movement analysis. This can be seen
in as much as the inspection-time effect observed in Experiments 1 to 4 persists under
the verbalisation instruction. This lack of any apparent disruption to primary task
processing means that the verbal protocol evidence for the heuristic-analytic theory
that arose from Experiments 5 and 6 seems to be substantiated. The increase in
inspection times across all cards in Experiment 7 remains intriguing, although this
finding is, perhaps, most compatible with the view that a think-aloud requirement,
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even at the status of a Level 1 externalisation of verbally-heeded information--can
still slow down primary task processing. The more general issue of whether the
findings from Experiments 4 to 7 can be accommodated by selection-task theories
other than the heuristic-analytic account will be examined in detail in the next, and
final, chapter of this thesis.
3.5 General Discussion of Experiment 4, 5, 6 and 7.
Experiments 4 to 7 were motivated by Evans' (e.g., 1996, 2006) heuristic-analytic
account of matching-bias effects with abstract selection tasks. In the heuristic-analytic
account, Evans claims that preconscious, heuristic processes direct attention towards
cards that appear to be relevant (which end up being selected) and away from cards that
appear to be irrelevant (which end up being rejected). The theory goes on to propose
that where analytic reasoning is applied, it is assumed not to play a major role in
determining card selections, and instead just serves to rationalise decisions already
achieved on the basis of relevance. Experiments 4 to 7 were designed to investigate the
small magnitude of the inspection-time effect that occurred in the eye-movement
studies reported in Chapter 2, and also observed by Roberts and Newton (2001).
Experiment 4 aimed to assess whether the small inspection-time effect might be due to
rule re-inspection behaviour that was clearly taking place during Experiments 1 to 3.
That is, it was possible that rationalisation processes were occurring whilst participants
actually re-inspected the rule that was situated at the top of each sheet during task
presentation. If this was the case then an increased inspection-time effect between
selected and non-selected cards might be expected if the presentation of each rule was
separated from the presentation of the associated cards. Experiment 4 involved precisely
this adjustment to the standard method of selection-task presentation. Yet despite the
use of this rule-separation paradigm the small inspection-time effect persisted.
Once this possible methodological explanation for the small inspection-time effect had
been eliminated, concurrent verbal protocols were elicited in Experiments 5 and 6 in
order to explore what people think about when deliberating over cards. The verbal-
protocol method is a valuable way of providing a reliable index of participant's
attentional focus during task performance (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Evans, 1989) and
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although it may be less sensitive than methods such as eye-movement tracking, it is able
to provide an explicit trace of the content of people's thoughts whilst they engage with a
task. In relation to Experiments 5 and 6 it was assumed that if it was possible to obtain a
trace of the content of people's thoughts, then it should also be possible to gain a greater
understanding of why the difference in inspection times between selected and non-
selected cards seen in the eye-movement studies was so small in magnitude.
Experiment 5, then, used concurrent verbal protocol analysis and employed the standard
selection-task paradigm requiring only active, select decisions for cards that participants
thought needed to be turned over. The results provided support for the heuristic-analytic
theory, showing that participants referred reliably more often to facing and hidden sides
of cards that they ended up selecting compared with those that they ended up rejecting.
The results provide support for previous research using verbal protocol analysis with the
abstract selection task (Evans, 1995), as well as evidence for the role of secondary
matching biases dominating people's references to the hidden sides of the cards (Wason
& Evans, 1979). It is this latter finding that is of particular interest, as it suggests that
people's analytic processes may be supported by the rapid, secondary cueing of
matching information. This result, in fact, explains the minimal level of analytic _
processing on selected cards that arises in the inspection-time experiments reported in
Chapter 2. Essentially, if rationalisation processes are supported by the rapid, heuristic
cueing of 'relevant' values that might occur on the reverse sides of cards, then there is
no reason to expect such rationalisation processes to take very long at all.
In Experiment 6, a selection-task paradigm was utilised that involved an enforced
select/reject decision for all cards in order to assess what impact this decision
.»
requirement might have on the content of people's thinking. Experiment 3 in Chapter 2
has already demonstrated that matching bias and the inspection-times effects predicted
by the heuristic-analytic theory are able to survive the forced-decision paradigm.
However, the fact that a reduction in the magnitude of the inspection-effect was
observed in Experiment 3 suggests that requiring people to attend to all cards might also
have a small but detectable impact on the effect magnitudes for heuristic-analytic
predictions relating to references to facing sides of cards. This was indeed seen to be the
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case. All facing side predictions were supported, but there was some evidence of
reduction in the size of the observed effects. More importantly, however, in the case of
heuristic-analytic predictions pertaining to references to hidden sides of cards, we
expected reliable effects (as in Experiment 5), but with no particularly marked impact
on effect magnitudes. This was because the heuristic-analytic theory would argue that
people should not think about what values might be on the hidden sides of to-be-
rejected cards (since these are judged to be irrelevant), even if the task instructions
necessitate that people have to attend momentarily to the facing sides of such cards.
Again, all heuristic-analytic expectations gained support from the protocol-based data
obtained in Experiment 6, with reliable analytic-processing effects in evidence for
selected cards versus rejected cards, and less noticeable reductions in effect magnitudes
for the hidden-side predictions compared with the facing-side predictions.
Finally, Experiment 7 was carried out to assess the impact that producing verbal
protocols might have on the 'normal' reasoning processes that occur on the selection
task, as observed in Experiments 1 to 4. The experiment was a replication of
Experiment 6, although this time participants' eye-movements were recorded alongside
their verbal protocols. Combining these two methodologies produced a unique
opportunity to observe whether requesting participants to generate think-aloud accounts
as they tackle selection tasks modifies the way the tasks are carried out. If the eye-
movements are altered then it could put into question the use of the protocol method as
a reliable way in whi~h to investigate thought processes on the selection task, as the
evidence would suggest that the verbalisation requirement was having a reactive
influence on normal task processing. If, however, the eye-movements are unaltered,
then this is a good validation of the use of verbal protocols on the selection task and
means that the results observed in Experiments 5 and 6 here, as well as elsewhere in the
literature, are telling us something useful about the processes involved on the task.
Suffice to say that eye-movement-based inspection-time pattern arising in the results of
Experiment 7 remained unchanged as compared to Experiments 1 to 4, demonstrating
support for the heuristic-analytic predictions and, therefore, evidence that engaging in
thinking aloud whilst carrying out the selection task does not alter the natural mode of
thinking that is used.
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Overall, Experiments 4 to 7 have provided both eye-movement and protocol-based
evidence for the role of relevance effects influencing both heuristic and analytic
processing in abstract selection-task performance, as predicted by Evans' (e.g., 1996,
2006) heuristic-analytic theory. It is important, however, to consider whether other
contemporary theories of the selection task are able to accommodate the present set of
findings. It may well be that whilst these findings are congruent with the heuristic-
analytic theory that motivated the research, they may be similarly amenable to
interpretation by one or more other contemporary selection task theories. This
possibility will be assessed in the next, final chapter of the thesis.
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Chapter 4
General Discussion
4.1 Chapter Outline
This chapter will provide a general discussion of the experimental chapters. It will
begin with a brief summary of the findings of the thesis and then go on to consider
what these findings mean in relation to contemporary theories of reasoning with the
selection task. This discussion will include proposals concerning how existing
theories may need to be adapted in order to account for the effects reported in the
present series of experiments. The chapter will then report on methodological issues
arising in the course of the reported experiments that warrant further consideration,
and will, in particular, concentrate on the validity of the methods that the thesis has
employed, including the assumptions underpinning the methods used. Finally, the
chapter will tum towards a consideration of ways in which the methodologies
deployed in this thesis might profitably be applied in future research with both the
Wason selection task and with other reasoning paradigms in order to gain a deeper
understanding of the interplay between relevance and rationalisation processes in
reasoning tasks.
4.2 Summary of Findings
The present thesis had three main aims. The first was to the attempt to improve upon
previous mouse-tracking techniques that have been employed in the reasoning
literature with the Wason selection task (e.g., Evans, 1996; Roberts, 1998b) by instead
using eye-movement tracking as a more direct method for monitoring the moment-by-
moment transitions in the locus of participants' attentional focus during reasoning.
The second aim was to use the data deriving from the use the eye-tracking to establish
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the existence of an inspection-time effect (whereby selected cards are considered
longer than rejected ones). This effect has proved to be inconsistent in mouse-tracking
studies of the selection task (Evans, 1996; Roberts, 1998b; Roberts & Newton, 2001),
seemingly due to task-based artefacts that can arise through the use of mouse
pointing. Yet the existence of an inspection-time effect is critical for the viability of
one of the dominant theories of selection-task behaviour, that is, the heuristic-analytic
theory of Evans (e.g., 1984, 1989,2006; see also Evans & Over, 1996). The third aim
of the thesis was to utilise the verbal protocol method in order to investigate further
the magnitude of inspection-time effects produced by the eye-tracking experiments.
One particular benefit of adopting the verbal think-aloud technique in the present
research programme was that it allowed the technique to be used with far more
participants than have been assessed in previous selection-task experiments (e.g.,
Beattie & Baron, 1988; Evans, 1995).
Experiments 1 to 3 were eye-tracking experiments that set out to improve upon the
previous mouse-tracking methodology that exists in the literature on the selection
task. First, Evans' (1996) mouse-tracking experiment was replicated in Experiment 1
(with the slight change of using only abstract conditional materials along with the full
negations paradigm) exchanging the mouse-tracking method for the eye-tracking
method. Although Experiment 1 produced a highly reliable inspection-time effect, a
methodological problem was identified that may have influenced the results, giving
rise to artefactual support for the existence of an inspection-time effect. This artefact
had arisen from the request in Experiment 1 for participants to make active select
decisions only, with just a 'passive' reject response being required for non-selected
cards. The concern was that this active decision requirement for selected cards might
have led to inflated inspection times on such cards, thus either creating the inspection-
time effect in the first place or inflating a far weaker effect.
Experiments 2 and 3 set out to remove this task-format bias, first by separating out the
reasoning component of the task from the decision making section of the task (in
Experiment 2), and second by equalising the influence of any potential pointing bias
by utilising a forced-decision paradigm, whereby participants made a 'select/don't
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select' decision for all four cards. Both Experiments 2 and 3 again provided support
for the inspection-time effect, indicating that it was reliable over these methodological
changes aimed at removing all remaining task-format biases with the selection-task
paradigm. The robustness of the inspection-time effect across all three initial
experiments provided good support for the predictions of Evans' (e.g., 1996, 2006)
heuristic-analytic theory, from which the inspection-time predictions were themselves
derived. Thus the first two aims of the thesis were largely fulfilled through
Experiments 1 to 3.
Although Experiments 1 to 3 provided reliable evidence for the inspection-time effect,
a lingering issue needed further investigation. The magnitude of the effect that was
observed in the first three experiments was small. Indeed, participants spent very little
time inspecting cards-regardless of whether they ended up selecting them or not-
and the size of the inspection-time effect was only about one-third of a second in the
most unbiased experiment of all (Experiment 3). It was the need to examine the nature
and cause of this small inspection-time effect that motivated the experiments that
were conducted in the second half of this thesis.
Possible explanations of the small inspection-time effect could be that either: (1) the
rationalisation processes that arise in the selection task are extremely quick and are
driven by the rapid, heuristic cueing of information that may appear on the reverse
sides of cards; or (2) that rationalisation processes on the task occur relatively slowly
but at a point when participants are re-inspecting the rule as they were carrying out
the task. The latter proposal, then, is that the inspection times that might have
accumulated on to-be-selected 'cards were instead being distributed to other parts of
the task-specifically the presented rule. Experiment 4 set out to check this
methodological explanation of apparently rapid rationalisation processes by
separating out the rule presentation from the card presentation in order to prevent
participants thinking about card selections when they were inspecting the rule. If the
small size of the inspection-time effect remained under this manipulation then this
would indicate extremely quick rationalisation processes. On the other hand, if the
size of the inspection-time effect was seen to increase in this rule-separation
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paradigm, then this would support a methodological explanation for the small
inspection-time effects seen in Experiments 1 to 3. As it transpired, the small
inspection-time effect persisted in Experiment 4, indicating that rationalisation
processes must indeed be extremely quick, and presumably be guided by rapid
heuristic processing of values on the reverse sides of cards.
Experiments 5 and 6 aimed to investigate the precise nature of the rationalisation
processes observed in the previous experiments. A think-aloud reporting technique
was utilised as a different process-tracing method to eye-tracking that would allow
examination of the content of processes occurring on the selection task. Experiment 5
used the standard, abstract selection task requiring only active 'select' decision for to-
be-selected cards. Participants were additionally asked to think aloud concurrently
with their task performance. Analysis of the resulting verbal protocols revealed that
participants referred reliably more often to facing and hidden sides of cards that they
ended up selecting compared with those that they ended up rejecting. This finding
provides converging evidence to the eye-tracking data for the role of heuristic and
analytic processes in the selection task, whereby people focus their attentional
processing on to-be-selected cards. The data also produced evidence for the role of
secondary matching biases in the selection task (Wason and Evans, 1975), whereby
people's references to the hidden sides of the cards are dominated by the
consideration of possible 'matching' values that may appear there. This latter finding
suggests that people's analytic processes may be supported by the rapid, secondary
cueing of matching information on hidden card-sides.
Experiment 6 adopted the same procedure except that a forced-decision paradigm was
employed in order to investigate the impact of enforced select/reject decision making
for all cards on the content of people's thinking. As with the slight reduction of the
inspection-time effect observed in Experiment 3, it was predicted that the same might
occur within this paradigm for references to facing sides of cards. This was indeed
found to be the case, that is, although all predictions were supported, there was
evidence for a reduction of the size of the effect relating to references to facings sides
of selected versus rejected cards. In relation to the predictions for the hidden sides of
cards, however, it was expected that this effect size would remain unchanged, as
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according to the heuristic-analytic predictions that were being tested, people should
not think about the hidden values of to-be-rejected cards. This prediction was also
supported.
Finally, Experiment 7 used the eye-tracking methodology alongside a think-aloud
verbalisation requirement to ensure that the verbal protocol method was not
responsible for any disruption to the normal process of reasoning on the selection
task. If the eye-movement-based inspection-time effect remained despite the think-
aloud instruction then this gives some reassurance that no such disruption to normal
processing had occurred. The persistence of the inspection time effect in Experiment 7
suggested that this was indeed the case. The slight increase in the inspection times for
all cards in this experiment can be accounted for by research in the literature that
suggests that Level I verbalisation does, in fact, slow down normal thinking a little.
One final finding to note is that in all experiments, card selection frequencies
indicated not only the expected preference for TA cards over FA ones, but also a
small preference for TC cards over FC ones. This finding suggests that there is some
evidence for a verification bias in these experiments, as well as the standard matching
bias response. Evidence of verification bias in selection tasks has been inconsistent in
the literature. for example, Manktelow and Evans (1979) found no overall preference
between TC and FC cards over a number of experiments, whereas the preference has
been reported by other authors such as Reich and Ruth (1982) and Krauth (1982). It is
not clear why verification bias is present consistently throughout the data reported in
this thesis. One possibility is that verification bias is indicative of a superficial mode
of responding on the task that works in conjunction with matching bias. This might
arise because some participants in the present experiments were (for some reason)
simply not engaging fully with the task instructions, Such a lack of engagement could
promote very superficial responding - albeit responding that is sensitive to the
presence of negations within rules (cf. Evans, 1995). For example, when presented
with the rule 'If there is not all N 011 one side of the card then there is not an 8 on the
other side of the card' and the choice of cards are N, T, 1, 8, the normal matching
response would be Nand 8, but participants may be choosing T and 1 via a superficial
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response-bias mechanism that is attentive to negations (see Oaksford, 2002a, for
related ideas). This is clearly an interesting possibility that would be worthy of further
research.
In summary, all of the inspection-time and card-reference predictions were upheld
across the seven reported experiments that involved a range of different task-format
manipulations as well as the deployment of two very different process-tracing
methodologies. It is now important to consider the findings of the experiments in
more depth in relation to the theories of the Wason selection task discussed earlier in
the thesis.
4.3 Findings in Relation to Theories of Reasoning
If we put aside for the moment the origin of the predictions of the inspection-time
paradigm, the findings of the thesis were essentially: (1) a successful replication of the
inspection-time effect in the selection tasks with eye-movements, in that people look
longer at the cards they end up selecting than the ones they end up rejecting; (2) that
the difference between the inspection times for selected versus rejected cards is small;
and (3) that people refer more often to the facing and hidden sides of the cards they
end up selecting than the ones they end up rejecting, and refer more to hidden
matching values than hidden non-matching values. In order to explain these findings
we need to apply the theories of reasoning that have been under discussion throughout
the thesis.
4.3.1 The heuristic-analytic theory
The findings of the experiments reported in the thesis offer clear and strong support
for the heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning as proposed by Evans (e.g., 1984, 1989,
2006; Evans & Over, 1996). Indeed, the inspection-time predictions that have been
tested derived originally from this theory. The theory accounts for card selections on
the Wason selection task by suggesting that people's attention is directed by
preconscious, heuristic processes (i.e., the 'matching heuristic' and the 'ifheuristic')
that result in attention to cards that appear relevant and away from cards that seem
irrelevant. Relevant cards get selected whilst irrelevant cards are rejected. In
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particular, and shown consistently in the eye-tracking experiments presented in the
thesis, inspection times are longer for the selected matching and mismatching cards
over rejected ones. This is because relevance effects extend beyond just the matching
cards in determining card selections, since the if-heuristic encourages selection of the
TA card across all four rules types. This means that the matching TA cards will be
selected on two of the rules and the mismatching TA cards win be selected on the
other two rules. This finding is consistent with the heuristic-analytic theory as card
selections are deriving from judgements of relevance.
Conscious and rational processes that occur on the task only serve to rationalise card
decisions that have already been made on the basis of relevance. As stated above, this
proposal is clear in the inspection-time effect that is established across all the eye-
tracking experiments. Indeed, it is the rationalisation process that is responsible for
the inspection-time effect, as rationalisation is deployed to justify only select
decisions and not reject decisions.
The verbal-protocols experiments give further support for the role of analytic
rationalisation processes on the selection task, as they show that people also make
more spoken references to the facing and hidden sides of the cards they end up
selecting. The support comes especially from the finding regarding references to the
hidden sides of the cards. In particular we can see that although the hidden sides of the
cards are considered, this does not have any effect on card selections (if it did we
would expect the link between references to the hidden sides of the cards and the card
selections to be severed; that is, people might spend time referring to a card but end
up rejecting it). Indeed, instead of playing a role in determining card choices, thinking
about the other side of the card instead seems to confirm card selections-selections
already made on the basis of relevance.
The verbal protocol experiments provide even more evidence for the heuristic-analytic
account if we consider what it is people are actually thinking about when they consider
the reverse sides of the cards. They are clearly not thinking about the mismatching
values on hidden sides, and, according to the heuristic-analytic account, this is because
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people do not see the mismatching cards as relevant to the decision-making process.
What we have seen in the protocols in relation to references to the hidden sides of the
cards is that such references are dominated by the mention of matching possibilities.
This secondary matching bias that appears to be taking place serves to cue the analytic
processes into a justification of selecting those particular cards (see also Wason &
Evans, 1975). The secondary matching bias is also an explanation for the small
inspection-time effect that persists throughout the experiments. We have explained
this small effect as being due to a rapid rationalisation process that would, indeed, be
very quick if people's justifications are determined by the heuristic cueing of relevant
(i.e., matching) values that could appear on the reverse sides of cards.
As can be seen here, then, as well as in earlier discussions, the heuristic-analytic
account of selection-task performance has been supported by the use of eye-tracking
and verbal-protocol methodologies, and, as such, provides a good account of reasoning
processes on the task. Indeed, Evans' (e.g., 2003, 2006) more recent proposals of his
hypothetical thinking theory and extension of the heuristic-analytic theory is now
nearing an almost step-by-step model of the interplay between heuristic and analytic
processes in reasoning. This is particularly the case with Evans' (2006) recent
introduction of the three principles of hypothetical thinking into his heuristic-analytic
theorising, that is, the singularity principle (people construct only one mental model at
a time in which to represent a hypothetical situation), the relevance principle (people
consider the model which is the most relevant in the context) and the satisficing
principle (people evaluate models according to their current goals and accept models
that appear to be satisfactory). The satisficing principle provides an especially good
account of why the analytic system typically fails to override heuristically-cued
choices in the selection task: Most people's analytic systems will simply satisfice
(accepting heuristically-cued choices) whenever either a verification or a falsification
justification for selecting a card can be found (depending on the matching value on the
hidden side of the card). In practice, this means that heuristically-cued choices on the
selection task will almost invariably be accepted.
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Essentially, then, Evans (2006) is arguing that heuristic processes bias and shape
analytic reasoning by cueing default mental models that lead to default decisions. In
these more recent proposals, Evans suggests that the intervention of analytic
processing mayor may not occur to inhibit this default responding by revision or
replacement of the models. The sort of situation that analytic intervention will occur in
is where the reasoner has very high cognitive ability (i.e., high working memory
capacity), where people are instructed to engage in logical reasoning, or where there is
more time for people to engage in reflective thinking.
4.3.2 The information gain theory
The second theory to consider is Oaksford and Chater's (e.g., 1994, 1996, 2003)
information gain account. As noted in Chapter 1, the information gain theory has a
compelling track record in terms of its capacity to explain many aspects of selection-
task performance (including the influence of probabilistic manipulations) across a
variety of task variants. According to the theory, information gain provides a formal
measure of 'relevance' (see Oaksford & Chater, 1995), and, therefore, information
gain appears to predict the same basic pattern of matching-card selections as envisaged
by the heuristic-analytic theory.
In relation to the findings in this thesis, the theory has mixed applicability. With
regards to both the inspection-time paradigm and the verbal-protocol paradigm, the
information gain theory appears at first sight to predict identical inspection times or
facing side references across all cards since reasoners need to undertake expected
information gain computations on each card to determine its potential support for the
rule. This clearly is not supported by the findings of this thesis. On closer analysis,
however, information gain theory may well be able to provide an alternative account
of the findings that is distinct from Evans' (e.g., 1984) emphasis on the linguistic basis
of matching effects (I am grateful to Oaksford, personal communication, for alerting
me to this). So, for example, relevance assessments determined on-line by participants
via information-gain calculations could lead to more references to matching versus
mismatching values on facing sides, essentially because people will end up showing a
greater level of interest in the relevant cards (i.e., the 'rare' items) than the irrelevant
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ones-which would also contribute to an inspection-time effect. In a similar way,
information gain theory would also predict that in justifying their card selections
participants would show secondary matching because for all rules they are searching
for the rare cases (which are always the matching antecedent and matching
consequent combination).
Overall, then, the information gain model may well be able to capture the relevance
effects that we have demonstrated in relation to references to both facing and hidden
card sides, as well as the basic inspection-time effect established through eye-
movement tracking. This theory, moreover, would describe secondary matching
effects arising in references to hidden sides of cards as analytic response (Oaksford,
personal communication). This account also ties in selection-task behaviour to rational
explanations of biases in judgements relating to 2 x 2 contingency tables (e.g.,
Anderson & Sheu, 1995; Over & Green, 2001).
One potential weakness with the information gain account as it is currently
formulated, however, is that it does not provide a full-blown algorithmic level theory
specifying the specific nature, organisation and time-course of the processing steps
underpinning card selections (i.e., it is formulated at the computational level of what is
being computed). Indeed, to derive an account of both our inspection-time data and the
verbal-protocol data we have had to go quite some way beyond the assumptions of the
theory as currently explicated in published research. As Oaksford (personal
communication) has pointed out, however, most current models of the selection task
(and not just the information gain theory) are also highly underspecified in terms of
the detailed operation sequences underlying reasoning. with theories simply tending to
refer to a loose binary processing distinction (e.g., heuristic then analytic; initial
representation then fleshing out). Indeed. the information gain model seems to be at
least as capable as some other theories of affording an understanding of algorithmic
level issues in the abstract selection task-as has been outlined above. Nonetheless. it
would be appealing to see the information gain theory developed further at an
algorithmic level; such developments are apparently underway (e.g., Oaksford,
2002b). Their fruition is certainly something to be looked forward to.
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4.3.3 The mental model theory
The final theory to consider is the most recent mental models account of the selection
task (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). In terms of the inspection time effects, it would
seem that mental model theory would predict equivalent inspection times for all cards.
This is because reasoners attempt to integrate each card with their model of the
conditional to determine its impact on the rule's truth or falsity. The observed
inspection-time difference between selected and rejected cards does not, therefore,
emerge directly from mental model theory as currently stated. One way in which the
theory could be reconciled with the inspection-time effect is to propose that cards that
can be integrated with existing models are subjected to increased processing-perhaps
whilst the logical consequences of such integration are determined-relative to cards
that cannot be integrated with existing models.
A remaining difficulty for mental model theory, however, is to account for verbal-
protocol evidence that people think primarily about matching values on hidden card
sides rather than reflecting on potential falsifying and verifying values. This apparent
asymmetry in what values people consider as being present on the reverse sides of
cards does not readily seem to emerge from the mental models assumption that people
assess cards in terms of how their hidden values might impact on the truth or falsity of
the presented rule. It may well be that mental models theorists could develop a viable
account for such secondary matching effects, but it remains the case that these effects
were directly predicted by the heuristic-analytic theory.
It is also finally worth noting here that the secondary matching evidence uncovered
with the verbal protocols are also a challenge for Feeney and Handley's (e.g., 2000)
claims to have detected a deductive component in abstract variants of the selection
task-a conclusion that they base on their finding that participants consider the hidden
sides of presented cards. However, if when considering such hidden values most
people are simply engaging in a secondary matching process, then this would seem to
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be evidence against deduction being a key component of reasoning in the selection
task. The limited support for mental models predictions deriving from evidence for
secondary-matching effects also calls into question Evans' past proposals (e.g., Evans
& Over, 1996, p. 136) that mental modelling may supply the analytic component to
the heuristic-analytic theory, which has always been less well specified than the
heuristic component in this account. On balance, it would seem that either Evans'
heuristic-analytic account (minus a mental-models analytic stage) or Oaksford and
Chater's information gain theory are most readily able to explain the full breadth of
protocol-based evidence that we have uncovered for relevance effects and
rationalisation processes in the selection task.
In summary, Evans' (2006) recent extension of the heuristic-analytic theory, which
now links to three principles of hypothetical thinking, arguably takes the heuristic-
analytic account one step closer toward a detailed process-model of the indicative
selection task than either mental models theory or information gain theory. Moreover,
the processing steps that the heuristic-analytic theory specifies seem currently to
provide the most convincing account of the small but reliable inspection-time effect
demonstrated in the eye-tracking experiments and the secondary matching bias effects
uncovered in the verbal protocol experiments reported in this thesis. If the information
gain theory evolves to produce an algorithmic level theory then it may well end up
having the edge on the heuristic-analytic account, because of its impressive ability to
explain a wide range of probabilistic influences on card-selection patterns.
4.4 Methodological Issues
Now that the findings of the thesis have been considered in relation to theories of
reasoning. methodological weaknesses or strengths with the reported experiments can
be examined. All of the experiments in the thesis involve techniques and paradigms
that have considerable potential to be reactive to methodological issues that may
induce confounds and biases in the resulting data. However. the research undertaken
has been very alert to such biasing possibilities at every step of the way. such that it is
quite hard to identify any remaining task-based or technique-based factors that I!light
be having any biasing effect on the results as they stand.
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Two main methodological issues were dealt with over the course of the experiments.
Within the first eye-tracking experiment (Experiment 1), a potentially major bias was
identified, which was the requirement in the standard abstract selection task for only
active decisions to be registered for card selections. This factor has a potentially large
implication for the inspection-time effect: At best any cards that are selected might
cause an inflated inspection-time effect; at worst any selected cards could have caused
the inspection-time effect to occur in the first place. Experiments 2 and 3 were able to
combat this problem, first by removing the pointing time for the selection decision (in
Experiment 2), and second, by equalising the active-decision time across all four cards
(in Experiment 3). With these safeguards in place a reliable inspection-time effect was
still observed. Experiment 4 aimed to ensure that the small magnitude of the
inspection-time effect was not due to participants thinking about cards for selection
whilst engaging in re-reading of the rule. This experiment removed the rule
presentation from the card presentation in order to overcome this potential problem. It
turned out that the small inspection-time effect remained, despite these steps being
taken, and the thesis went on to explore the processes involved in selection task
performance using verbal protocols. However, this final methodological check in
Experiment 4 ensured that all apparent methodological explanations of the inspection-
time effect had been tested and rejected.
Beyond these paradigm-specific methodological concerns, however, there are some
more wide-reaching methodological issues that remain which relate to the basic
assumptions underpinning the use of eye-movement tracking and think-aloud methods
in reasoning research. The justification for the use of these methods was forwarded
earlier in the thesis, but will be discussed again here in the light of the findings as a
whole. The eye-tracking methodology was utilised as it was believed that it provided a
more direct measure of on-line attentional processing than the mouse-tracking method
upon which the thesis was originally based. The eye-tracking methodology has been
used extensively in a number of different information processing tasks in psychology
in order to explore the underlying cognitive processes that are occurring, with the
basic idea being that eye-movements reflect these moment-to-moment cognitive
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processes. Although we often look at something in our environment when we attend to
it, it is of course possible to attend to an item without looking at it, and research has
shown that the relationship between gaze direction and attention will depend on the
nature of the task and its demands on the attentional 'spotlight' (Posner, 1980). If the
stimuli are complex it will be more effective to move the eyes instead of one's
attention (He & Kowler, 1992), and although the locus of attention and eye location
can be separated in simple discrimination tasks (see Posner, 1980), it is generally
agreed that in more complex information processing task such as reading, the link
between the two is actually quite tight.
The eye-movement methodology has been used extensively in reading research where
researchers have been interested in the nature of eye-movements such as saccades
(continual ballistic movements made by the eyes), fixations (moments when the eyes
remain relatively still for about 200-300 ms) and pursuit movements (when one's eyes
follow a moving target); see Rayner (1998) for a review. This research deals mainly
with what information (if any) is being processed across these different categories of
eye movement. For the purpose of the present thesis, however, the interest in relation
to eye-movements was exclusively concerned with gaze duration, that is, where a
person spends their time looking whilst tackling a particular task. Just and Carpenter
(1976) found that on tasks such as mental rotation, sentence verification and
quantitative comparison, the time that people spent gazing at a figure reflected the
time it took to encode and operate upon that figure. They suggested two reasons why
gaze duration may continue. They propose that either fixation continues on a figure
despite the relevant information having been already encoded, because the processor is
busy, and so there is no need to move the eyes elsewhere, or there is an active
instruction to the eye to remain where it is because saccadic movement initiates new
encoding which the processor cannot deal with until it has finished dealing with
previous information that has been encoded. Either way, Just and Carpenter argue that
duration of gaze provides a very good measure of time spent processing stimuli.
Moving on to a consideration of the assumptions associated with the verbal-protocol
method, we note that the verbalisation technique adopted for this thesis required
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participants to give think aloud accounts of their reasoning as they worked through the
selection tasks presented to them. According to Ericsson and Simon (1993), this
particular method should appease the critics of the use of verbal protocol methods in
cognitive research who claim that verbally-based thoughts do not necessarily correlate
with observable behaviour. Ericsson and Simon suggest that it is only the use of
concurrent think-aloud reports that allows researchers to gain access to the sequential
states of thought that each contain an end-product of cognitive processing. As these
products are stable it is possible to produce a verbalisation of them, and these
verbalisations are largely unchanged by this verbal-production process itself. There is
a good array of evidence to support this idea (see Ericsson & Simon, 1993, for a
review).
In summary, both eye-tracking and think-aloud techniques are well-respected methods
for the collection of process-tracing data, and there is a large body of research that.
gives us confidence in the use of these methods within the context of this thesis. These
methodologies, when used in combination, have provided a unique opportunity for a
detailed investigation into relevance and rationalisation processes in the Wason
selection task. Moreover, the datasets deriving from the deployment of these distinct
methods appear to converge to provide a coherent set of findings that allow for
meaningful theoretical interpretations of results in terms of current reasoning theories.
4.5 Future Directions
The findings of the thesis have been discussed, and it is now important to tum to the
future directions of this work. It is particularly interesting to consider possible
applications of the methods used here in order to understand more fully the role of
relevance and rationalisation in reasoning. To this end, we note that eye-tracking
methodology and verbal-protocol techniques could be applied to both different
versions of the selection task as well as to a variety of other different reasoning tasks
beyond the selection task. We will now consider some of these ideas in more detail.
The first obvious application of the methodologies used here would be to thematic
variants of the selection task. When Evans (1996) ran his pioneering mouse-tracking
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experiments he uncovered an inspection-time effect for a series of thematic (including
deontic) selection tasks. indicating that relevance plays a strong role in reasoning that
can cut across both abstract and thematic problem contents. On thematic versions of
the selection task matching bias is usually suppressed and these versions can give rise
to the facilitation of the logically correct card-selection responses of p and not-q. The
heuristic-analytic account would argue that on these tasks. facilitation occurs due to
the presence of alternative cues to relevance. such as pragmatic cues instead of the
linguistic cues that operate on the indicative version. Such pragmatic cues seem to
operate providing that there is: (1) familiarity with the rule (or at least that the
rationale of the rule for guiding behaviour is clear); and (2) some minimal context to
the rule (removal of minimal content has been shown to have detrimental effects on
facilitation; see Evans & Pollard. 1987).
On the basis of the findings of this thesis and those reported by Evans (1996). it is
predicted that the application of the eye-movement and verbal protocol methodologies
to thematic versions of the selection task would produce very similar findings relating
to the processing times for selected versus rejected cards as well as to the frequency of
references to the facing and hidden sides of such cards. Such a generalisation of the
effects reported in the thesis would be important as it would consolidate the findings
of this thesis and give further support to the heuristic-analytic account. In addition. this
generalisation might also help to arbitrate between the heuristic-analytic account and
other reasoning theories such as the information gain account.
A further use for the eye-tracking methodology with the selection-task paradigm
would be to deploy it in studies using a rapid-response version of the selection task. as
developed by Roberts and Newton (2001). In their Experiment 2, Roberts and Newton
presented participants with different versions of the selection task (both abstract and
thematic). The free time group were presented with a blanked-out preamble and rule as
well as blanked-out cards. Viewing each part of the task involved holding the mouse
pointer over one of these areas, and as this was done the card became visible and card
inspection times were calculated. Participants had to make a decision about all four
cards but could view each of the cards as many times as they liked. The rapid response
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group had a similar set up, being only able to view one card at a time, or the preamble
and the rule. However, participants had only one second to view each card and a
further second to make their decision about that card. The prediction was that if
analytic processing was having no effect on card selections-which were being driven
purely by heuristic processes-then there should be no difference in the selections
between the free time and the rapid response groups. The findings were broadly in line
with this prediction, although the card-selection patterns did actually show a slight
increase in consequent-matching decisions for the rapid response task. The latter
finding suggests that analytic processes for some participants in the free time group
may well have been functional in overturning heuristic cueing of matching consequent
cards. For the purpose of the present discussion, however, it is notable that Roberts
and Newton did not collect any response times for the rapid response task (presumably
because the time-limitations associated with the task were so restrictive). But if a more
standard presentation format was adopted for the selection task then eye-movement
tracking could reveal interesting aspects of on-line processing even under rapid
response instructions-where, say, participants had just 10 s to complete the whole
task. Based on Roberts and Newton's results, it would be predicted that a time
restriction would allow no opportunity for rationalisation to occur, which would result
in no inspection-time effect, but the same standard pattern of matching card selections
should persist because of the dominance of heuristic processes.
An additional, interesting application of the combined deployment of eye-tracking and
verbal-protocol methodologies would be in relation to the experimental manipulations
presented by Feeney and Handley (2000). They successfully obtained q card
suppression on a version of the selection task that involved the presentation of two
conditional rules that contained alternative antecedents to one another. They claim that
when using this rule manipulation people are able to recognise that on the back of the
q card there may be a p case or a not-p case, and this then leads them to infer that the q
card actually has no bearing on the truth or falsity of the rule. Feeney and Handley
suggest that this effect could only arise if people are able to consider explicitly the
reverse sides of the cards. If this were the case, then using the inspection-time
paradigm with this manipulation would lead to the prediction of an increase in the time
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that participants spend looking at the q card-but with the subsequent rejection of this
card. This would break the link between increased card inspection and card selection
such that no inspection-time effect would be uncovered. Essentially, then, it may be
that the very nature of this version of the selection task-that is, the extra antecedent
in the second conditional rule-is causing other cards to appear relevant, and so the
pattern of selections is altered. The claim by Feeney and Handley that people are
considering what is on the back of the q card, could clearly be investigated further
with the application of the verbal-protocol method. The application of both eye-
tracking and verbal protocol analysis to the Feeney and Handley paradigm would
allow some of these issues regarding the presence of deductive reasoning versus the
dominance of rationalisation and relevance to be clarified more fully.
Although there are many other potential applications of the eye-tracking and verbal-
protocol methodologies to the selection task, the last one that will be considered here
is in relation to probabilistic manipulations on the selection task, in particular to
deontic versions of the task (e.g., Manktelow & Over, 1991). One such study by
Manktelow, Sutherland, and Over (1995), used an enlarged-array selection task to
investigate the role of probabilistic factors in reasoning with conditional obligations.
This study is of interest because it added probabilistic information (information that
causes items to appear more relevant) to both antecedent and consequent items in the
Cheng and Holyoak (1985) immigration task, where the rule specifies that 'If a
passenger's form says ENTERING on one side then the other side must include
cholera amongst the list of diseases' (see Chapter 1). Manktelow et al.'s manipulation
increased the number of cards used in the task from four, in the original version, to 20.
Six of these were ENTERING (p) cards, four said TRANSIT (not-p), five included
cholera among a list of diseases (q) and five did not include cholera among a list of
diseases (not-q). On the p and not-p cards, probabilistic information about the
passenger's country of origin was inserted, that is, on half the cards a tropical country
was inserted (e.g., Thailand, where cholera is present), and on the other half a
European country was inserted (e.g., Denmark, where cholera is not present).
Participants were, therefore, presented with extra relevant information about those
passengers that present a higher risk.
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Manktelow et al. (1995) predicted that the p and not-q cards would be the most
frequently selected, but that participants would select more of the cards that indicated
countries of high infection probability and the specified disease, compared with cards
for travellers from areas with a lower probability of infection. The results showed that
the p cards were indeed affected by probability information, in that there was a
suppression of p cards if they had a European country on them. Manktelow et aI.
propose that card selections on this task are being mediated by differing subjective
expectations of low-probability and high-probability items, in particular, low-
probability items are deemed to be of less value than high-probability ones. Within the
eye-movement based inspection-time paradigm this finding could be explored further.
It would be interesting, for example, to determine whether people spend time looking
equally across all p cards, or whether they spend more time looking at the p cards that
hold more 'utility' or appear more 'relevant'. Indeed, it would be possible to undertake
a detailed inspection-time analysis that was specifically focused on just the p cases to
determine if there were longer looking times at selected p cards than rejected p cards.
Finally, we note that relevance effects are reported widely elsewhere in the literature
on conditional reasoning, particularly on truth-table tasks. One type of relevance effect
can be seen in studies of both truth-table evaluation tasks (e.g., Johnson-Laird &
Tagart, 1969) and truth-table construction tasks (e.g., Evans, 1972) that show that
participants judge false antecedent cards to be 'irrelevant'. A second type of relevance
effect in truth-table tasks is matching bias; indeed it was the truth-table construction
task where matching bias was first discovered (Evans, 1972), as demonstrated by the
finding that people are more likely to construct a case that matches either or both
components of the conditional. These relevance effects, as we know, are also
demonstrated in the selection task.
Essentially, then, the truth-table task and the selection task both provide evidence for
two different sources of relevance, that is: (1) cases appear more relevant when the
antecedent condition is fulfilled, and (2) cases appear more relevant when their
features match those named in the conditional (Evans & Over, 1996). The interesting
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difference between matching bias on the truth-table task and matching bias on the
selection task is that when matching bias is eliminated on both tasks (e.g., Evans,
1983; Evans, Clibbens, & Rood, 1996), there is an increase in logical responding on
the truth-table task but not on the selection task. Evans proposes that this is because
the truth-table task elicits analytical as well as heuristic processes, whereas, as we have
seen, analytic processes on the selection task do nothing other than to rationalise card
selections. Such differences between truth-table tasks and selection tasks could readily
be investigated further with the use of both eye-tracking and verbal-protocol methods.
In summary, there are a number of predictions arising from the heuristic-analytic
theory of thematic and probabilistic selection tasks as well as truth-table tasks that
could profitably be examined using eye-movement inspection-time measures as well
as verbal-protocol assessments of the content of people's thought processes. All of
these predictions are easily testable. It is possible that the findings from such
experiments would, in particular, add to the growing experimental evidence for the
presence of relevance and rationalisation processes in the selection task. Such
evidence could, itself, give increased support for the heuristic-analytic theory of
reasoning, and thereby make an important, further contribution to current debates
concerning the nature of human reasoning process.
4.6 Summary statement
The experiments presented in this thesis have demonstrated that valuable data can be
collected from a combination of different process-tracing methods, such as eye-
movement tracking and think-aloud protocol analysis. Such data have allowed for an
investigation of the abstract Wason selection task that goes well beyond simple card-
selection patterns, instead enabling the processes behind these selections to be
examined in detail. The data have also helped to inform an understanding of different
theories of reasoning, and suggest that the heuristic-analytic account (e.g., Evans,
1996, 2006) may currently be the leading theory of selection-task performance, as it is
the only theory that is sufficiently well-specified to be able to account readily for the
full set of process-oriented findings uncovered in the present research programme.
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